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Explaining the Corporate Demand for Risk Management: 
Financial and Economic Views 
Abstract 
The purpose of this thesis is to review a number of academic perspectives on the 
practice of risk management in primarily widely-held (i. e. quoted) firms. In particular 
the currently dominant modern finance approach is criticised on the grounds that it 
offers an overly narrow view of corporate risk management behaviour. The core of the 
modern finance approach is that risk management is said to exist as a means to 
alleviate the adverse impact of various financial and capital market based agency and 
transactions costs that prevent the firm's stakeholders from achieving a Pareto 
efficient distribution of risk amongst themselves. However, in what follows it is 
argued that the presence of such agency or transactions costs do not provide a 
complete rationale for corporate risk management. Indeed fruitful research is already 
being done in the areas of organisational behaviour, sociology and psychology. Yet, 
what remains to be fully explored is the short run economic impact of risk 
management on a firm. In view of this a new economic framework for risk 
management is proposed based on the twin economic concepts of risk related "pure 
penalties" (which represent an unambiguous cost to a firm) and "technological non- 
linearities" (which can affect the structure of a fine's revenue, cost and production 
functions). Both of these phenomena can have a significant effect on the expected 
profits of a firm. Moreover, it is demonstrated that there are numerous scenarios in 
which risk management may be used by an expected profit maximising firm. 
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Chapter 1: 
Introduction 
1. The Role and Development of Risk Management 
Risk is a consequence of life itself. In fact both individuals and firms have been 
informally coping with risk for thousands of years'. Yet, despite the prevalence of risk 
in society academic interest in the area of corporate risk management has only begun 
quite recently. In fact the "birth" of the discipline can largely be traced back to only 
the late 1950's and early 1960's, since it was not until this time that a formal definition 
of corporate risk management was developed or indeed widely accepted (Snider 1991, 
Williams et al 1995). The crux of this early definition was risk management's role as 
an insurance buying function. As such the main province of risk management was 
seen to be "pure risk" avoidance, the idea being that it should help to identify and then 
eliminate (or at least substantially reduce) a firm's exposure to the financial impact of 
insurable pure risks (such as the risks of fire, theft, employee injury or legal liability 
claims). Pure risks were defined as risks that could only depress the profitability of a 
firm (see Chapter 2, section 2). Moreover, pure risks were typically seen as being non- 
business risks (e. g. Carter & Crockford 1974, Mehr & Hedges 1974) in that they were 
more an unfortunate by-product of a firm's manufacture of goods and services rather 
than an integral part of the production process. 
Contemporary (1980's-90's) research into corporate risk management has moved 
along away from emphasising the importance of insurance buying and pure risk 
avoidance. In fact there can almost be said to have been an explosion in the various 
different types of role that have been attached to risk management (see Chapter 2). 
This explosion has, however, developed out of two key insights. The first is that risk 
management should be a holistic function (Shapiro & Titman 1985, Klouran 1992, 
One of the earliest recorded examples of risk management is the marine insurance 
arrangements that were drawn up by Phoenician traders around 3000 
Haimes 1992, Williams et al 1995), that addresses not just insurable pure risks but 
also all the many other types of risk that a firm can face (such as financial risks, 
political risks, or business risks like fluctuations in consumer demand or cost changes 
etc. ). The second is that risk management should, like any other business discipline, 
aim to meet the global objectives of the firm (e. g. Shapiro & Titman 1985, Doherty 
1985, Kloman 1992, Williams et al 1995)2. The view being that in order to be 
successful risk management must beco e an increasingly integrated, if not central, 
part of the business activities of a firm. 
I 
Yet, although many contemporary writers are united in their belief in the widespread 
scope and need for corporate risk management the discipline is far from "mature" 
(Williams et al 1995, p22). For example, the significance attached to the specific 
duties and functions that can be carried out by risk managers (such as risk 
identification and measurement, risk control and risk financing) varies considerably, 
amongst both academics and practitioners. In addition, the many and various attempts 
to explain why firms actually invest in risk management have been on something of 
an ad hoc basis3. Thus it would seem that the discipline of risk management is one 
that is still evolving and at the moment this process would appear to be quite slow. 
What the subject lacks is a coherent framework from which to understand the risk 
management decisions of firms. 
2 For example Williams et al (1995) define risk management as: "a general management 
function that seeks to identify, assess, and address the causes and effects of uncertainty and 
risk on an organisation. ". They then go onto say that "[t]he purpose of risk management is to 
enable an organisation to progress toward its goals and objectives in the most direct, efficient, 
and effective path. ". 
3 Hood et al (1992) call this the "Risk Archipelago" (see also Hood & Jones 1996, p3-6). 
2. Rationale of Thesis 
As stated in section 1 above corporate risk management is still quite an immature 
discipline. This immaturity can perhaps be best illustrated by the subject's 
preoccupation with two rather fundamental questions (Shapiro & Titman 1985): 
(i) To what extent does a firm need to manage its exposure to risk? 
(ii) Given that risk management is necessary, how should a firm go about 
managing its exposure to risk? 
In recent years these questions have given rise to numerous different insights (see 
Chapter 2), however, most of them share a common ancestry 
- 
modem finance theory. 
The basic argument is that if financial/capital markets were perfect firms would not 
need risk management. In such an environment stakeholders would hold (without 
cost) fully diversified asset portfolios within which they can diversify away the effects 
of most risks. Risk management is therefore only assumed to be of value when 
circumstances conspire to make the markets in which stakeholders trade less than 
perfect. Of course in the real world numerous such market imperfections exist 
- 
from 
the dead-weight losses that can be associated with portfolio management, bankruptcy 
and taxation, to the problems of incomplete and asymmetric information. It is these 
imperfections that are then used to explain both why and how firms invest in risk 
management. 
Within this thesis the view that risk management can exist to counter the 
imperfections present in financial and capital markets is accepted. However, it is 
argued that the current focus on modern finance theory means that some other 
important motivational factors (many of which also represent imperfections in both 
the internal and external markets faced by firms) for risk management have largely 
bccn ignored. Indeed fruitful research is already being done in the areas of 
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organisational behaviour, sociology and psychology4. Yet, one important discipline 
remains largely undeveloped by risk management theorists 
- 
neo-classical economics. 
The primary purpose of this thesis is, therefore, to begin to develop an economic 
theory of risk management. Admittedly a considerable amount of research has already 
been conducted into the economic value of insurance and more generally risk 
management (e. g. Mossin 1968, Ehrlich & Becker 1972, Dionne & Eeckhoudt 1985, 
Briys & Schlesinger 1990, Briys et al 1991, Parry & Parry 1991, Schneider 1992, 
Sweeney & Beard 1992, Froot et al 1993, Di Mauro 1994, Gollier et al 1997). 
However, the vast majority of this work has focused on the preferences of risk averse 
individuals rather than those of firms5 
(Being 
influenced by the attitudes of various, 
often conflicting stakeholder groups, a firm's behaviour will generally be much more 
i 
complex than that of an individual (Arrow 1963, Razin 1976, Goldberg 1990). This 
means that it is not usually possible (or indeed desirable) to assign a utility function to 
a firm or even give it a specific "human" attitude towards risk. 
Given the multi-personal nature of a firm's decisions it is often better to select more 
simplistic decision making criteria. The one proposed in this thesis (see Chapters 4,5 
& 6) is short rim profit maximisation. At first glance such an assumption may seem 
surprising. One of the major tenets of the modern finance approach is that while risk 
management may increase a firm's long term market value it often represents a cost in 
the short run (see Doherty 1985, Smith & Williams 1991). As such risk management 
would appear to be of little value to a myopically profit maximising firm. However, 
For an excellent introduction into this area see Glendon & McKenna (1995) and Hood & 
Jones (1996). 
The notable exceptions to this point are the works of Parry & Parry (1991), Schneider (1992) 
and Froot et al (1993). More on their work in Chapters 4 and 5. 
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economic models of the theory of the firm under risk demonstrate that this need not be 
so. In particular it will be argued that even in a world where all stakeholders are risk 
neutral and there exists no tax or bankruptcy costs a firm may still invest in risk 
management. Furthermore, in oligopolistic industries such a move may not always be 
designed to reduce risk, instead in some circumstances firms may actually invest in 
risk increasing devices, since doing so will actually raise their expected profits. 
While drawing extensively on economic theory this thesis is not intended to be a piece 
of pure economic research. Instead it is designed specifically to extend our 
understanding of risk management within organisations. It is hoped that this work will 
encourage new lines of investigation, with a greater focus on what should be a core 
issue for corporate risk management 
- 
profit. Although it has been recognised that 
firms often follow objectives other than the earning of profit it is hard to reject that for 
many it remains an important issue (see, for example, Hay & Morris 1991, p292-296, 
Schoemaker 1993). Moreover, by focusing on such a simple economic objective the 
analysis of a firm's risk management decisions should become more tractable. Indeed 
by incorporating corporate risk management into a formal economic context it is 
hoped that a rather more coherent and relevant basis for future research into the 
discipline can be developed. 
3. Outline of Thesis 
Chapter 2 of this thesis commences with a brief review of the currently dominant 
modem finance approach to risk management (e. g. Cummins 1976, Doherty 1985, 
Shapiro & Titman 1985, Smith & Williams 1991, Skogh 1989 & 1991, Grillet 1992 
& 1993)1'. In this research risk is viewed as an implicit contractual claim between on 
Note, however, that in the UK research into the organisational behaviour based "cultural 
theory" (see chapter 6, section 3.3.2.2) approach to risk management appears to be getting 
increasingly popular. Already it has been discussed extensively in the books by Glendon & 
the one hand well-diversified shareholders who are largely indifferent to most (except 
systematic) risks and on the other the firm's non-shareholder stakeholders 
(employees, creditors, third parties, etc. ) who because of various asset market 
imperfections (such as indivisible and non-marketable assets, for example) would 
prefer to have risk removed. Unfortunately the argument then goes that the presence 
of various transactions costs, most notably: information asymmetries, bounded 
rationality and free rider problems, make it difficult for non-shareholder stakeholders 
to achieve efficient market solutions on their own (Easterbrook & Fischel 1985). In 
this context the purpose of risk management is seen as not only being to cost 
effectively reduce risk but also to align shareholders' interests with those of the firm's 
other stakeholders. In so doing risk management is said to help to ensure the optimal 
allocation of risk and jointly maximise the welfare of all parties having contractual 
relationships with the firm. This even includes well-diversified shareholders, since by 
lowering the compensation demands of the firm's other stakeholders the presence of 
risk management should (providing it is cost effective) raise a firm's mean cash flows 
and hence the value of equity. 
The modern finance approach to risk management has undoubtedly helped to guide 
research into risk management by focusing attention on the important questions of 
"why? " and "how? " firms should invest in risk management (see section 2, above). 
However, whether the approach is a reliable predictor of real world behaviour is an 
empirical matter. Unfortunately, current empirical research into the modem finance 
approach to risk management has been on something of an ad hoc basis: a number of 
studies exist, but, their results lack any real generality. Indeed most studies have 
focused on specific risk management tools (in particular derivatives and insurance) or 
industries and often both (see for example Mayers & Smith 1990, Tufano 1996). 
\lcKenna (1995), Hood & Jones (1996) and in journals such as: The British Journal of 
M1anagement, Safety Science and Risk Decision and Policy. 
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Others have even gone a step further investigating the behaviour of only one firm or 
stakeholder group (e. g. Gegax et al 1991, Doherty & Smith 1993, Viscusi 1993 etc. ). 
In response to this lack of breadth Chapter 3 reports the results of a questionnaire 
distributed to a wide cross-section of 127 large UK companies in the Summer and 
Autumn of 1993. As well as summarising the respondents' motives for the practice of 
risk management in general, the validity of the modern finance approach is formally 
tested. This is done by conducting a number of multinomial probit estimations to 
examine whether the importance assigned to these motives differs systematically 
across the sample according to a firm's financial and organisational characteristics and 
the preferences of its management. 
On balance the results of the various regression analyses do not provide convincing 
proof of the validity of the modem finance approach. Admittedly the attitudinal nature 
of the questionnaire used to gather the data does temper the strength of this conclusion 
(although currently there is no other source of general risk management information 
that could be used 
- 
see Chapter 3). However, the evidence in support of many of the 
specific hypotheses of the modern finance approach is extremely limited. In fact in 
only the "Productivity (Injury)" model does a firm's financial or organisational 
characteristics have any real effect on manager's responses. Furthermore in this and 
many other models the signs of the significant coefficients are not always as expected. 
The purpose of Chapter 4 is to introduce the main idea of this thesis 
- 
that corporate 
risk management research can be usefully extended by incorporating it into neo- 
classical economic theory. In particular it will argue that the agency and transactions 
costs put forward by the modem finance approach are merely a subset of a much 
larger group of economic issues. 
Unfortunately the most popular mechanism through which past research has tried to 
explain the economic consequences of risk is expected utility theory. Admittedly this 
7 
approach does have some merit. For example, it has often been said that expected 
utility theory provides a good representation of so called "rational" utility maximising 
behaviour under uncertainty (see Shiller 1997), moreover, it provides a consistent 
basis from which to understand a decision maker's behaviour under different models 
of risk. However, despite its widespread use Chapter 4 begins by arguing that the 
applicability and tractability of models incorporating expected utility theory are often 
highly suspect. This is particularly the case in the corporate context. Being influenced 
by many, often conflicting, stakeholder groups it is hard to imagine that a firm will 
possess the same subjective likes or dislikes for risk that an individual decision maker 
might. Instead the suggestion is that it is often better to assume that a firm's decisions 
are motivated by rather more objective concerns, such as profit'. 
The next (and main) part of Chapter 4 then begins to examine why a supposedly risk 
neutral, expected profit maximising firm might wish to invest in risk management. 
Although such firms might reasonably be thought of as being indifferent to risk, 
recent economics based research has illustrated that this need not always be the case. 
Indeed many different causes of this lack of indifference have been identified, 
however, these can generally be classified according to two main groups. The first 
group are known as "pure penalties" (Martin 1981), and denote risk related factors 
that can either unambiguously raise a firm's operating costs or lower its revenues. The 
second group of factors are commonly termed "technological non-linearities" (see 
Aiginger 1987, Ch. 4 or Driver & Moreton 1992, Ch. 4). These non-linearities can 
arise when two elements are present. First the firm must make its price and or output 
decisions ex-ante (i. e. before the state of the world and hence its final profits is 
known) 
- 
this forces it to maximise expected rather than actual profits. Second the 
firm's total and or marginal profit function must be strictly concave (or potentially 
7 This is not to say that firms might sometimes appear to exhibit subjective preferences for risk. 
Howe 'er. even in such circumstances a firm's "attitude" can often be traced to rather more 
objective concerns (e. g. see Goldberg 1990). 
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even convex) in the random variable(s) faced. The situation is then analogous to that 
of a expected utility maximising individual (von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944, Pratt 
1964, Arrow 1965), the only difference being that a firm's behaviour is firmly rooted 
in its desire to maximise expected profits rather than utility. 
Although the presence of "pure penalties" or "technological non-linearities" might 
generate a concern for risk in even an expected profit maximising firm it does not 
necessarily follow that it will invest in risk management. Risk management can be a 
costly exercise, moreover, the efficiency with which certain tools might be able to 
reduce a firm's exposure to risk is often highly questionable (Briys et al 1991). The 
purpose of Chapter 5 is, therefore, to explore this issue more fully and examine 
whether or not an expected profit maximising firm will actually want to invest in 
reducing its exposure to risk. 
Unfortunately the risk management decisions of a firm can be highly sensitive to the 
economic environment it finds itself in (such as the cost, production or market 
conditions faced 
- 
Aiginger 1987), however, a basic model is constructed in order to 
demonstrate the economic importance of risk management. From this model three 
different solutions are provided, each one based on a distinct market form. 
Interestingly perfect competition largely yields the standard result of the modem 
finance approach that a risk neutral firm will not generally purchase risk management 
unless it alleviates either agency or transactions costs. Yet, in both monopoly and 
duopoly markets it is demonstrated that the market power of a firm can create a 
"technological non-linearity" which causes both its total and marginal profit function 
to become concave in final output. When exposed to output fluctuations this can then 
cause the expected output and profits of such firms to fall, prompting investment in 
risk management. 
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Although Chapter 5 demonstrates that firms operating in imperfectly competitive 
markets are often more likely to invest in risk management, an important limitation of 
this analysis is that it largely ignores the strategic consequences of a firm's actions. 
Chapter 6, therefore, discusses the possibility that decisions on corporate risk 
management purchases may well have a strategic dimension. Oligopolistic markets 
are characterised by strategic interdependence, whereby, the decisions of one firm are 
influenced by those of all other firms in the market 
- 
and vice-versa. This situation 
can create both opportunities and threats for oligopolistic firms, many of which are 
intensified in a world of risk. As such it is argued that the role of risk management 
may be much broader than the simple alleviation of "technological non-linearities" or 
"pure penalties": instead firms may use it to maximise any risk related strategic 
opportunities or minimise any threats. 
The analysis begins in a simplified and effectively static environment in which 
identical but self interested duopolists are required to simultaneously decide on their 
exposure to risk. Each firm's exposure to risk is then allowed to condition the nature 
of competition played out in the final output market and hence its expected profits. 
Using such a framework many different outcomes are possible, however, particular 
attention is given to several interesting scenarios. These include both "Risk Wars" and 
"Certainty Wars" in which self interested firms respectively expose themselves to 
excessive degrees of risk and certainty and also potentially costly co-ordination 
equilibria where a firm must second guess the behaviour of its rivals. 
The analysis is then extended to incorporate rather more dynamic interactions 
between duopolists. In particular the possibility that self interested duopolists may 
become aware of and attempt to control their tendency to select jointly Pareto 
inefficient outcomes is explored. The theoretical basis for this analysis is that of a 
multi-stage game with "closed-loop" equilibria (e. g. see Fudenberg & Tirole 1986, 
Shapiro 198Qa, Slade 1995). The essential characteristics of such games is that at each 
10 
stage firms are able to fully remember and make strategic decisions conditioned on 
what has gone before. A firm may, therefore, make commitments to either punish its 
rival for engaging in non-cooperative behaviour or rather more interestingly to punish 
itself if it was to do the same. Using this insight it is then argued that some of the 
tools that a firm can use to control its exposure to risk (such as external insurance, 
captive insurance, physical risk control devices etc. ) may be employed as 
commitment devices in "risk games". As such risk management may be more than a 
simple internal control device (in a similar manner to non-executive directors) but 
could also be used to improve a firm's external relations with its competitors as well. 
In addition to discussing a number of possible limitations and extensions of the 
current analysis Chapter 7 rounds the thesis off with a brief summary of the main 
contributions that economic theory can offer to the development of a theory of risk 
management. 
Conceivably the most important contribution of economic theory is its ability to 
demonstrate that a firm's risk management decisions can make a direct contribution to 
its short run profits. The returns from risk management have typically been seen as 
being both hard to measure8 and taking a long time to materialise (see Chapter 2). In 
an economic context, however, the benefits of risk management are often not only 
immediate but highly tangible as well. This insight can then be used to extend the 
circumstances under which risk management may be of use to a firm. 
A second related contribution of economic theory is that it places much more 
emphasis on the mean returns (i. e. profits) of a risky decision than its variance. 
8 It would be difficult for a firm to estimate how many third party liability suits might be 
avoided through investment in environmental risk management, for example. 
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Perhaps as a consequence of expected utility theory9 much of the research into the 
modern finance approach to risk management still focuses on how seemingly risk 
averse stakeholders will react to increases in the variance of their returns (see Chapter 
2)10. The trouble with this, however, is that a decision maker's attitude towards the 
variance of his or her returns is an inherently personal one, as such it is very difficult 
to achieve a reliable prediction on how different decision makers will respond to the 
same level or type of risk. The advantage of focusing on the mean returns of a risky 
decision is that this problem can be largely eliminated. In general it is reasonable to 
assume that all decision makers will prefer more returns to less 
- 
thus where risk can 
be shown to have a direct impact on the mean returns of a decision maker it becomes 
much easier to make general predictions. 
Finally economic theory can be used to provide a definite link between a firm's core 
business and risk management decisions. Certain authors in the modern finance 
approach to risk management (e. g. Froot et al 1993, Stulz 1996) have already 
recognised that a firm's risk management function can be used to support both its long 
term investment and short term operational decisions, however, what this research has 
failed to do is provide explicit proof of this link. By using economic theory it is hoped 
that this thesis will provide some supportive theoretical evidence. 
It is hard to deny that expected utility theory has not had a major influence on many of the 
subsequent theories of firm and or individual behaviour in a world of risk. 
10 However. it should be noted that the modern finance based research into convex tax functions 
and bankruptcy costs does not share this problem 
- 
see Chapters 2 and 4. 
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Chapter 2: 
The Modern Finance Approach to Corporate Risk Management 
1. Introduction 
Before the 1960's the discipline of risk management had not really been formally 
recognised (Snider 1991). Until this time the accepted wisdom was that most non- 
business risks should (where possible) be simply transferred to an insurer, the idea 
being that a firm should focus on its core activity of making money rather than 
devoting any real attention to keeping the assets that it already had. 
However, during the latter half of this century and especially in the 1980's and 1990's 
there has been an explosion in both practical interest and academic research into the 
field of risk management'. Much of this research has been developed from modern 
finance theory (in particular the Capital Asset Pricing Model) and associated agency 
and transactions cost research. The basic idea behind this modem finance approach is 
that most firms do not invest in risk management because they are risk averse, instead 
it is argued that a firm (or rather its managers) will only undertake such investment if 
it increases the long term wealth of its largely risk neutral owners. This insight has 
since lead to the development of numerous associated theories to explain the 
corporate demand for risk management, it is these theories that are reviewed in this 
Chapter. 
The next section outlines the development of the modern finance approach, 
explaining how it evolved out of the rather unrealistic assumption that firms are risk 
averse'. 
Section 3 then goes onto to critically evaluate the ways in which risk 
See Klouran (1992) and Williams et al (1995) for two good reviews of the development of 
risk management. 
For a detailed critique of the problems associated with using risk aversion in models of 
management is believed to be of value to a firm and its stakeholders, while section 4 
applies these theories to a number of important stakeholder groups. Section 5 finishes 
with a brief summary and conclusion. 
2. Developing the Modern Finance Approach to Risk Management 
Many early writers in the field of risk management tried to demarcate it from other 
management disciplines on the grounds that its purpose was to deal with pure rather 
than speculative risks (Mowbray 1930). The taking of speculative risks 
- 
which offer 
the prospect of either a gain or a loss 
- 
was seen to be the primary purpose for 
business. In fact it was widely recognised that in order to make a profit firms must 
take speculative risks, by launching a new product or entering into a new market, for 
example. Pure risks on the other hand were seen as both an unfortunate and 
unavoidable by-product of this activity. Pure risks only offer the prospect of loss and 
as such it was assumed that they would simply depress the profits of a firma. 
This rather depressing rationale for risk management lead many early theorists to 
conclude that firms would generally act in a risk averse way towards pure risks. A 
good example of this reasoning is provided in Carter & Crockford (1974). They 
corporate risk management see Chapter 4, section 2. 
Note, however, that more recently it has been argued that the distinction between pure and 
speculative risks is rather semantic (Williams et al 1995). Typically, all risks have both pure 
and speculative elements. For example, a homeowner often faces the risk of both positive and 
ne-ative fluctuations in the value of his or her house. These fluctuations can be the result of 
many different occurrences, from say a fire or subsidence or a change in the demand for 
houses. Yet for some reason occurrences such as fires are seen as pure risks, while a reduction 
in the demand for houses is seen as being a speculative one (since the demand for houses can 
also increase). 
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argued that since risk management deals with risks that can only depress the 
profitability of a firm, its purpose should be to protect a firm's assets from harm by 
cost effectively reducing both the frequency and severity of loss. Other notable 
authors such as Mehr & Hedges (1974) also supported this view, however, they took 
it a step further by developing a number of more specific motives for corporate risk 
management. 
- 
Protect the firm from bankruptcy. 
- 
Ensure that the firm maintains a high level of efficiency and growth 
both pre- and post-loss. This embodies a number of sub-objectives 
including: keeping risk management costs down as much as 
practicably possible, maintaining market share and ensuring continuity 
of performance by providing ample funds for reinvestment. 
- 
Peace of Mind: The aim being that risk management should leave 
managers free to pursue profitable speculative ventures without having 
to worry about pure risks. Thus ensuring that they do not pass up 
positive net present value projects simply because of their large 
downside potential. 
- 
Good citizenship/social responsibility: Where it was argued that a firm 
should seek to reduce the risks faced by their employees, suppliers, 
customers and third parties, even at the expense of its profitability. 
More recent research has rejected the idea that risk management arises out of 
corporate risk aversion. This view was initially raised by Olson & Simkiss (1982) 
who criticised the idea that risk management was simply there to reduce a firm's 
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exposure to pure risk. Viewing risk management as a specialist aspect of financial 
management, they argued that its function should be the same as any other financial 
discipline: to help maximise the difference between the risks a firm's owners face and 
their returns. 
"The objective of the risk manager is the same as the objective of the portfolio 
manager or chief financial officer. It is to increase the wealth of shareholders or 
owners by selecting strategies that entail the optimal combination of expected returns 
and risk. " (Olson & Simkiss 1982). 
However, as Doherty (1985) points out Olson & Simkiss made no attempt to develop 
their proposition by explaining how risk management could achieve such an "optimal 
combination" of risk and return. 
Perhaps the reason why Olson & Simkiss did not develop a financial framework for 
risk management decision making was because Cummins (1976) had partially done 
so already. Although not criticising the then fashionable focus on corporate risk 
aversion Cummins did at least stress the need for risk management expenditure that 
directly contributes towards the long term global objectives of a firm (or rather its 
owners). Perceptively, Cummins recognised that risk management could be integrated 
into a number of existing theoretical approaches (for example neo-classical 
microeconomics), however, the decision making framework that he chose to focus on 
was the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). 
In order to increase the value of its owners' stakes4 a firm needs to select risky 
Given the number of diverse claims within an organisation (employees, managers, consumers, 
etc. ) it is rather hard to assign overall objectives to a firm. However, most finance theorists 
assume that the purpose of a firm is to maximise its long term value to existing owners, 
whether they be bond or equity holders. 
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investments which maximise the difference between its expected cash flows and the 
returns demanded by all its investors (employees, suppliers, consumers etc., as well as 
those demanded by owners). Developed simultaneously by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner 
(1965) the CAPM attempts to predict what a firm's investors' returns will be. 
Rightly or wrongly (see Chapter 4) one of the key assumptions of the CAPM is that a 
firm's investors are risk averse, preferring an investment that yields a certain income 
to a risky prospect of equal expected return. Consequently the riskier the investment 
the greater will be the level of compensation demanded. In helping to predict these 
compensation claims (otherwise known as an investor's risk premium) the CAPM 
then allows firms to calculate the net present value of a project5 and select those that 
generate the greatest income. 
Using the CAPM Cummins argued that risk management will only be of value to a 
firm's owners if, all things being equal, it can help to decrease the non-diversifiable 
risks they face or increase their returns. Although suggesting that his framework 
could be applied to all the firm's risk management decisions Cummins illustrated this 
proposition by exploring the optimum level of insurance deductible6. In this example 
Cummins then argued that the proportion of any given loss a firm retains should 
increase up to the point where the associated premium savings (equivalent to the 
marginal benefit of risk retention) are entirely offset by the cost the firm must bear in 
terms of increased owner risk premiums (the marginal cost of retention). 
This is calculated by subtracting the predicted compensation claims of investors from the 
expected return of the investment. 
6 Where insured losses incorporate deductibles the policy holder is required to retain part of the 
potential loss, such as the first £ 100 per occurrence. 
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Given that the CAPM is a widely accepted investment tool it might appear to 
represent a rather good starting point from which to evaluate the effectiveness of a 
firm's risk management decisions, however, there is a fundamental flaw. The key 
proposition of the CAPM is that all investors can create a portfolio, known as the 
market portfolio, which consists of every risky investment within an economy (for 
example: stocks, bonds, real estate and even human capital), in the exact proportions 
necessary for them to diversify away the effects of all firm specific or unsystematic 
risk. Consequently the only risk that will influence an investor's decisions and hence 
the value of the firm, will be systematic7, which cannot be diversified away. Indeed 
Main (1983a) has criticised Cummins's work on this basis, arguing that, since most 
pure risks are firm specific, the CAPM would appear to be an inappropriate basis 
from which to evaluate the cost effectiveness of risk management decisions. Others 
have gone even further and suggested that if the predictions of the CAPM are true 
then it is more than just an inappropriate basis for evaluating risk management, it 
renders the whole process redundant (see Cho 1988 for a review). 
However, the hypothesis that a firm's owners will not value risk management (at least 
with respect to diversifiable unsystematic risks) does seem to contradict the available 
evidence. For example, Cassidy, Constand & Corbett (1990) demonstrated that the 
equity value of a firm rises after planned increases in risk management expenditure 
are announced to shareholders. Moreover, Sprecher & Pertl (1983) even found that 
large, firm specific, fortuitous losses decrease the value of a firm by around 4%. In 
short there would appear to be something of a paradox, in theory a firm's owners 
should be indifferent even hostile to risk management (assuming it is costly or 
destroys any natural hedge between the returns of an owner's investments - Mayers & 
7 Systematic risk measures the degree to which the variance of an investment's return co-varies 
with the returns of all other risky investments within the market portfolio. 
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Smith 1983, Doherty & Schlesinger 1985), however, in practice they would seem to 
find it quite desirable. The question that many have since tried to answer is why? 
An obvious explanation for the apparent paradox between the predictions of the 
CAPM and a firm's owners' apparent concern for risk management is that the 
assumptions which underlie the CAPM are invalid. In fact modem finance based 
researchers have long shared this view, arguing especially that the CAPM's 
requirement of a perfect markets does not properly reflect real world trading 
environments (see Brealey & Myers 1991 for a good review). A classic critique is 
Levy's (1978) Generalised Capital Asset Pricing Model in which he relaxes the 
CAPM's perfect market assumption in order to explain why a firm's owners might 
value its attempts to reduce certain theoretically diversifiable risks. What Levy 
observed was that certain owners may possess assets which are indivisible or face 
market transaction costs (such as brokerage fees or information gathering and 
processing costs) that would constrain their ability to construct mean-variance 
efficient portfolios. As such he argued that it is quite possible that a firm's owners 
will be averse to unsystematic risk and inflate their compensation claims accordingly. 
8 The assumption of a perfect market embodies the following: 
- 
That asset markets are frictionless with zero transactions costs (Coase 1937, Arrow 1969. 
Williamson 1975), 
- 
That investors can invest any fraction of their "capital" in assets and all assets are marketable. 
_ 
That asset markets are perfectly competitive 
- 
hence investors act as price takers and cannot 
influence the market price of their assets. 
9 The owners of small firms are a prime example of this since they are likely to have most of 
their wcalth tied up in one organisation (Fama & Jensen 1983). 
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However, Levy's criticism of the applicability of the CAPM to the owners of widely 
held firms (i. e. shareholders) is rather limited. When considering the effects of market 
imperfections on a large quoted company he was unable to show that the investment 
behaviour of many of its shareholders would be significantly different from the 
predictions of the CAPM. The shareholders of quoted firms are not only able to 
divide up their wealth across many industries but can also trade on established stock 
markets, thus improving the marketability of their assets. Moreover many of these 
shareholders are large financial institutions (e. g. banks, unit trust and pension funds) 
that are able to take advantage of significant economies of scale in order to minimise 
the impact of any further market imperfections. As such it would seem that the 
shareholders of widely held firms are likely to remain indifferent to risk even in a less 
than perfect market. 
Although Levy's Generalised Capital Asset Pricing Model may not explain how the 
shareholders (especially institutional ones) of quoted firms could gain directly from 
investment in risk management it can still be used to should how they may benefit 
indirectly. This insight was recognised by authors such as Doherty (1985) and 
Shapiro & Titman (1985) who argued that while shareholders might be able to create 
mean variance efficient portfolios the firm's other investors will find this much more 
difficult1°. Adopting a contractual approach to the firm Doherty and Shapiro & 
Titman viewed it as a nexus of contracts between many different stakeholder groups 
(for example: employees, consumers, bondholders, suppliers, shareholders and even 
third parties). What they then concluded was that the concerns and preferences of all 
these groups would have a financial impact on the firm - whether they explicitly 
10 Earlier authors like Mayers & Smith (1982) and Main (1982) had already investigated the 
corporate demand for insurance in this way, however, they 
failed to explain the demand for 
other risk management devices. 
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invested money into it or not' 1. 
Of course if the markets a firm's stakeholders traded in were able to operate as 
"perfectly" as the stock market then they should all be indifferent to the adverse 
effects of unsystematic risk. Moreover, even if stakeholders cannot achieve mean 
variance efficient portfolios it is possible that firms will be able to draw up contracts 
that shift risk from more risk averse stakeholders to groups such as shareholders that 
are less risk averse (see, for example, Cheung 1969, Stiglitz 1974, Mayers & Smith 
1982, Milgrom & Roberts 1992). However, what Doherty and Shapiro & Titman 
observed was that the markets in which stakeholders trade are frequently far from 
perfect'2. Their argument then went that these market imperfections would not only 
constrain the ability of non-shareholder stakeholders to create a mean-variance 
efficient portfolio, but also restrict the ability of firms to shift risk from these groups 
to shareholders (either because of shareholders' limited liability or the fact that the 
impact of certain physical risks 
- 
such as the risk of employee injury 
- 
cannot be 
easily shifted). Thus just as in Levy's model the suggestion was that the compensation 
claims of poorly diversified stakeholders would become inflated by the presence of 
unsystematic risk. This, in turn, would have a knock on effect on the firm's 
shareholders causing them to benefit indirectly from investment in risk management. 
The reason for this was that any firm which reduced its exposure to unsystematic risk 
would lower the compensation claims of its non-shareholder stakeholders. Then 
assuming that any investment in risk management is cost effective' 
3 it should serve to 
1t In the words of Doherty (1985): "[t]he firm finds itself at the centre of a web of economic 
relationships contracted in a set of distinct but interrelated markets". 
12 For example, the health and financial risks faced by employees, consumers and third parties 
are rarely either divisible or marketable. 
13 Risk management is not a free good, so as with any investment its benefits must exceed its 
costs. 
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raise the firm's mean cash flows and hence the value of its shareholder's equity. 
3. Financial Motives for Risk Management 
- 
The Hypotheses of the Modern 
Finance Approach 
The recognition in the mid 1980's that in order to be of value risk management would 
need to increase the size of a firm's cash flows meant that researchers could no longer 
rely on their old stand-by: corporate risk aversion. Indeed many new and richer 
theories have since been proposed to explain the corporate demand for risk 
management. Much of this work, however, has rested upon the modern finance based 
foundations laid by authors such as Doherty (1985) and Shapiro & Titman (1985) 
focusing on the effects of three interrelated forms of largely financial market failures: 
1. Non-divisible or marketable capital, 
2. Transactions costs, 
3. Agency conflicts. 
These market failures form the crux of the modem finance approach to risk 
management. On the one hand they are used to explain the invalidity of the 
predictions of the CAPM and thus justify investment risk management - the idea 
being that stakeholders which experience these failures will encourage a firm (or 
rather its owners and managers) to invest in risk management. However, on the other 
hand it has been suggested that these failures may also attenuate a stakeholder's 
ability to achieve a beneficial reduction in risk. As such another role for risk 
management, or rather certain risk management tools (such as insurance - see section 
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3.3) has been proposed: to facilitate the efficient functioning of "risk markets", in 
situations where stakeholders are unable to protect themselves against being exposed 
to Pareto inefficient14 level of risk. 
The purpose of this section is to review the broad hypotheses that underpin the 
modern finance approach to risk management. In the next part various thoughts 
regarding the personal ability of stakeholders to achieve a beneficial reduction in risk 
are explored. Sub-section 3.2 then reviews the suggested roles for governments in 
ensuring the efficient functioning of risk markets. Finally, sub-section 3.3 concludes 
with a brief discussion of the suggestion that both market forces and government 
intervention may not always be strictly necessary. 
3.1 Can Poorly Diversified Stakeholders 
Expenditure on their Own? 
Encourage Risk Management 
One of the fundamental ideas behind the modem finance approach to risk 
management is that where stakeholders cannot eliminate their own exposure to risk 
(whether it be due to the existence of non-marketable and indivisible assets or the 
existence of transactions costs such as retraining fees or information gathering and 
processing expenses) they are likely to value a firm's attempts to do it for them. 
Unfortunately it has also been recognised that while stakeholder groups such as 
employees, third parties or creditors15 may obtain considerable benefit from risk 
14 Pareto efficiency is a common measure of economic welfare. It is maximised where no one 
can be made better off without someone else being made worse off. 
15 Just like shareholders the firm's creditors are often seen as being able to achieve mean- 
variance efficient portfolios. However, they will often act in a more risk averse way than 
shareholders (Easterbrook & Fischei 1985). One reason for this is that creditors have to bear a 
disproportionate amount of any bankruptcy costs that might be faced by a firm (Jensen & 
I\ erkling 1976). Moreover since debt based assets are rarely as liquid as equity creditors may 
find it much more costly to remove the effects of unsystematic risk and as such may prefer the 
?3 
management the effective owners and controllers of the firm: shareholders and 
managers (who act as shareholders' representatives) may not. Thus the argument then 
goes that since shareholders and managers may be personally indifferent to the effects 
of most unsystematic risks16 they might actually prefer to invest nothing at all in risk 
management. 
One problem is that risk management is costly: insurance premiums can contain 
significant loadings for factors like profits, administration costs and moral hazard 
monitoring expenses for examplel7, while safety devices are often both expensive 
(Schmit & Roth 1990, Schneider 1992) and difficult to appraise (see Briys et al 
1991). Moreover, it has even been suggested (see Mayers & Smith 1983, Doherty & 
Schlesinger 1985) that risk management tools such as insurance may serve to reduce 
any beneficial natural hedges18 in a shareholder's equity portfolio (that could be 
created by negatively correlated fluctuations in the dividend/capital returns provided 
by one firm and those of another, for example). Consequently, the argument then goes 
that shareholders and their managers may seek to avoid investing in risk management 
devices that do not directly benefit them. Instead they are likely to prefer to invest in 
more productive assets19 and so doing expose the firm's other stakeholders to 
firm to do it for them (for example it is generally harder to find a buyer for debt than it is for 
equity). 
16 It should be noted that this is need not always be the case. See sub-section 3.3 for more 
information. 
17 As Main (1982) points out shareholders are often indifferent about the choice between 
whether to purchase actuarially fair insurance or create their own "home made" (Doherty 
1985 Ch. 6) investment portfolios since both mechanisms achieve the costless elimination of 
risk. 
is See Appendix 4 for a definition of a natural hedge. 
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excessive amounts of risk (see Easterbrook & Fischel 1985, Grillet 1992). 
This conflict between managers/shareholders and the firm's other, less well 
diversified stakeholders can perhaps be best explained by referring to Jensen & 
Mecklings' (1976) research into "agency costs". In Jensen & Mecklings' model firms 
exist as a nexus of agency relationships between principals (the purchasers of goods 
and services) and agents who are hired to undertake actions and make decisions on 
the principal's behalf. Problems arise because the goals of these two parties conflict. 
Although the principal hires agents to achieve his or her aims they will, if possible, 
prefer to act opportunistically and further their own ends instead. For example, an 
employer will require maximum (consummate) productive effort from his or her 
employees, while they will generally prefer on the job leisure. 
Figure 1 about here 
Jensen & Meckling illustrate this proposition by exploring managers' incentives to 
consume perquisites (fancy offices, corporate jets, expensive lunches etc. ) at the 
expense of the firm's profitability and subsequently the value of equity. Figure one 
shows an indifference curve map of managers' preferences between profits and 
perquisites (containing two possible indifference curves U, and U, ). As illustrated 
managers receive significant utility from consuming perquisites, however, since their 
continued consumption of these benefits depends on the survival of the firm and that 
they are often residual claimants they will need to at least partially constrain their 
consumption. Thus an owner-manager who owns 100% of the firms assets, for 
example, will spend a relatively small amount on perquisites since for every pound 
they spend they will lose a full pound of income 
- 
as represented by the budget 
constraint curve YY'. Such an owner-manager will, therefore, maximise his or her 
19 For example: research and development, ne« machinery etc. 
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Figure 1: Incentives for Agent Opportunism 
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profits at P* 
- 
where their indifference curve is tangential to the budget constraint 
curve. Note that while this is not the true profit maximising point, the perquisites that 
the owner-manager consumes are necessary to ensure that they remain in the job and, 
therefore, represent a valid cost. 
Next suppose that the manager sells some proportion of the firm's assets to one or 
more external investors but retains all of the decision making powers. In so doing the 
manager's budget constraint will expand (in this case to YZ) since the cost of 
perquisite consumption is now shared with these new owners. A self seeking owner- 
manager will now be able to increase his or her expenditure on perquisites to point 
A** while suffering only a relatively small drop in income (from P* to P**). The new 
shareholders will, however, be forced to bear the remainder of the associated 
reduction in income (from point P** to P***) without benefiting from the increased 
consumption of perquisites. 
Using Jensen & Mecklings' agency framework, risk reduction can then be viewed as 
an implicit contractual claim (Cornell & Shapiro 1987) between 
managers/shareholders and all other stakeholder groups. In essence, stakeholders act 
as the principal and hire managers to reduce the risks that they face. Unfortunately, 
managers acting in shareholders' interests may not undertake the desired amount of 
risk reduction, since shareholders will bear the majority of the associated costs 
without receiving any of the benefits. Interpreting it another way, shareholders 
benefit 
from not investing in risk reduction, while the firm's other stakeholders, 
face most of 
the costs. 
However, even though the firm's shareholders and managers may not share the same 
risk management objectives as the firm's other stakeholders, it has been suggested that 
they could still value invest in risk management. Agency theory generally assumes 
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that a principal will be aware of an agent's incentive to attenuate his or her welfare. 
consequently stakeholders are likely to demand some extra form of remuneration to 
compensate for any unwarranted exposure to unsystematic risk. Moreover, at the 
extreme they may even refuse to enter into certain contractual relationships 
altogether. Shareholders should now, in theory, be forced to bear some, if not all of 
the costs associated with their opportunistic behaviour, providing them with an 
incentive to reduce it. In the words of Thompson (1988): 
"It follows that all parties have a potential interest in finding a contractual solution 
which minimises agency costs". 
Perhaps the simplest response to risk related agency conflicts is for stakeholders to 
demand a monetary premium from the firm's managers and shareholders whenever 
they are exposed to risk. Indeed ever since Adam Smith's observation that workers in 
unsafe or otherwise unpleasant jobs demand a compensating wage differential 
numerous authors have explored the risk-return trade offs exhibited by stakeholders20 
However, it is Viscusi (see 1978,1979a and 1993) who has perhaps made the largest 
contribution to this areal' 
. 
The basis for Viscusi's risk-return model is expected utility theory22. Indeed in line 
the traditional predictions of this model Viscusi assumed that stakeholders' 
compensation demands (or put another way the amount that they will sacrifice in 
20 See especially Oi (1973,1974), Thaler and Rosen (1976) and Rosen (1986). 
21 It should be noted that while Viscusi has largely constrained himself to exploring Smith's 
observed risk-wage trade off, his model is equally applicable to predicting the behaviour of 
lion-employees. 
22 For more on expected utility theory see Chapter 4. 
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order to improve their safety) would increase with both the frequency and severity of 
loss (since the marginal utility of wealth is assumed to be positive) and the degree of 
risk aversion they exhibit. However, what is much more critical to Viscusi's model is 
that stakeholders are also assumed to possess state dependent utility functions, ' and 
consequently would prefer it if they did not experience a loss (see Cook & Graham 
1977, Viscusi 1978). It is this assumption that is then used to illustrate why workers 
will demand high, in fact increasingly high, compensating differentials for risks that 
they would rather avoid. 
Figure 2 about here 
Figure 2 illustrates Viscusi's risk-return model for two firm-specific groups of 
expected utility maximising stakeholders labelled 1 and 2 and the stakeholder market 
as a whole 
- 
as denoted by the curve XX24. Given the state dependent nature of losses, 
the indifference curves25 for each individual stakeholder group (as denoted by EU, 
and EU, respectively) as well as the global risk-compensation curve are a positive and 
strictly convex function of stakeholders' exposure to risk. Thus not only will exposure 
to higher levels of risk yield greater compensation demands from stakeholders but 
these demands will also rise at an increasing rate. As such managers and shareholders 
23 State dependent losses permanently lower an individual's welfare. Such losses are usually 
assumed to be physical in nature (loss of limbs, brain damage etc. ), however, even financial 
risks may appear to be state dependent if such losses permanently lower an investor's mean 
returns. 
24 The curve XX represents the points of tangency between each individual firm's offer curve 
and its stakeholders' constant expected utility loci (i. e. their indifference curve). 
2 In this case these indifference curves denote combinations of risk and compensation that yield 
the same level of utility. 
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Figure 2: Viscusi's Risk Return Model 
Rz Risk 
that expose their employees to risk should quickly pay the price. For example, in the 
current example a firm with the offer curve AA (which denotes the optimal 
combinations of risk and compensation offered by the firm to stakeholders) would 
attract stakeholders with the indifference function EU, (since this is tangential to AA). 
These stakeholders will then be prepared to bear a level of risk R, in return for the 
compensating differential C,. However, if the firm wanted to increase its stakeholders' 
exposure to risk to R2 it would have to pay at least in C, compensation in order to 
attract a new group of less risk averse stakeholders with the indifference function 
denoted by EU2 (which is tangential to the new offer curve BB). Note also that if the 
firm was to expose its existing stakeholders (group 1) to this level of risk they would 
require a much higher and in fact Pareto inefficient level of compensation (C3) 
relative to group 2. 
Interestingly many labour and consumer market studies appear to support Viscusi's 
hypothesised positive relationship between risk, risk aversion and stakeholders' 
compensation claims (see Viscusi 1993 for a comprehensive review). Moreover they 
have also revealed that stakeholders are often extremely risk averse, attaching 
significant values to both their lives and their continued financial well-being. In fact 
estimations of an individual's value-of-life have ranged from $3 million to as high as 
$8 million (1990 US$) for a fatal injury and $25,000-$50,000 for a non fatal one. 
These results have also been supported by a number of questionnaire based studies 
that have attempted to assess stakeholder's own opinions about the costs associated 
with the risks that they face. Again stakeholders (although consumers and employees 
in particular) have often been found to be willing to sacrifice substantial amounts of 
income to reduce even comparatively small risks (see Jones-Lee et al 1985, Gegax et 
al 1991, Rundmo 1992, Rodgers 1993 and Evans & Viscusi 1993)26. 
0 I-loww-ev-er this research must be interpreted with care. The labour market studies are often 
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Faced with the possibility of sizeable ex-ante (i. e. pre-loss) compensation claims from 
stakeholders a firm's shareholders might well be expected to try to reduce these 
demands and thus increase their profits. Risk management expenditure should then 
occur up to the point where the marginal cost of risk management equals its marginal 
benefit in terms of a reduction in stakeholder compensation claims. Ho« ever, 
although certain stakeholders in certain situations may be able to motivate 
expenditure on risk management in this way the effectiveness of such a free-market 
based solution to the Pareto efficient allocation of risk is by no means certain. Indeed 
just as particular market imperfections such as indivisible assets may prevent 
stakeholders from personally eliminating their exposure to risk other imperfections 
may also constrain their ability to get the firm's self-seeking owners or managers to 
do it for them. In the literature these imperfections are commonly known as: 
"transactions costs". 
In a pure CAPM world stakeholders are assumed to operate under a free market 
mechanism (just as in classical economics) that will allow them to buy and sell all the 
goods, services and investments (including risk transfer/reduction devices) that they 
are willing and able to pay for or supply. However it has long been recognised (Coase 
1937) that in the real world the free market model will not lead to a Pareto efficient 
allocation of resources because of certain constraints, or what Arrow (1969) and later, 
Williamson (1975) termed: transactions costs27. Numerous transactions costs have 
based on inconsistent and unreliable accident reporting procedures (i. e. the definition of a 
"serious" accident often varies) meaning that they are likely to have either over or under- 
estimated any true risk return trade-off. Furthermore while the questionnaire work does 
admittedly circumvent this problem by considering the opinions of employees directly, it is 
likely to have encouraged perceptual bias in respondents as a result of framing and mental 
availability effects (e. g. Tversky & Kahneman 1973.1981). For a more detailed discussion of 
these criticisms see Chapter 3, section 2. 
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been identified, but perhaps the most significant for risk management are those 
associated with information gathering (see Easterbrook & Fischei 1985, Skogh 1989. 
1991, Grillet 1992). Ex-ante (i. e. pre-loss), acquiring and processing sufficient 
information to allow stakeholders to accurately monitor their exposure to risk is likely 
to prove highly expensive if not impossible28 (factories will need to be surveyed, 
products subjected to numerous tests, financial statements scrutinised, for example). 
This then restricts stakeholders' ability to assess the risks they face and provides the 
firm's shareholders with the opportunity to expose them to risks that they have not 
been adequately compensated for. 
Fortunately, many risks can at least be assessed ex-post (i. e. after a loss has occurred). 
Where possible this may be enough to prevent opportunism in the first place. 
Stakeholders who realise that they have been unwittingly exposed to risks that they 
have not been adequately compensated for are likely to either cancel or attempt to re- 
negotiate their contracts. This represents a cost to shareholders who should go onto 
realise that failure to invest in risk management can lead to higher compensation 
claims in the future or even the loss of valuable contracts altogether (see Viscusi 
1979b & 1980). 
However, it should be noted that the threat of ex-post contractual re-adjustment is not 
always going to be an effective deterrent for managerial and or shareholder 
opportunism. One major issue is the time it can take to gather sufficient information. 
For example the effects of latent hazards, like radiation or asbestos can take years to 
materialise 
- 
well beyond the natural termination of any contract. This fact can then 
prevent stakeholders from learning about their true exposure and thus allow 
27 See Williamson (1989) for a good review of this literature. 
28 5cc Simon (1957), \Villiamson (1975) and Hart & Holmstrom (1987) for seminal discussions 
of information gathering and monitoring problems 
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shareholders and managers to reduce expenditure on the mitigation of important risks 
(see Ringleb & Wiggins 1990,1992; Barney et al 1992). Another obstacle is that 
information gathering and any resultant contractual negotiations/re-negotiations are 
public goods. Rational stakeholders will, therefore, attempt to free ride on the efforts 
of others and will avoid getting involved in costly bargains, preferring to let others 
pay for these goods and then reaping their non-excludable benefits. Obviously if all 
stakeholders attempt to free ride (which is likely), they will not be able to either 
monitor or enforce risk management expenditure and shareholder/manager 
opportunism will remain unchecked. 
Furthermore, even if non-shareholder stakeholders can begin to negotiate with 
shareholders/managers it is by no means certain that they will be able to achieve a 
Pareto efficient outcome. One condition for Pareto optimality is that a decision maker 
will act in an economically rational way, seeking to maximise the value of his or her 
own personal utility function. Unfortunately, many individual stakeholders may not 
behave rationally (i. e. in this case not in accordance with expected utility theory). 
Instead individuals who have to make difficult decisions in environments where little 
information is available, and where the outcomes may be highly undesirable, are 
known to resort to 'rules of thumb' (heuristics) which depend more on their 
perceptions of the risks involved than any objective criteria, ",. The presence of 
heuristics in the decision making processes of even a few stakeholders can then have 
serious implications for Pareto efficiency. As Ringleb & Wiggins (1992) point out, 
irrational individuals who have no direct experience of the risks they face are more 
likely to under rather than over estimate their impact (this is known as the availability 
heuristic 
- 
Tversky & Kahneman 1973). These irrational stakeholders may, therefore, 
be prepared to accept very low, Pareto inefficient risk premiums for the risks they 
-"ý See Pidgeon et al (1992) and Shiller (1997) for good reviews of the heuristics literature. 3? 
face, providing rational stakeholders with a rather stark choice: either they refuse to 
enter into contracts (and receive nothing) or engage in high risk ones which generate 
sub-optimal (but positive) levels of return. 
Finally, where stakeholders cannot properly assess risks, they may be equally ill- 
equipped to evaluate the effectiveness of risk management mechanisms designed to 
reduce them. Shareholders could abuse this, providing cheap minor improvements 
which appear to indicate their commitment to stakeholders but in the end prove 
ineffective. Again rational stakeholders should be aware of this, however this may 
still not lead to a Pareto efficient allocation of risk. Fearing that all safety 
improvements may be worthless stakeholders might even refuse to lower their 
compensation claims for real improvements in safety, thereby further reducing a 
firm's incentives to invest in risk management. 
3.2 The Role of Governments in Motivating Risk Management 
When market forces are perceived to be ineffective a common solution is government 
intervention. As such is hardly surprising that where poorly diversified stakeholders 
are unable to prevent themselves from being exposed to "excessive" levels of risk 
some researchers have suggested that they may receive assistance from the 
government30. Yet the attitudes of the modem finance approach towards government 
intervention is somewhat ambiguous 
- 
with just as many authors arguing that it will 
do harm than those who suggest it may do good. 
Government intervention in risk markets typically takes the form of statutes in either 
civil or criminal law. Perhaps the most prevalent form of civil protection 
from risk is 
30 See Viscusi et al (1992) for a detailed discussion on the role of government intervention in 
risk management. 
31 
the concept of legal liability. In its most basic form the principle of legal liability 
allows a person (or group) to sue (i. e. seek monetary compensation from) any party 
that has negligently exposed them to physical or financial loss. The suggested 
advantage of this system is that it allows stakeholders to receive compensation for 
losses ex-post, even when they initially underestimated or were forced to accept such 
risks (Spence 1977a). This it is argued should then provide shareholders and 
managers with a powerful ex-ante incentive to invest in risk management since no 
matter how long a risk takes to materialise they will end up having to pay for their 
opportunism (e. g. Shavell 1984a). However, if liability suits were truly effective they 
would rarely occur. Unfortunately they are rather common (especially in the USA), a 
fact which does rather question their total effectiveness. 
One question over the total effectiveness of legal liability suits is that the actual level 
of compensation paid is sometimes insufficient to cover the financial consequences of 
a stakeholder's losses. The trouble with this is that where stakeholders are not fully 
compensated shareholders and managers will not bear the full cost of their 
opportunism and as such will be less inclined to prevent it. A possible cause of this 
problem highlighted in the modem finance literature is that a firm's owners may turn 
out to be "judgement proof' 
- 
possessing insufficient funds to fully compensate 
stakeholders for the consequences of their actions (Shavell 1986)31. Moreover, it has 
even been suggested that firms might be able to avoid paying certain liability claims 
altogether by spinning-off hazardous activities into smaller, legally separate, process 
specific companies (Ringleb & Wiggins 1990 & 1992, Barney et al 1992). However, 
for many the advantages of such a strategy are often outweighed by the associated 
costs. External suppliers can act opportunistically and lower the quality or raise the 
31 
: \s sliave ll (1986) notes this is especially likely to occur in firms which possess 
limited 
liability. 
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price of inputs. Also, given the risks associated with the assets for sale, buyers may be 
unwilling to purchase them (except for a very low price) and firms eager to maintain a 
good reputation may prefer to control these assets so as to avoid any future bad 
publicity. Finally with the possible introduction of new retroactive and joint and 
several liability laws (see section 4.3 below), divestment may no longer protect 
previous owners from civil actions. 
It is also worth noting that where stakeholders' utility is "state dependent" the ability 
of liability suits to promote risk management expenditure can be further attenuated 
(see Cook & Graham 1977, Viscusi 1980). For example, sufficiently serious injuries 
(loss of limbs, permanent breathing problems, death etc. ) that permanently affect an 
individual's mental and physical health can rarely be adequately compensated for ex- 
post. Courts have admittedly attempted to attach financial values to state dependent 
losses, however, this has often lead to excessive compensation awards32. Excessive 
awards challenge the effectiveness of liability suits. The prospect of very high 
compensation awards can encourage moral hazard on the part of the plaintiff who 
may attempt to misrepresent the size of their loss or even participate in deliberate 
contributory negligence. In addition, larger awards increase the chance that a firm 
may turn out to be judgement proof and could even raise its incentive to seek socially 
undesirable ways to avoid them (either by divestment or by hiring top lawyers to 
exploit legal uncertainties) 
- 
circumstances which are likely to lead to a reduction 
rather than an increase in risk management expenditure (Ringleb & Wiggins 1990). 
32 Indeed as t'iscusi et al (1992) point out, since the 1970's compensation awards have contained 
ever growing allowances for non-economic factors (such as mental anguish or pain and 
suffering). A result which would appear to indicate that liability claims are not being based 
upon objective economic criteria, but rather the whims of judges and jurists. 
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Finally perhaps the "biggest" (Freeman & Kunreuther, 1996) suggested problem with 
liability suits is that it is often very difficult to establish a causal link between 
exposure to a particular hazard (especially latent ones) and the alleged losses of a 
plaintiff. This can then lead to opportunism on the part of both the plaintiff and 
defendant with each party exploiting legal uncertainties for their own advantage. For 
example, the defending firm might try to avoid punishment even though it (privately) 
knows that it responsible, while plaintiffs may unfairly seek compensation for losses 
they (or some other party) were responsible for33. Admittedly the purpose of a law 
court it to detect and prevent such opportunism, however, the efficiency with which 
they can do this is questionable. Court cases can lead to both plaintiffs and defendants 
incurring considerable legal expenses as they argue over who actually caused a given 
loss. In fact, in some cases these costs can be so great that they far exceed the 
plaintiffs original compensation claim (see Engelmann & Cornell 1988, Freeman & 
Kunreuther 1996). 
The second main suggested option open to governments is to resort to criminal law. 
Criminal law based devices usually take the form of regulations designed to directly 
prevent, ex-ante, certain prescribed losses from occurring (see Shavell 1984a&b, 
1987, Kolstad et al 1990). Usually these devices are aimed at encouraging a reduction 
in physical risk. Indeed most developed nations have some form of ex-ante safety 
regulation designed to protect vulnerable groups like consumers, employees and third 
parties (for a more detailed discussion of the reasons why see section 4 below) from 
being exposed to an excessively high risk of injury34. Failure to adhere to these laws 
may then involve the imposition of fines on the firm or even 
its enforced closure 
(both temporary and permanent). Moreover, with increasing frequency further 
33 Additionally a guilty firm may even be able to avoid detection in the first place (Shavell 
I984a&b). 
14 See Carter & Crockford (1974. section 6.3) for a review of current UK safety legislation. 
36 
penalties are being directed at a firm's senior management 
- 
such as fines, 
imprisonment or removal from office 
- 
in an attempt to provide them with a personal 
incentive to manage risk (for example, see Shavell 1987, Ch. 12). 
One of the major supposed advantages with using ex-ante regulation is that the 
government (or rather its appointed regulators) often possesses superior monitoring 
abilities over stakeholders in terms of both information gathering and processing 
powers (see, for example, Shavell 1987, Ch. 12, Viscusi et al 1992, Ch. 10). In 
addition, since government regulators are formally employed to monitor firms they 
should have less of an incentive to free ride. However, despite the superior skills and 
incentives possessed by government regulators even they are unlikely to be able to 
ensure a Pareto optimal allocation of risk. One problem is that government regulation 
can sometimes not go far enough with certain major risks being under regulated (see 
Shavell 1984a, Hood et al 1992)35. Moreover others have argued that the effectiveness 
of existing regulations can be seriously attenuated when they are ambiguously worded 
(Gun 1993), too complex or improperly enforced (Genn 1993)36. 
Surprisingly authors such as Schneider (1992) and Di Mauro (1994) have even 
suggested that over regulation can lead to a reduction in risk management 
expenditure. Admittedly their argument is based on the unproved assumption that risk 
management expenditure is largely a fixed cost, however, it is hard to reject the fact 
that some (if not all) elements of risk management expenditure are fixed. Then 
35 Although the deleterious effects of under regulation can sometimes be reduced where civil 
liability laws are used in conjunction with ex-ante regulation (see Shavell 1984b, 1987, 
Kolstad et al 1990). 
30 For example, in a study of tUK health and safety regulations 
Genn (1993) revealed that 
inspectors paradoxically made more frequent visits to large firms even though it was the 
smaller ones that tended to have a poorer safety record. 37 
providing that increased compliance costs cause a reduction in output (which unless 
demand is perfectly inelastic is likely) they argue that the average unit cost of a firm's 
risk management programme will also rise. This will in turn rationally prompt a 
reduction in risk management expenditure 
- 
since its fixed cost is now spread out ovei- 
a smaller level of output 
- 
and possibly even an increase in risk. 
3.3 Will Shareholders and Managers Always Want to Expose the Firm 's Other 
Stakeholders to Excessive Levels of Risk? 
Where stakeholders are unable to prevent excessive exposure to risk and government 
regulation proves ineffective there would not seem to be much if any role for risk 
management. However, even in such circumstances researchers in the modern finance 
approach have suggested that the value of risk management to shareholders and 
managers is rarely zero. The following section explores the reasons why. 
One interesting possibility is that managers may be much more risk averse than the 
people they represent 
- 
shareholders. If this is true then managers should be able to 
enforce increased investment in risk management, despite shareholders' wishes to the 
contrary. For example, Parry & Parry (1991) argue that if managers are exposed to the 
risk of personal liability suits or criminal prosecution they may require investment in 
risk management as part of their remuneration package. Furthermore, authors such as 
Donaldson (1963), Amihud & Lev (1981), Smith & Stultz (1985) and May (1995) 
have even suggested that there may be an agency conflict between shareholders and 
their managers who could opportunistically invest in reducing the risks of financial 
distress and bankruptcy37. This, it is argued, is due to the considerable firm specific 
capital that managers may have invested in a firm (both pecuniary and non- 
37 Note that where outside shareholders possess large block holdings managerial opportunism is 
likely to be attenuated (e. g. see Arnihud & Lev 1981). 
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pecuniary), coupled with the labour market stigma associated with being involy ed in a 
failing/failed firm. 
Yet, the hypothesis that managers are more risk averse than shareholders is by no 
means certain. Indeed Mayers & Smith (1982) have even argued that since managers 
can possess shorter time horizons than shareholders they may actually expose 
shareholders to too much risk. However, more recent studies have shown that the 
exact behaviour of managers will often depend on their reward structure38. It has, for 
example, been demonstrated that managers who receive the bulk of their remuneration 
as a normal salary (or profit/"performance" related pay) are likely to behave in a risk 
averse way. On the other hand, those that possess large common stock holdings39 or 
share options are much more likely to exhibit risk preferring/neutral preferences (see 
Agrawal & Mandelker 1987, Lypney 1993, Tufano 1996). Moreover, a number of 
empirical surveys into managerial attitudes towards risk illustrate that managers do 
take risks and that senior managers in particular are not very risk averse 
(MacCrimmon & Wehrung 1986 & 1990, March & Shapira 1987). 
Another rather enlightened approach to justifying investment in corporate risk 
management has been to suggest that even shareholders may be directly concerned 
about risk. The basis for this argument is the observation that although shareholders 
may be indifferent to any unsystematic variability in their firm's long term cash flows 
they will still care about the direct effect that risk can have on the mean level of these 
38 See Oviatt 1988 for a review of managerial incentive mechanisms. 
IM Although May (1995) does provide some evidence to indicate that where a CEO's stock 
holdings represent a sizeable portion of their wealth they are likely to expend more of "their" 
firm's resources on risk reduction. 
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flows and hence the value of their firm (see especially Shapiro & Titman 1985)40. 
Indeed as will be shown in Chapter 4 there are numerous circumstances in which the 
presence of risk may serve to directly reduce a firm's expected market value (or even 
its short run profits), however, current risk management research has largely focused 
on just two cases 
- 
the transactions costs of bankruptcy and taxation. 
In the real world liquidating a firm's assets is generally costly. Upon bankruptcy firms 
face numerous legal and administrative costs (see Warner 1977) as well as losing the 
value of any outstanding tax credits (De Angelo & Masulis 1980) or investment 
opportunities (Myers 1977). Thus in the presence of a positive risk of bankruptcy (i. e. 
where the firm has purchased debt41and faces unpredictable fluctuations in its cash 
flows) it has been argued that these costs should serve to lower the expected cash 
flows of a firm and thus decrease its return on equity (e. g. Mayers & Smith 1982, 
Shapiro & Titman 1985, MacMinn 1987, Rawls & Smithson 1990). If risk 
management can, therefore, help to prevent these bankruptcy costs by reducing the 
probability of bankruptcy the argument then goes that its presence should be able 
increase the firm's mean cash flows and thus the value of levered equity. 
With respect to taxation it has been suggested that investment in risk management can 
help to reduce a firm's tax liabilities in one of two main ways (see Mayers & Smith 
1982 & 1990, Main 1983b, Rawls & Smithson 1990, Eeckhoudt et al 1997). The first 
tax related benefit derived from risk management is very similar to the case of 
0 Of course, just like every other stakeholder group shareholders will be concerned about 
systematic risk. However, while risk management devices may be able to alleviate the impact 
of some systematic risks (for example, earthquakes and floods 
- 
see Doherty 1985. 
Kunreuther et al 1993) they are usually more effective at dealing with unsystematic ones (see 
Dutte & Srinivasulu 1983). 
41 Without debt a firm cannot in theory go bankrupt. 
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bankruptcy costs outlined above. All losses are tax deductible after they occur (ex- 
post), however risk management expenditure (such as insurance), is deductible pre- 
loss (ex-ante). Hence by investing in risk management the firm is able to write off its 
loss related expenses earlier than if it simply allowed losses to happen and then 
financed them ex-post. Tax payments are thus delayed enabling the firm to reduce its 
future tax costs and increase expected cash flows. The second benefit, however, is 
rather different, relying on the existence of a convex tax schedule. 
Figure 3 about here 
As shown in figure 3, a progressive tax code or one with carry forward or back 
provisions creates a strictly convex tax schedule in which the effective tax rate rises 
(at an increasing rate) with a firm's pre-tax income. Now imagine that without risk 
management the firm faces an equal (50%) chance of experiencing two possible states 
of nature: one in which the firm earns a low pre-tax income PTI, and another in which 
it receives the higher income PTL. At the lower level of income the firm pays a level 
of tax T,, while at the higher income this rises to T, giving it an expected tax liability 
of E(T)`A'. However, with insurance or risk management the value of E(T) is likely to 
fall. Risk management which reduces the variability of a firm's pre-tax profits will 
move PTI, and PTI, closer together thereby reducing the firm's expected tax liabilities 
- 
up to a maximum of T(PTIMEAN) where all risk is eliminated43. 
In the light of the above discussion it would seem that even when both governments 
and poorly diversified stakeholders are unable to force investment in risk 
manaticment circumstances may arise when managers and shareholders will 
42 Where E(T) 
_ 
[0. *T(1)] + [O. 5*T(2)] 
43 Note that this is an application of Jensen's Inequality. For more information on this see 
Chapter 4, section 3.3. 
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unilaterally reduce a firm's exposure to risk. However, the scale of any bankruptcy or 
tax related incentives for risk management should not be over-estimated. For example 
it has been argued that the costs of bankruptcy are largely non-existent (Miller 1977) 
or at worst very small (Haugen & Senbet 1988)44. Moreover the tax benefits of risk 
management can be slight where a firm faces does not face a strongly convex tax 
function (e. g. as in the UK where there is a single rate of corporation tax of 30%). In 
short, even if shareholders' and managers' do benefit from reductions in risk their 
preferred levels of investment in risk management are still likely to be far below those 
desired by other stakeholders45. 
Where risk averse stakeholders or governments are unable to encourage investment in 
risk management and the firm's shareholders and managers are largely (if not 
completely) indifferent to risk the situation would seem to be quite bleak. Yet, even in 
such an environment it has been suggested that risk management 
- 
or rather certain 
specific risk management tools 
- 
may still be of value to a firm. However, rather than 
providing a simple reduction in risk the role of risk management in this context is 
perceived to be rather different. Instead it is claimed that risk management may also 
be used to help improve the efficient functioning of "risk markets" (e. g. see 
Easterbrook & Fischel 1985, Katzman 1985, Holderness 1990, Skogh 1989,1991, 
Grillet 1992, Freeman & Kunreuther 1996). 
The argument goes that if non-shareholder stakeholders or governments are unable to 
44 Although Summers & Cutler (1988) provide evidence that this need not always be the case. 
They reported that upon filing for bankruptcy in 1987 the value of Texaco's equity fell by 
$817 million. 
45 Indeed as Genn (199 3) points out real world managers are often quite unconcerned about 
small losses (such as the injury of one employee) which do not threaten the solvency of their 
e site rpprise. 
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cost effectively ensure adequate investment in risk management, risk markets may 
break down with certain stakeholders refusing to participate in the operations of the 
firm altogether (or at best charging very high rates of compensation). Cessation of 
trade is not, however, a very desirable situation for shareholders or managers. Instead 
it is logical to assume that they might well try to find some way to credibly commit 
themselves to investment in risk management and thus signal their willingness to 
meet the wishes of their fellow stakeholders (see Smith & Williams 1991). 
The primary commitment device that has been proposed in the literature is 
conventional external insurance. Relative to stakeholders and governments insurance 
companies often possess a comparative advantage in terms of monitoring and 
constraining the opportunistic behaviour of shareholders, at least in relation to firm 
specific, pure, risks46. Firstly insurers are specialist information gatherers and are 
able to collect and accurately process information at a lower cost than anyone else. 
Secondly by agreeing to indemnify stakeholders in the event of certain specified 
losses insurers possess a vested interest in ensuring that they do not occur. 
There are, however, alternatives to insurance. Indeed in some cases insurance may 
prove to be quite ineffective. The problem is that even insurance companies can 
sometimes lack the information necessary to monitor and constrain the actions of 
shareholders and their managers47. Consequently where the cost effectiveness of 
insurance is low, firms may prefer instead to exploit retention funds, captive 
46 In fact as both Katzman (1985) and Freeman & Kunreuther (1996) have pointed out it is often 
better for government regulators to leave the enforcement of environmental legislation to 
insurers because of their superior monitoring abilities. 
47 This is especially likely for firms operating in areas of rapid technological change and or 
those which face a risk of low frequency but high severity losses (see Doherty & Smith 1993). 
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insurance companies or other risk financing devices (such as derivatives). In fact self- 
insurance arrangements are likely to be just as effective at constraining shareholder 
opportunism (if not more so) as conventional insurance since shareholders will be 
forced to bear the full cost of their actions. 
In short, risk management has been seen as not just a device to reduce risk but also as 
a means to prevent opportunism and align shareholders interests with those of the 
firms more risk averse stakeholders. Whether in conjunction with insurance, self- 
insurance, government or direct stakeholder sanction, risk management may be able 
to function as a bonding device. In so doing it monitors and constrains shareholder 
and manager opportunism and signals their commitment to serving the interests of all 
stakeholders. 
4. The Value of Risk Management to Individual Stakeholder Groups 
One of the primary advantages of the modem finance approach to risk management is 
that it can be applied to all the stakeholder groups that comprise a firm. However, 
despite the widespread applicability of the basis tenets of the approach, the exact risks 
faced by different stakeholders and the extent to which agency and transactions costs 
may impact upon them is often claimed to vary. The purpose of this section is, 
therefore, to examine rather more closely the implications of the issues raised in 
section 3 in relation to several specific stakeholder groups. 
4.1 Einplovc'es 
Employees are exposed to the risks of both physical injury and redundancy - risks 
which they generally cannot remove for themselves. When faced with a high risk of 
physical injury or redundancy a firm's employees are likely to require some form of 
extra compensation in the form of higher wages. They may also lower their 
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productivity, leave the company48 or sue their employers for negligence in the event of 
physical injury. In addition there are a number of health and safety regulations (for 
example, the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974) designed to protect employees, and 
failure to comply with these laws can lead to the imposition of fines and possibly even 
the imprisonment of senior managers. 
With respect to their exposure to physical risks employees are often thought to be 
powerful bargainers, even in the absence of liability laws or government regulation. 
Many possess valuable firm specific skills and or are represented by unions and 
professional associations that reduce information gathering costs and help prevent 
free riding (e. g. see Viscusi 1980,1983). Indeed authors such as Gegax et al (1991) 
have reported that, when compared to non-union employees, unionised workers often 
demand greater levels of compensation for the risks they face. Moreover, even in the 
case of latent hazards employees are often quite well informed. As Barney et al 
(1992) point out, employees are often aware of the fact that their jobs are hazardous 
but are prepared to risk injury because of the relatively high wages they receive" 
Despite the apparent market power of employees Viscusi (1993) has suggested that in 
economic downturns 
- 
where the supply of labour exceeds its demand 
- 
even 
unionised employees may be unable to negotiate efficient contracts that reduce or 
adequately compensate them for the risks that they face. However, while shareholders 
and managers may be better able to exploit their employees during recessions, such a 
move will not attract a high quality work force. Poor quality staff may cause a firm's 
48 Viscusi (1993) claims that if an employee's exposure to physical risk could be eliminated, 
manufacturing quit rates in the USA would be reduced by up to one third. 
49 Although as Barney et al admit these risk-wage premiums tend to be rather small when 
compared to the risks faced. 
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productivity to fall (see Doherty 1985 Ch. 2), thereby providing managers with an 
incentive to engage in loss prevention expenditure even when employees' bargaining 
power is weak. Similarly Doherty (1985) has also suggested that investment in risk 
management may also raise the productivity of a firm's work force by helping to 
prevent post loss disruptions in production. If machines or inputs are lost (as a result 
of fires, breakdowns etc. ) the marginal productivity of labour may fall 
- 
since there 
will either be too many workers relative to the number of remaining machines or they 
will simply run out of inputs to assemble. 
In addition to protecting employees against physical injury shareholders and 
managers may also wish to protect them from the risk of redundancy. By helping to 
prevent large losses which may cause bankruptcy and financial distress, it has been 
suggested that risk management could help to decrease wages, lower labour turnover 
and increase productivity (see Shapiro & Titman 1985, Smith & Stultz 1985). Firms 
which face a high risk of bankruptcy will either have to significantly increase worker 
salaries or lose their most productive personnel as they move to more secure jobs, 
furthermore Brockner et al (1992) have reported that even those employees that stay 
are likely to reduce their productivity. At very high levels of redundancy risk 
Brockner et al revealed that employees become apathetic, deciding to reduce their 
productivity and relax, since they believe that they are unlikely to remain with the 
firm for long. However, they also warn that if employees feel too safe in their jobs 
productivity will fall again. When the risk of bankruptcy is low employees prefer to 
pursue their own objectives (for example on the job leisure) since there is little fear of 
redundancy. 
Thus given the relative bargaining power of most employees and their ability to 
collect and process information effective risk management expenditure that reduces 
the risks they face is likely to be imperative even \V ithout government intervention. 
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However, there are invariably groups which can be exploited: the non-unionised, the 
very poor or uneducated, illegal immigrants etc.. As a result some form of 
government regulation or compulsory insurance arrangement (Employers Liability 
and National Insurance in the UK and Workers Compensation in the USA) is always 
likely to be necessary. 
4.2 Consumers 
Consumers are exposed to the risk of physical injury if a product malfunctions and 
the possibility of financial loss if the firm is unable to honour product guarantees or 
provide continuity of supply (Shapiro & Titman 1985). Because of marketability and 
divisibility problems consumers can often find it very difficult to diversify away the 
effects of such risks, however, a considerable amount of evidence exists to indicate 
that the incentives they generate to get firms to do it for them can be considerable. 
One useful incentive device possessed by consumers is the ability to exert a degree of 
market power. The implication being that consumers who fear that a firm may be 
exposing them to an undesirable level of risk will often be able to punish such 
behaviour by switching to a safer supplier instead. 
Much of the evidence in support of the hypothesis that consumers will not knowingly 
deal with firms that expose them to excessive degrees of risk is anecdotal. For 
example, Shapiro & Titman (1985) report that when Chrysler, an American car 
manufacturer, was near to bankruptcy it found it very hard to encourage consumers to 
buy its cars (largely because they feared the implications that this might have for the 
availability of spare parts and the validity of any guarantees). Similarly, scares about 
the safety of asbestos in the 1970's and 80's have all but destroyed the industry and 
similar scares appear to be ruining the reputation of its substitute, fibreglass (Sells 
1994). Finally, another interesting example of the market power of consumers was 
Source Perrier's rather exuberant response to the presence of above regulation levels 
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of Benzene in what was probably only a few batches of Perrier in 1990. Source 
Perrier actually recalled the entire world supply of Perrier for over a month at cost of 
FFr430m (FT 11th May 1990). However, had Source Perrier not withdrawn Perrier its 
reputation for purity could have been lost causing sales to fall considerably. 
In addition to the available anecdotal evidence a number of formal studies also appear 
to indicate that consumers are able to punish firms that expose them to excessive 
degree of especially physical risk. There is, for example, the work of Jarrel & 
Peltzman (1985) who provide evidence that product recall announcements in the drug 
and auto industries lead to an average six percent decline in the value of a firm's 
equity. Similarly Jones-Lee et al (1985), Rodgers (1993) and Evans & Viscusi (1993) 
have all reported that consumers are often prepared to pay significantly higher prices 
in order to improve the safety of the products they buy 50 
However, it should be noted that opinions regarding a consumer's ability to encourage 
risk management are not all positive. Of particular relevance is the work of Bromily 
& Marcus (1989) who directly challenge Jarrel & Peltzmans' results 1. Using a longer 
event study they revealed that the equity value of a finn usually rebounds to its 
original level within a week and in some cases rises even higher. This Bromily & 
Marcus claim would seem to suggest that consumers (and to some extent 
shareholders) are unaware of the true impact that poor product safety might have upon 
their welfare. Yet, Borenstein & Zimmerman (1988) argue that such rebounds are 
simply the result of shareholder expectations that consumers will often forgive the 
occasional accident, providing that the firm has a good overall reputation for safety52 
ýýý Further studies do exist, see Viscusi (1993) for a review. 
51 See also Davidson et al (1987). 
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Furthermore, using the result of a questionnaire survey Jones-Lee et al (1985) 
revealed that consumers are often prepared to pay far more for observable safety 
improvements than they will demand in compensation for equally obvious 
deteriorations in safety. This implies that while equity values may be unaffected by 
the occasional accident, firms should still want to improve the safety of their products 
because of the significant premiums they can load onto the prices of their products. 
Despite the apparent market power of consumers in relation to some risks it is still 
possible that they may not always be able to encourage Pareto efficient levels of 
investment in risk management on their own. One major problem is the latency of 
certain physical hazards (such as the risk of expose to harmful chemicals like DDT). 
With a latent hazard there may be a considerable delay between consumption and 
injury, a factor that can prevent consumers from quickly (if ever) learning about their 
exposure to risk and seeking adequate compensation from firms53. Moreover, a 
consumer's involvement in potentially thousands of different companies means that 
for less obvious risks they can sometimes experience very high information gathering 
costs and free-rider incentives. Admittedly a number of non-governmental pressure 
groups do exist to help consumers achieve reductions in risk (for example, the 
Consumer's Association, that publishes WHICH magazine), however, such groups 
often lack the resources to deal with every issue. As a result it is possible (e. g. Viscusi 
et al 1992, Ch. 23) that consumers may also need to be protected by ex-ante 
government regulations (such as minimum product safety standards) and in relation to 
physical risks strict liability laws54. 
52 For more on this literature see Chapter 3, section 2. 
53 For more on this see section 3 above. 
54 See Carter & Crockford (1974, section 6.3) for a list of L'K consumer related statutory safety 
requirements. 
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Strict liability is a rather different and perhaps even more contentious concept to the 
conventional type of negligence based liability described above. In the current context 
strict liability implies that when a consumer alleges that he or she has been injured 
through the use of a defective product they do not need to prove negligence on the 
part of the retailer or manufacturer only that there exists a causal link between the 
injury and the product's defect (Consumer Protection Act 1987). The claimed main 
advantage of strict liability is that it should encourage firms (or more specifically 
managers and shareholders) to better police their own activities and consequently 
increase expenditure on risk management (see Freeman & Kunreuther 1996). 
However, Grillet (1993) criticises the use of strict liability rulings. He argues that if 
managers and shareholders are unable to defend against large liability claims they 
may develop a fatalistic attitude towards risk control. The danger then is that they 
may reduce their firm's expenditure on safety 
- 
because they believe that they will 
face large and potentially solvency threatening liability suits even if they have an 
effective risk management programme. Moreover, rather than preventing opportunism 
and increasing Pareto efficiency Grillet also argues that the additional costs imposed 
by strict liability rulings may simply increase managers' and shareholders' incentives 
to find ways round liability claims (see section 3.2 above) or where this is not 
possible lead to certain products from being withdrawn altogether. 
4.3 Third Parties 
Externalities occur where the welfare of third parties is influenced by activities in 
which they have no direct involvement'. In classical economic theory activities that 
In fact third parties are sometimes known as "involuntar}, stakeholders" (Fasterbrook & 
Fischel 1985). 
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enhance an individual's or firm's utility/profits are assumed to increase social welfare 
by the same amount. However, in practice activities that enhance private interests 
may either damage social welfare or increase it by a sub-optimal amount (this is 
known as a positive externality)56. Economic activities create numerous externalities, 
however, one of the most common is the negative externality of environmental 
pollution. Pollution represents a significant cost to society, both financially (in terms 
of cleanup costs, reductions in property values) and physically (e. g. injuries, latent 
illnesses etc. ), although it is a cost that can be reduced through the use of risk 
management. 
Even though third parties have no direct economic relationship with a firm they can 
still influence its decisions. Indeed in a perfect market Coase (1960) has even argued 
that market forces represent the best solution to most externality problems, the only 
governmental role being the assignment and enforcement of property rights. Then 
who pays for the externality should simply depend upon whether the firm (or rather 
its managers and shareholders) has a legal right to pollute or affected third parties 
have a right to prevent it. Either way the adverse effects of pollution (or indeed any 
other externality) are prevented without any loss of Pareto efficiency, although one 
side will obviously be more satisfied than the other. 
Perhaps in recognition of the state dependent nature of their utility functions (see 
section 3.1) third parties are generally assigned the right to prevent pollution (at least 
this is the case in most developed nations). However, whether third parties can really 
do this effectively is open to debate. For example, gathering information on 
environmental hazards is likely to prove highly expensive and time consuming, 
especially since many are latent hazards the effects of which may take years to fully 
For a , cod discussion of this topic see Gravelle & Rees (1992, Ch. 18). 
51 
materialise. Moreover, free riding is likely to be a significant problem. Unlike the 
risks that employees and consumers are exposed to pollution is often a global matter 
(e. g. the depletion of the ozone layer will affect the entire planet), consequently an 
individual's incentive to help prevent pollution is likely to be very small since they 
will appropriate only a minute proportion of their action's benefits (see Viscusi et al 
1992, especially Ch. 21). 
Partly in response to the significant problems of imperfect information acquisition 
and enforcement environmental safety regulations and liability laws are often both 
numerous and severe57. For example, in developed nations ex-ante regulations 
typically dictate quite stringent minimum safety standards or maximum pollution 
levels and non-compliance can lead to significant fines and even the imprisonment of 
those responsible (see Viscusi 1992, Ch. 21). Environmental liability laws also tend 
to be quite harsh, especially in America. In fact Muoghalu et al (1990) estimate that 
the market value of an American firm will fall by, on average 1.2% (which translates 
into an average cost of $33.3 million) at the filing of an environmental law suit. A 
result which would appear to indicate that the risk of third party liability suits are a 
reasonably effective deterrent against shareholder opportunism58. 
The severity of the impact of US law suits on firm value probably stems from the 
nation's Superfund Act (1980). Under the act firms face joint, several and strict 
liability for actions that damage the environment. Joint and several liability means 
57 Other supposedly less rational reasons for the stringency of many environmental regulations 
and liability laws include the influence of political concerns, the media and pressure groups 
who exploit heuristics such as dread and information availability (e. g. see Nelkin 1988, 
\Tiscusi 1992, Ch. 19, Hood et al 1992, Yardley et al 1997 ) 
5` Although the strength of this deterrent will also depend on a firm's perceptions regarding 
whether or how quickly they believe they \' ill be caught and the returns to pollution. 
that any firm (supplier, distributor, co-producer etc. ) that was involved in a particular 
pollution episode can be held either partially or fully liable even if is was not directly 
responsible. The aim of joint and several liability is to encourage firms to monitor 
each other and ensure that pollution does not take place. However, Grillet (1993) 
argues that such policies are misguided and can lead to levels of risk taking and 
pollution that far exceed pre-regulation levels. For example, firms that face large 
liability suits, even when they were not directly responsible, may decrease their 
expenditure on pollution prevention since they believe that they will be held liable 
anyway. To make matters worse Grillet even suggested that an increase in the number 
and size of liability suits might restrict the capacity of insurance firms to insure such 
risks. This could then prevent shareholders and managers from exploiting their 
valuable monitoring function and, thereby, paradoxically increase the chance of 
opportunism59. 
UK environmental liability laws are much less harsh and for the moment it seems that 
the creation of more severe liability laws is unlikely (although the recent Environment 
Act in 1990 does threaten the possibility of joint and several liability for latent 
hazards in the future 
- 
see Dowding 1995). Indeed fortunately for many British firms 
and insurers a recent attempt to lay the precedent for strict environmental liability 
failed. In 1993 Cambridge Water tried to sue Eastern Counties Leather for pollution it 
caused decades ago. However, the House of Lords ruled that firms will not (as yet) be 
made responsible for pollution damage that could not be "reasonably foreseen" (FT 
10th December 1993). 
Interesting recent research has also suggested that the need for blunt instruments such 
See also Shapiro (1993) for a similar argument in relation to the unlimited liability regime 
proposed for oil transporters in the 1990 Oil Pollution Act. 
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as legal liability and direct government regulation is diminishing. Of particular 
relevance is the work of Klassen & McLaughlin (1996) who in the light of empirical 
research argue that market forces can have an important role to play in motivating 
environmental risk management. One explanation for this phenomenon is the 
increased public awareness of and concern for the dangers of environmental pollution 
(see, for example, Rosewicz 1990). In addition many people are now willing to pay 
substantial premiums for products produced by environmentally friendly processes. 
Indeed firms are now slowly beginning to wake up to this fact. Some like the Body 
Shop and Ben & Jerrys' (American premium ice cream manufacturers) have already 
profited from this phenomenon (for example, see FT August 11th, 1994). Moreover, 
it would appear that firms cannot get away with mere announcements about their 
environmental commitment but must also back them up with substance. A prime 
example of this is the controversy that surrounded the Body Shop in 1992/3 when it 
was claimed in a Channel 4 TV report that it was not as environmentally or animal 
friendly as it seemed. In the year subsequent to the report both the Body Shop's 
profits and share price fell substantially an occurrence that is claimed to be at least 
partially linked to the report (e. g. see FT May 28th 1992, September 17th 1992 and 
June 26th 1993). 
4.4 Creditors and the Agency Costs of Debt 
Despite the inability of employees, consumers and third parties to diversify away the 
effects of unsystematic risk, it is likely that the assets of stakeholders such as creditors 
are sufficiently divisible and marketable to allow them to achieve mean variance 
efficient portfolios on their own (although often not without some cost). However, 
what some modern finance based risk management theorists have argued is that the 
presence of agency and transactions costs can create situations in which even 
creditors may value reductions in unsystematic risk (see Greenwald & Sti Litz 1990 & 
1993). 
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The basic argument goes that the shareholders of firms in possession of outstanding 
risky debt will possess an incentive to rearrange its financial structure in order to 
transfer wealth from creditors to themselves60. Unfortunately, while such transfers 
may increase the value of shareholders' equity they arise out of investment decisions 
that more than proportionately reduce creditors' returns and hence the overall value of 
the firm (Chen & Kim 1979). 
Jensen & Meckling (1976) were the first to investigate the agency costs of debt. Once 
debt had been purchased they argued that managers, acting in shareholders interests, 
would pass up valuable low risk investments in favour of variance increasing projects 
of lower or even negative expected returns. Shareholders' motivation for such 
opportunism was the fact that they often possess limited liability and are residual 
claimants. This situation then enables debt to be likened to a European call option the 
value of which typically increases with the level of risk faced (Black & Scholes 
1973). 
The value of a European call option increases with the level of risk because of the 
rather asymmetric nature of its payoffs 
- 
where the monetary payoffs associated with 
increasingly good states of nature far exceed any losses in adverse ones. In the context 
of debt purchase, for example, shareholders have essentially sold the firm to their 
creditors in return for the option to buy it back 
- 
in instalments, paid on set dates. 
60 With risky debt creditors face the prospect that they will lose some of their initial capital if a 
firm defaults. Admittedly they can be protected by me-first rules, however, these are rarely 
perfect. Even when debt is secured creditors could be left with nothing if a firm's assets are 
dcstroyed or prior claims are sufficiently large (e. g. trade creditors, tax demands, fines etc. ). 
Furthermore shareholders might be able to exploit contractual loopholes to invalidate 
creditor's ine-first claims (see Chen & Kim 1979). 
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Therefore, shareholders will only exercise their option to buy the firm back if it earns 
a level of return that exceeds their creditors' debt interest payments, otherwise they 
will simply default and let the creditors keep the firm. Default is relatively costless for 
limited liability shareholders since they can never lose more than the initial value of 
their investment stake. However, as residual claimants there is no upper limit on their 
returns. Consequently, shareholders will prefer to invest in high risk projects which 
offer the prospect of very large gains and losses since these projects will increase their 
likely returns without affecting the maximum level of loss. In contrast creditors prefer 
low risk investments since any increase in risk will only decrease their returns. Unlike 
shareholders, they receive a fixed return and will not be compensated for any increase 
in default risk, facing simply an increase in the risk that they will be left with nothing. 
Easterbrook & Fischel (1985) sum this up quite well: "[b]ecause limited liability 
increases the probability that there will be insufficient assets to pay creditors' claims, 
shareholders of a firm reap all of the benefits of risky activities but do not bear all of 
the costs" 
. 
Myers (1977) discussed another agency cost associated with the purchase of debt: the 
so called "under-investment problem". He argued that firms in financial distress will 
(providing that managers are acting in shareholders interests) pass up certain 
discretionary investments that would only be of value to creditors. For example, 
assume that a firm experiences a large fortuitous loss which destroys its assets (as a 
result of a fire or chemical spill etc. ). The firm could reinvest and replace its lost 
assets, however, because of business interruption problems (loss of sales during 
rebuilding, customer switching costs etc. ) it may be unable to make future debt 
repayments, at least in the short run. Consequently shareholders will not sanction 
reinvestment since they will be forced to hand the firm over to 
its creditors whether or 
not it occurs. Instead they will prefer to keep any available 
investment funds and issue 
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themselves with a large final dividend of some form61. 
However, despite shareholders' and managers' incentives to act against the wishes of 
their creditors, many authors feel that the extent to which these two groups may be 
able to act opportunistically is limited. Creditors often possess both the incentive and 
the skills to monitor the opportunistic behaviour of shareholders and managers 
(Easterbrook & Fischel 1985). In addition, they also have the power to seriously 
punish firms they believe to be behaving opportunistically 
- 
by being able to demand 
significant additional interest charges or even refusing future credit requests 
altogether (see Mello & Parsons 1992). Risk management is, however, one possible 
solution to the debt agency cost problem. By reducing the risk that a large fortuitous 
loss may cause insolvency risk management prevents the transfer of wealth from 
creditors to shareholders, thereby lowering the cost of debt (Mayers & Smith 1987, 
MacMinn 1987)62. 
4.5. Suppliers 
Like creditors, suppliers stand to make a loss if a firm goes bankrupt. As such it has 
been suggested that suppliers should also value and try to encourage risk management 
expenditure that helps to prevent this (Shapiro & Titman 1985). 
61 Although many debt contracts contain dividend restrictions shareholders may be able to find 
ways round them. For example, owner-managers could simply consume extra perquisites. 
62 Admittedly other solutions to debt agency conflicts do exist, for example: dividend 
restrictions, ensuring that debts mature before additional investment takes place, providing 
creditors with re-negotiation rights and the issuing convertible bonds (see Haugen & Senbet, 
1981). However these solutions are often ineffective, impractical or costly so in many 
circumstances risk management is likely to be the cheapest option (see Kim et al 1977). 
Indeed MacMinn (1987), Davidson et al (1992) and Khang (1992) all argue that debt agency 
cost reduction is one of the prime motives for insurance and (more generally) risk 
management. 
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In any market transaction a supplier will often incur numerous sunk costs 
- 
for 
example, they will need to negotiate a price, build up client goodwill (by providing 
business lunches, advertisements etc. ) and develop any special modifications to their 
product. In the event of their client's bankruptcy, however, all these costs will have 
been wasted. Consequently, firms which are believed to face a high risk of 
bankruptcy are likely to find that new suppliers in particular will raise the price of 
their product or even refuse to trade altogether (Shapiro & Titman 1985). Thus by 
reducing a firm's risk of bankruptcy, managers and shareholders should be able to 
both increase suppliers' willingness to do business with them and significantly lower 
input prices. 
High risk firms may also find it difficult to get trade credit. Firms who are likely to 
stay in business will value a good credit reputation since it provides them with an 
easy and cheap way to borrow money (albeit for a short while). However, if a firm is 
unlikely to survive it may, in an attempt to forestall bankruptcy, mistreat its trade 
creditors by delaying repayment for as much time as possible. In addition, if credit is 
outstanding when the firm goes bankrupt trade creditors may find that they end up 
with nothing. Of course trade creditors are likely to be aware of this and firms that 
face a high risk of bankruptcy may well be denied credit or at best be charged high 
rates of interest (see Shapiro & Titman 1985 for a good discussion of this topic). 
5. Conclusions 
The purpose of this Chapter was to review the currently dominant modern 
finance 
approach to corporate risk management expenditure. In this approach risk 
is viewed 
as an implicit contractual claim between on the one 
hand well diversified shareholders 
(and their representatives managers), who are largely indifferent to most fortuitous 
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risks and on the other non-shareholder stakeholders (in particular employees, 
creditors, third parties, consumers and suppliers), who because of various market 
imperfections (for example, indivisible and non-marketable assets) would prefer to 
have it removed. Moreover, the argument then goes that the presence of various 
transactions costs, most notably: information asymmetries, bounded rationality and 
free rider problem makes it difficult for stakeholders or governments to achieve 
efficient market solutions on their own (see especially Easterbrook & Fischel 1985). 
The fundamental role for risk management in this context is then seen as a solution to 
the twin problems of imperfectly diversified stakeholder portfolios and shareholder or 
manager opportunism. By helping to alleviate these problems it is argued that risk 
management should ensure a Pareto efficient allocation of risk for all stakeholder 
groups. This even includes well diversified shareholders since by lowering the 
compensation demands of the firm's other stakeholders the presence of risk 
management should (providing it is cost effective) raise a firm's mean cash flows and 
hence the value of its equity. 
The modern finance approach to risk management has undoubtedly done much to 
further our understanding of the behaviour of firms in a world of risk. In particular it 
has rejected the rather negative and unrealistic view that firms' exhibit the same kind 
of simple risk averse behaviour expected of individuals. Furthermore the theoretical 
underpinnings of the modern finance approach to risk management are well 
developed and a-priori at least they would seem quite plausible. However, 
despite 
these observations the usefulness of the approach is far 
from certain. One issue, 
already discussed in the introduction of this thesis, 
is that the modern finance 
approach to risk management stems from a rather narrow theoretical 
base. Thus while 
some of the ideas outlined in this Chapter may apply 
to certain firms in certain 
situations it is not at all certain that they will 
be generally applicable. In what follows, 
however. (see Chapters 4.5 & 6) it will be shown that economic theory can be used to 
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provide a rather more comprehensive framework to explain the role of risk 
management in firms. 
Furthermore a major problem with the modem finance approach is that the ideas it 
has spawned have been developed on something of an ad hoc basis. In part this may 
reflect the real world diversity of firm behaviour under risk, however, such variety 
restricts the approach's ability to develop a coherent predictive theory of risk 
management. Indeed all the modern finance approach really attempts to do is explain 
the past risk management decisions of firms rather than try to suggest what might 
actually happen in the future. The trouble is that the ideas developed within the 
approach are based on what can happen when the real world departs from the perfect 
market assumptions of the CAPM. As such it is founded more on the failure of 
modern finance theory to explain observed behaviour than its ability to reflect the 
actual behaviour of firms. A model of risk management that is based on economic 
theory 
- 
which attempts to predict the real world behaviour of firms (see for example 
Gravelle & Rees 1992, Ch. 1) 
- 
should not share this problem. This may then allow us 
to not only reliably predict whether a particular firm operating in a particular 
environment will want to invest in risk management but also the impact that its risk 
management decisions will have on its core business ones (such as what or how much 
to produce or what price to charge, etc. ). 
However, before proceeding with an in-depth review of the proposed new economic 
framework for risk management (see Chapters 4,5 and 6) it is important to consider 
the empirical validity of the modern finance approach. The rationale behind this is 
that even if the modern finance approach does stem from a narrow or potentially 
unsound theoretical base there is little point looking for an alternative framework if it 
represents a realistic view of corporate risk management decisions. The next Chapter, 
therefore, reports the findings of past empirical research into the modern finance 
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approach and the results of some new empirical research conducted especially for this 
thesis. 
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Chapter 3: 
Empirical Evidence Regarding the Modern Finance Approach to 
Risk Management 
1. Introduction. 
As was shown in Chapter 2 the modem finance approach to risk management is an 
amalgam of many different and sometimes conflicting theories, however, while 
interesting and in certain cases highly plausible (at least a priori) they have not yet 
received adequate empirical attention. The purpose of this Chapter is, therefore, to 
provide a more extensive investigation into the practical relevance of the modern 
finance approach than has yet been attempted. 
A considerable amount of empirical research into the practice of risk management 
already exists, however, the general applicability of the results of these studies is 
highly questionable. Indeed most studies have focused on specific risk management 
tools (in particular derivatives and insurance) or industries and often both (see for 
example Mayers & Smith 1990, Tufano 1996). Others have even gone a step further 
investigating the behaviour of only one firm or stakeholder group (e. g. Gegax et al 
1991, Doherty & Smith 1993, Viscusi 1993 etc. ). In response to this lack of breadth 
the main part of this study reports the results of a questionnaire distributed to a wide 
cross-section of 127 large UK companies in the Summer and Autumn of 1993. As 
well as summarising the respondents' motives for the practice of risk management in 
general, the Chapter attempts to test the validity of the modern finance approach by 
including an analysis of whether the importance assigned to these motives differs 
systematically across the sample according to a firm's financial and organisational 
characteristics and the preferences of its management. 
The Chapter proceeds with a critical review of previous empirical work in the area. In 
section 3 the methodology used for collecting the data in the current survey 
is 
addressed and summary statistics presented. Section 4 outlines the main hypotheses 
and descriptive variables as well as explaining the analytical approach that is 
undertaken. The results of the analysis are then detailed in section 5 in which it is 
shown that there appears to be little strong evidence of any systematic relationship 
between the motives suggested for the practice of risk management and firm 
organisation or performance. The final section offers a brief summary and some 
concluding remarks. 
2. Previous Empirical Research on the Validity of the Modern Finance 
Approach. 
Almost all empirical research into the applicability of the modem finance approach' 
has suffered from the same problem: the lack of meaningful data regarding firms' risk 
management activities (Tufano 1996). This dearth of information has lead to quite a 
variety of ad hoc approaches to testing the theories proposed, however, most of this 
research can be classified into five main types: 
i. Event studies 
- 
that examine how the stock market reacts to information 
concerning a firm's exposure to risk (e. g. Sprecher & Pertl 1983, Cassidy et al 
1990, Knight & Pretty 1997). 
ii. Stakeholder specific studies 
- 
some of which have just used ready published 
data (e. g. Viscusi 1993), while others have undertaken questionnaire surveys 
and experimental studies to examine the personal attitudes of respondents 
towards risk (e. g. Gegax et al 1991, Lypney 1993). 
I See Chapter 2 for a detailed review of the modern finance approach to risk management. 
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iii. Case studies 
- 
in which the motives behind the risk management decisions of 
either an individual firm or a small group of firms are examined (see Doherty 
& Smith 1993, Genn 1993). 
iv. Studies that have focused on industries and/or risk management tools for 
which there is published data. (e. g. Mayers & Smith 1990, Tufano 1996). 
v. Combination studies 
- 
where the results of questionnaire surveys are used in 
conjunction with published data about a firm's financial and organisational 
characteristics (e. g. Khang 1992, Nance et al 1993). 
The event study was one of the first methods used to test the predictions of the 
modem finance approach to risk management. In fact as early as 1983 Sprecher & 
Pert! used this approach to examine the effect that large fortuitous losses (which were 
roughly taken to mean any loss that was in excess of 10% of a firm's net worth) would 
have on the value of a firm's equity. Although using only a very small sample (27 
firms which experienced large losses between 1969-1978) Sprecher & Pertl did reveal 
that large losses could have quite a significant impact 
- 
reducing the equity value of a 
firm by around 4%. Many subsequent event studies have also supported the view that 
shareholders are likely to react unfavourably to the news of non-business related 
crises such as product recalls or environmental pollution (e. g. Jarrel & Peltzman 1985, 
Cross et al 1989, Muoghalu et al 1990, Klassen & McLaughlin 1996). Moreover it has 
even been demonstrated that investment in risk management will generally illicit a 
positive response from shareholders (e. g. Cassidy et al 1990, Klassen & McLaughlin 
1996). However, there is also evidence to the contrary. For example, in their study of 
the airline industry Davidson et al (1987) did not find any evidence that large losses 
impact upon a firm's value, while Borenstein & Zimmerman (1988), Bromily & 
Marcus (1989) and Knight & Pretty (1997) have found that following the 
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announcement of a large loss the equity value of a firm will often quickly rebound 
back to its original level or even increase. 
One interesting explanation developed especially by Knight & Pretty (1997)2 for the 
fact that the equity value of a firm may quickly recover after the announcement of a 
major disaster is that such announcements can generate two conflicting effects. The 
first effect is negative and takes account of the stock market's expectation of both the 
current and future costs of a disaster (clean up and business interruption costs or 
anticipated liability claims, for example). The second effect, however, is positive and 
reflects the fact that a company which shows an ability to competently manage the 
effects of a large disaster could benefit from increased stakeholder confidence. 
Consequently, a firm (or rather its managers) that demonstrates an ability to cope in a 
widely publicised crisis may well find that value of its equity increases, thus helping 
to mitigate the negative consequences of a disaster3. 
However, despite the intuitive plausibility of Knight & Prettys' theory it is by no 
means certain that this is the real explanation for the rather divergent results that have 
been yielded by risk management event studies4. For example, one major problem 
with event studies is that fluctuations in a firm's equity value can rarely be assigned to 
a particular event. This "noise" makes it very hard to determine whether a change in a 
fine's equity value is really due to non-business related losses or other concerns such 
as changes in the macro-economic environment or dividend announcements. 
The 
2 See also Borenstein & Zimmerman (1988) for the beginnings of this idea. 
3 For more on the relationship between stakeholder confidence and 
the value of a firm's equity 
see Chapter 2. 
Indeed Bromily R Marcus (1989) argue that the conflicting nature of stock market reactions 
to disasters is largely due to the irrational behaviour of shareholders. 
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upshot of this is that the results of these studies will tend to be quite unreliable5 a 
problem that is also often compounded by the relatively small sample sizes used. 
Moreover, as with any other detailed hypothesis, the idea that good crisis management 
may help to increase firm value cannot really be adequately tested in an event study. 
Although an event study can be used to demonstrate an apparent relationship between 
exposure to risk and shareholders' valuation of a firm's equity the underlying causes of 
this relationship cannot be so easily proven. In effect all an event study can do is 
investigate the degree to which shareholders will react to updated information 
regarding a firm's exposure to risk. Thus in no way can any definite conclusions be 
reached regarding why such a reaction is taking place. Indeed it is entirely possible 
that the supposed relationships between risk and equity value identified in event 
studies are due to factors other than those predicted up until now. 
Unfortunately more rigorous tests of the modern finance approach appear to suffer 
from ever greater information gathering and reliability problems. For example, the 
easy availability of employee accident statistics6 has lead to a considerable amount of 
empirical research into the validity of Viscusi's hypothesised risk-return relationship. 
In the main these studies have been quite positive (see Viscusi 1993 for a review), 
revealing that employees will generally demand higher wages as the level of risk 
(measured in terms of the number and seriousness of accidents they experience) 
increases. However, there are a number of serious flaws with this type of study. One 
problem is that they largely focus on fatal and or serious injuries, thereby ignoring the 
Even those studies that attempt to control this problem, say by excluding firms which made 
profit/dividend announcements at the same time as they experienced an abnormal loss, are 
rarely free from noise - see, for example, the discussion in Klassen & McLaughlin (1996 
p1204-1205). 
Employee accident statistics as with much other labour force information are often collected 
and published by governments. 
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impact of less serious events and also importantly "near misses" since these are not 
commonly reported. Another is that the accident statistics used in these studies tend to 
be unreliable and often vary, with the figures depending on the definition of what 
constitutes a serious accident, whether only work related accidents are included and 
on the criteria used to demarcate specific industry sectors. In addition, published 
statistics rarely analyse the causes of accidents in sufficient detail (e. g. whether they 
were due to employer or employee negligence etc. ). 
One way in which some studies have attempted to counter the poor quality and 
reliability of reported accident data is to conduct surveys of stakeholders' own 
assessments of the risks that they face (e. g. Viscusi & 0' Connor 1984, Gegax et al 
1991, Lypney 19937). Such studies also have the added advantage of taking into 
account stakeholders' perceptions regarding their exposure to risk and indeed many of 
the surveys have shown that stakeholders tend not only to be averse to risk but that 
they frequently over-estimate their exposure (Rundmo 1992, Viscusi 1993). Yet, 
despite such cogent results the methodological validity of this work is still suspect. 
Many of these surveys ask questions based on rather artificial and simplified scenarios 
meaning that stakeholders' responses may not reflect their actual, real world, 
behaviour (where factors such as convenience, free riding or information gathering 
costs may become more important). Moreover the presentation of questionnaires used 
by many of these researchers (e. g. their focus on pure risks) is likely to have 
encouraged perceptual bias, either as a result of framing (see Schoemaker & 
Kunreuther 1979, Hershey & Schoemaker 1980, Tversky & Kahneman 1981) or 
mental availability effects (Tversky & Kaluzeman 1973). 
7 The study by Lypney (1993) is somewhat different from the rest in that he conducted an 
experimental study of managers' hedging decisions. Interestingly Lypney found that when 
managers ww ere given more concave remuneration functions they tended to hedge more risk 
than was desirable for shareholders. In addition, as with other studies in the area, a manager's 
perceptions regarding risk were found to be quite important. 
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Another response to the lack of good quality publicly available information has been 
to conduct case studies of particular firms (Doherty & Smith 1993) or of specific 
issues (the impact of regulation in particular) in relation to a group of firms from 
either one (Suokas 1993) or a number of different industries (Gern 1993, Gun 1993). 
This approach has yielded a number of interesting results, most notably that 
government regulation appears to be quite an effective motivating force for risk 
managements and that firms often place great importance on portraying a safe image 
to their stakeholders (Gern 1993). In addition, Doherty and Smiths' (1993) analysis of 
British Petroleum's (BP) insurance strategy lead them to conclude that tax benefits 
and real service efficiencies (i. e. the specialist underwriting and claims management 
services etc., offered by insurers) provide a reasonable incentive for insurance 
purchases. However, they also suggest that the costs of bankruptcy and financial 
distress are not very significant motivational factors. 
Unfortunately, although case studies can provide a lot of relevant information about 
the behaviour of one or perhaps a small group of firms their conclusions cannot 
always be readily applied to other firms or situations. Doherty and Smiths' (1993) 
study of BP is a case in point. BP is a very large company (in fact one of the largest in 
the UK) operating in a high risk industry, consequently the issues that may be of more 
(or less) concern to it are not necessarily those that may influence the risk 
management decisions of other firms. For example, smaller, less solvent firms are 
likely to be much more concerned about the costs of bankruptcy or financial distress 
than BP. 
8 For example Gun (1993) concludes that the rate of serious workplace accidents in Australia 
would be double what it is now without regulation. 
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A similar although much less labour intensive approach to the case study has been to 
focus on industries or risk management tools for which there is publicly available 
information. In particular several authors (Mayers & Smith 1990, Cummins & 
Sommer 1996, Kleffner & Doherty 1996) have exploited the more stringent reporting 
requirements in the insurance industry to examine the motives behind these firms' 
attempts to manage their exposure to risk. Similarly others have investigated the 
reasons why (primarily) non-financial firms purchase directors' and officers' liability 
insurance (Core 1997) and engage in derivatives hedging (e. g. Tufano 1996 
- 
who 
looked at the gold mining industry and Geczy et al 1997 
- 
who focused on the use of 
currency derivatives) since in certain countries and or industries information regarding 
these activities is made publicly available. Interestingly many of the broad 
conclusions in each of these studies are quite similar. For example in most cases (the 
most notable exception being the gold mine research by Tufano) increases in the risk 
or costs associated with financial distress and or bankruptcy provided some of the 
strongest incentives for investment in risk management. Moreover the extent of owner 
and manager (and in the case of Cummins & Sommer, consumer) risk aversion also 
seemed to have a consistently positive impact. However, the impact of taxation and 
agency cost considerations are largely discounted. 
The use of observed, ready published data in this fashion does have much to 
commend it. One major advantage is that this work can make use of very large sample 
sizes. Tufano, for example, was able to study the hedging activities of around 50 gold 
mining firms over a number of years, while Mayers & Smith had access to data 
regarding the reinsurance purchases of 1,276 property and liability insurance 
companies. This allows the use of wide confidence intervals while also permitting a 
comprehensive test of all of the modem finance approach's main predictions - thus 
removing the risk of mis-specification due to the absence of relevant correlated 
independent variables. Moreover, observed, published data tends to be highly 
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reliable. Being based on the actual decisions and circumstances of firms it provides a 
much more accurate reflection of the real behaviour of firms than any other medium. 
However, since published data is only available for certain industries and certain risk 
management tools, any conclusions that are reached may again not be generally 
applicable. Indeed as Tufano points out the lack of significance of the bankruptcy and 
agency cost hypotheses in his study may well be due to the fact that the costs of 
financial distress and bankruptcy are rather small in gold mining. Gold mining firms 
can inexpensively "moth-ball" productive assets making it easy for them to 
temporarily cease production (when the price of gold is low for example). Moreover 
they produce an unbranded commodity product with no requirements for after-sales 
service so that consumers are unlikely to lose out if any one firm goes bankrupt. 
Attempts at more general studies have been made, however, rather unfortunately, 
these do require the direct collection of survey data in order to gain an indication of a 
firm's risk management activities. One of the earliest surveys of the motives behind a 
firm's risk management decisions is the work of Main (1982). Main sent a 
questionnaire to the Fortune top 500 firms in the US in which he asked their Chief 
Executive Officer to rate on a scale of 1 (low) to 5 (high) the importance of eight 
possible factors that might motivate their demand for insurance. The results of a factor 
analysis then indicated that corporate insurance was mainly purchased for its ability to 
reduce the risk of financial distress (since this could give rise to agency and 
In statistical terms the reliability of data refers to its consistency. In this sense it reflects two 
aspects (see Bryman & Cramer 1990, p 71): 
External reliability 
- 
the ability of a given type of data to provide the same prediction in a re- 
test (where a different sample is used or the same sample is re-examined). 
Internal reliability 
- 
the ability of a given type of data to accurately reflect the actual issues 
that are being measured (e. g. a firm's willingness to purchase risk management). 
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bankruptcy costs). However, Main also concluded that another important role for 
insurance was its ability to signal a firm's financial soundness to both capital markets 
and (much less importantly) other stakeholders such as employees. 
Other researchers have more fully investigated the practical relevance of the modem 
finance approach by regressing the survey information that they have obtained about a 
firm's risk management activities against published data regarding its financial and 
organisational characteristics (see especially: Khang 1992, Nance et al 1993, Dolde 
1993 & 1995). Being perhaps the most comprehensive pieces of research to date these 
studies have provided some important results. There is, for example, limited support 
of risk management's role in reducing tax liabilities and in preventing agency conflicts 
between managers/shareholders and creditors (contrary to the insurance and derivative 
specific research of authors such as Mayers & Smith 1990 and Tufano 1996). In 
addition the personal circumstances of shareholders and to a lesser extent those of 
managers have also been found to significantly affect a firm's decision to invest in risk 
management's. Yet despite the improved generality of the results of such studies they 
have still only focused on the demand for certain specific risk financing tools (such as 
insurance and derivatives). Thus it is not clear whether the results of this research are 
applicable to the use of other risk management tools such as physical risk control or 
risk retention devices". In addition, several important hypotheses have been ignored. 
For example since insurance cannot deal with all the costs that may be associated with 
a particular risk the impact of government intervention (both civil and criminal) and 
public opinion on the demand for risk management have not yet been properly tested. 
10 However, it should be noted that the small sample sizes used by many of these studies does 
question the significance of their results. 
For definitions of these terns see Appendix 4. 
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This study, therefore, attempts to respond to this criticism by examining the motives 
behind the corporate demand for risk management in general. 
3. Questionnaire and Sample Construction. 
3.1 The Questionnaire 
Because of the lack of published information it was decided that as with many 
previous studies (e. g. Main 1982, Khang 1992 etc. ) the best way to gather data about a 
firm's corporate risk management activities would be to distribute a questionnaire. 
The main purpose of the questionnaire was to discover why UK firms spend money 
on risk management. A number of questions were posed, which investigated the role 
of risk management in controlling the impact of risk on each of the main stakeholder 
groups: employees (in relation to physical risk and the risk of redundancy), 
consumers, third parties, creditors (which included trade creditors), and shareholders. 
In accordance with the theoretical research reviewed in Chapter 2 several different 
motivational factors were considered, including how risk management might affect 
stakeholder compensation claims (in terms of wages, prices, interest rates, etc. ), their 
willingness to do business with a firm, the incidence of liability claims, the risk of 
criminal prosecution and finally a firm's public image" 
Given the competitive sensitivity of cost related information and the time that it might 
take to gather, respondents were not asked to detail the exact amount that their firm 
spent on managing the risks faced by each of its stakeholders13. Indeed preliminary 
12 A full copy of the questionnaire is detailed in Appendix 1. 
13 Admittedly in his analysis of the motives behind corporate insurance purchases Khang (1992) 
did ask respondents to detail exactly how much they spent on insurance. However, despite 
only requesting insurance premium information (and not expenditure on physical risk control, 
retention etc. ) the complexity of this request meant that he had to send out a rather simplified 
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discussions with risk managers revealed that respondents would be much less likely to 
reply to a questionnaire which requested hard financial data about their risk 
management programmes. Therefore a discrete attitudinal scale was used for each of 
the questions. Admittedly this does reduce the reliability of the results described in 
sections 3.3 and 4 below. Although respondents were asked to answer all questions on 
the basis of what was important to their company, rather than themselves, it is 
impossible to be sure that their personal opinions did not influence their responses. 
Thus it may be that the questionnaire data collected reflects what respondents feel 
should be the motivations for their company's risk management programme rather 
than what their company's motivations actually are. However, despite this limitation it 
was felt that the use of a discrete attitudinal scale represented the best solution to a 
rather tricky problem. 
To ensure consistency all questions were composed in a similar fashion. Thus in each 
case respondents were simply asked to express, on a scale of 1 (unimportant) to 5 
(important), how important they thought their company's risk management 
programme was in helping to alleviate the adverse impact of each stakeholder group's 
hypothesised responses to risk (see tables 3 and 4 and Appendix 1 for more 
information). In addition, a separate "don't know" box was included in each question 
to prevent blank replies. 
In recognition of the fact that a respondent's own experiences and opinions might 
affect their replies the questionnaire also sought to collect data on a variety of control 
variables relating to their personal characteristics. Respondents were asked standard 
questions about their job description, qualifications, pay structure, and level of 
experience. Moreover they were also asked to give an indication of their risk attitudes, 
questionnaire (for example all reference to liability insurance was excluded). Furthermore, 
Khan- only received a usable response rate of 2-3%. 
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including a description of the most suitable level of insurance cover for their own 
possessions and their company's assets (scored from 1= Wholly Insured to 5= 
Wholly Uninsured) and whether they saw themselves as being more or less of a risk 
taker than their senior management (scored from 1= Less to 5= More). Finally 
respondents were asked whether, in comparison with senior management, they were 
more or less likely to consider the long term impact of their company's investment 
decisions (scored from 1= Less to 5= More). 
3.2 The Sample 
Following detailed discussions with risk managers a finalised questionnaire was sent 
to a sample of 310 firms in June 1993. The criteria for selection were as follows: 
- 
Since the modern finance approach to risk management is most applicable to 
large firms (as their owners/shareholders are best able to diversify away the 
effects of unsystematic risk) sample firms had to be in the top 350 of the UK 
Times One Thousand 1992-1993 company listings. 
- 
In order to get the required company information for the analysis firms had to 
be listed on the FAME company database 
- 
Because much of the modem finance approach is targeted at non-financial 
services firms banks, insurance underwriting, insurance broking and other 
financial companies were excluded. 
In recognition of the fact that many firms still do not possess a 
formal risk 
management team two identical questionnaires were sent to each 
firm one addressed 
to the "risk manager" the other the "finance manager". In so 
doing it \vas hoped that 
someone with at least a knowledge of their 
firm's exposure and attitude towards risk 
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would answer the questions14. Where double replies were received (in only five 
companies) they have been excluded from the analysis in order to help avoid any 
institutional bias. 
After the initial mailing and a follow-up reminder letter with a further copy of the 
questionnaire (in September 1993) 114 usable responses were finally received, 
representing a response rate of around 36.8% of firms (this excludes the double 
replies)15. A description of the characteristics of sample firms is provided in Table 1. 
Table 1: Details of Sample Firms 
n= 114, Year = 1992 
Mean Standard Min Max Quartiles 
Deviation 123 
Turnover 
.f million 2548 4232.7 238 33250 600 1341 3050 
Pre-tax Profit as % Turnover 8.575 11.1 
-24.5 57.3 2.2 6.7 12 
Gearing Ratio 99.6 164.6 0.40 1633.8 35.3 66.7 110 
FT Actuaries Sector: 
Capital Goods and Oil & Gas 46 
Consumer Groups 36 
Other Groups 32 
Source: FAME, London Business School 
14 In many respects it may have been better to send the questionnaire to a firm's Chief Executive 
since they are likely to have the most control over the behaviour of a firm (as in Main 1982). 
However, CEO's are notoriously unreliable respondents (see Harrison 1992), moreover they 
are likely to pass questionnaires onto the relevant subordinate anyway. 
1 In total 1 ?7 replies ýt ere received. This includes the double replies and replies with missing 
responses. 
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Table 2 lists the details of the sample's respondents. As found in Khang (1992) the 
response rate of those describing themselves as "risk managers" (60.5% of 
respondents) was much higher than that for finance mangers (23.7% of respondents). 
Interestingly much of the remainder described themselves as Lawyers or Company 
Secretaries 
- 
perhaps an indication of the importance of the legal aspects of risk 
management. 
Also of interest was the fact that although many respondents were quite "risk averse" 
when it came to their personal possessions (68.4% preferring full or near full 
insurance), far fewer were concerned about the financial impact of their firm's 
exposure to risk 
- 
with only 39.5% preferring full or near full insurance'6. This 
supports the findings of MacCrimmon & Wehrung (1986) and Shapira (1986) that 
managers tend to be less averse to risks that are framed as business decisions. 
Furthermore on balance respondents did not see themselves as any more or less risk 
averse than their senior management, however, as many were keen to point out they 
were actually quite senior themselves (only 22.8% had a direct superior that was non- 
board level). 
16 Full insurance is indicated by a response of 1, near full insurance a response of 2. 
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Table 2: Details of Respondents 
n= 114 
Variable Name Mean % important % unimportant 
Personal Insurance 2.190 68.4 (insured) 8.8 (uninsured) 
(from 1= Wholly Insured 
to 5= Wholly Uninsured) 
Company Insurance 2.702 39.5 (insured) 20.2 (uninsured) 
(from 1= Wholly Insured 
to 5= Wholly Uninsured) 
Risk Taker 2.877 22 (more) 28.1 (less) 
(from 1= Less to 5= More) 
Long-Term View 3.316 32.5 (more) 7.9 (less) 
(from 1= Less to 5= More) 
Direct Superior: CEO 18 
Board Level 70 
Non-board Level 26 
Job Description: Risk/Insurance 69 
Finance 27 
Other 18 
Years Experience*: Mean 15.74 
Standard Deviation 8.42 
Minimum 0.0 
Maximum 32.0 
Number of Respondents Receiving 
Profit-Related Pay: 37 
Number of Respondents Receiving 
Share Options: 83 
* Due to a number of missing responses only 104 observations were available to calculate the summary 
statistics for respondents' years of experience. 
Source: Questionnaire data 
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3.3 A summary of managers' responses regarding the importance of risk 
management. 
Before proceeding with the full regression analysis it is instructive to consider some 
of the issues that arise out of the raw results. Table 3, therefore, lists manager's 
responses to each of main subjects in the questionnaire. 
Table 3: Risk Management Questionnaire Results 
On a scale from 1 (unimportant) to 5 (important), 
how important is risk management in: 
Mean % important 
(4 or 5) 
A. In Relation to the Risk of Employee Injury 
- 
more productive workforce 3.684 65.8 
- 
reducing labour turnover 2.833 27.2 
- 
reducing wage costs 2.930 35.1 
- 
reducing employee liability costs 4.254 81.5 
- 
conforming health and safety regulations 4.316 83.3 
% unimportant 
(1 or2) 
18.5 
38.6 
39.5 
7.1 
7.9 
B. In Relation to the Risk of Employee Redundancy 
- 
producing a more productive workforce 2.605 29.9 49.1 
- 
reducing labour turnover 2.325 19.3 57 
- 
reducing wages costs 2.500 17.2 53.3 
C. In Relation to Consu, ner" Safco ý 
- 
consumer safety regulations 4.228 79 11.4 
- 
reducing consumer liability costs 4.228 80.7 
7 
37 ö4 . 21 
- 
reducing loss of consumer confidence 3. - 3 
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D. In Relation to the External Environment 
- reducing regulatory and legal costs 4.070 71.9 7.9 
- 
ensuring a good public image 4.167 81.6 10.5 
- 
ensuring an ethical approach to business 3.833 70.2 17.5 
E. In Relation to Creditors 
- 
reducing trade creditor costs 1.974 21.1 72.8 
- 
reducing short term debt costs 2.246 26.4 65.8 
- 
reducing long term debt costs 2.053 18.4 69.3 
F. In Relation to Shareholders 
- 
maintaining existing dividends 3.474 55.2 24.6 
- 
increasing dividends 3.132 38.6 33.3 
- 
reducing tax liabilities 2.754 33.3 47.3 
- 
reducing financial distress/bankruptcy 3.509 53.5 23.7 
Source: Sample of 114 UK Risk and Finance Managers, 1993 
Of the reasons for undertaking risk management listed as "Important" in table 3, 
respondents placed a considerable amount of emphasis on ensuring statutory 
compliance with government regulations, governing such matters as employee health 
and safety (83.3%), product safety (79%) and environmental safety (71.9%). Firms 
also seem to practice risk management in order to limit possible legal liabilities to 
employees (81.5%) and consumers (80.7%). Thus the main purpose of risk 
management seems to be the avoidance of contractual, tortious or statutory liabilities. 
A result which would appear to support Genn's (1993) conclusion that current UK 
regulation is actually quite effective in ensuring that large firms invest in risk 
manatiement. 
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Government regulation may not, however, always be necessary. Interestingly as 
suggested by authors such as Genn (1993) and Klassen & McLaughlin (1996) a firm's 
public image was also deemed to be quite important with many respondents 
supporting the view that risk management has a valuable role to play in maintaining 
the goodwill of third parties (81.6%) and to a lesser extent consumers (64%). 
However, the work of authors such as Gegax et al (1991), Brockner et al (1992) or 
Viscusi (1993) is not well supported with employees appearing to have little power in 
motivating risk management either through demanding higher wages, lowering their 
productivity (except perhaps with their exposure to physical risks) or leaving the firm. 
There is even some evidence that risk management is practised in order to bring direct 
benefit to the firm's shareholders via maintaining the value of their dividends with 
55.2% of respondents ranking this motive as important (4 or 5). Moreover, the 
majority of respondents (53.5%) also felt that risk management had a role in helping 
to avoid the costly effects of financial distress and/or bankruptcy, thus partially 
supporting the propositions of Myers (1977) and Mayers & Smith (1987). However 
there is little evidence to suggest that risk management is utilised to reduce a 
company's tax burden or to reduce the firm's cost of debt capital (contrary to Main 
1983b). 
4. Testing the Relationship Between Risk Management Motives and Firm 
Specific Characteristics. 
While the results described in table 3 provide an interesting 
indication of the factors 
that may motivate corporate risk management expenditure the true validity of 
the 
modern finance approach rests upon whether these responses can 
be explained by 
variations in a firm's financial performance and organisational 
characteristics and or 
the opinions of its management. The purpose of 
this section is, therefore, to outline 
so 
some of the main hypotheses adopted by the modem finance approach and explain 
how they are investigated in the current analysis. 
4.1 Hypotheses 
To ensure consistency the hypotheses to be tested are similar to those adopted by 
previous empirical research into the modern finance approach. They are as follows: 
(1),,, / That the motivation for occupational risk management is not randomly 
distributed, but depends on the firm's financial performance and organisational 
characteristics and the preferences of its management. 
(2) That the measure of importance attached to all the various motives for risk 
management outlined in table 3 will vary according to certain specific 
measures of financial performance. Here two possibilities may arise. The most 
readily accepted hypothesis is that proposed by Shapiro & Titman (1985) who 
argue that the incentive for corporate risk management will increase as the 
firm's financial position deteriorates (e. g. as turnover/profits fall and gearing 
rises), since an injury or accident is more likely to result in costly financial 
distress. On the other hand, capital and liquidity constraints may discourage 
managers and shareholders from investing in risk reduction devices in 
practice. 
(3) Firms involved in traditionally riskier industrial sectors will value each of the 
proposed motives for risk management more. This should arise because of the 
greater potential for government intervention, bankruptcy and taxation, as well 
as the likelihood of very high stakeholder compensation claims. 
(4) As suggested in Mayers & Smith (1990) well diversified firms will attach less 
importance to managing the costs associated with, in particular, taxation, 
81 
financial distress and bankruptcy (since cash flow fluctuations should be 
reduced through pooling). In addition well diversified firms may also attach 
less importance to reducing stakeholder compensation claims in the more risky 
areas of its business since the relative impact of these claims is likely to be 
small. 
(5) 
, 
Larger firms are more likely to attach a greater importance to the public image 
and regulatory benefits of risk management but less importance to the costs 
associated with bankruptcy. While larger firms might be expected to face 
lower bankruptcy costs (as argued in Mayers & Smith 1990) they also tend to 
receive the most government and media attention (Genn 1993). 
(6) That capital intensive firms will attach especially great importance to the 
management of risk because of the potentially greater bankruptcy costs they 
may face. Note also that this factor should be especially significant with 
respect to liability claims due to the fact that capital intensive firms are less 
judgement proof (Shavell 1986). 
(7) That a respondent's concern about risk management will be stimulated by his 
or her risk aversion, remuneration package and level of expertise in risk 
management. This embodies the following sub-hypotheses: 
i. That more risk averse respondents will attach a greater importance to 
all the ascribed motives for risk management. 
ii. That those respondents which take a longer term view than their senior 
management will attach a greater importance to all the ascribed 
motives for risk management (Smith & Williams 1991). 
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M. That respondents describing themselves as risk managers will attach a 
greater importance to all the ascribed motives for risk management. 
The argument being that the impact of risk should be more "available" 
to them (Tversky & Kahneman 1973). 
iv. That managers receiving profit related pay will attach a greater 
importance to all the ascribed motives for risk management, while 
those receiving options will attach less importance (see Lypney 1993). 
4.2 Description of Dependent and Independent Variables 
4.2.1 Dependent Variables. 
The dependent variables used to test the hypotheses listed in section 4.1 are comprised 
of managers' responses to each of the various motives for corporate risk management 
expenditure outlined in table 3. In order to obtain the most comprehensive test of the 
modern finance approach each motive is treated as a separate dependent variable. 
Table 4 provides a description of the various terms used to denote these variables in 
the ensuing analysis along with the precise wording of the questions used to gather 
this information. 
Table 4: Description of Dependent Variables for Multinomial-Choice Model 
All variables have observed scores y=0,1,2,3 or 4** 
QUESTION: Considering the impact of the risk of physical injury on employees, how important is 
your company's risk management programme in contributing to the following 
corporate objectives'? 
A more productive \vorkforce 
"Productivity (Injury)" 
Reducing labour turnover "Turnover (Injury)" 
8) 
Reducing your company's wage costs 
Reducing the legal liability costs of your company 
Conforming to government safety regulations 
"Wages (Injury)" 
"Liability (Injury)" 
"Government (Injury)" 
QUESTION: The risk of corporate insolvency exposes employees to the possibility of redundancy. 
In this respect how important is your company's risk management programme in 
contributing to the following corporate objectives'? 
A more productive workforce "Productivity (Redun)" 
Reducing labour turnover "Turnover (Redun)" 
Reducing your company's wage costs "Wages (Redun)" 
QUESTION: Considering your consumers' safety, how important is your company's risk 
management programme in contributing to the following corporate objectives? 
Providing basic product safety, by complying 
to the relevant statutory safety regulations "Consumer Safety" 
Reducing the legal liability costs of your company "Consumer Sales" 
Reducing the losses associated with the decline 
of sales and consumer confidence "Consumer Liability" 
QUESTION: Considering the effect of the production process on the external environment (e. g. 
pollution), how important is your company's risk management programme in 
contributing to the following corporate objectives? 
Ensuring that regulatory and legal costs are reduced "Third Party Liability" 
Fiistirin a good public image "Third 
Party Image" 
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Ensuring an ethical approach to your business "Third Party Ethics" 
QUESTION: How important is your company's risk management programme in reducing the rate 
of interest charged by the following types of creditors, thus reducing your cost of 
capital? 
Trade creditors "Creditor Trade" 
Short term creditors 
Bondholders 
"Creditor Short Term" 
"Creditor Long Term" 
QUESTION: Considering your shareholders, how important is your company's risk management 
programme in contributing towards the following corporate objectives? 
Maintaining existing dividends, 
thus protecting the value of your company's shares 
Increasing dividends, 
thus raising the value of your company's shares 
Reducing your company's tax liabilities 
Avoiding the costly effects of financial distress 
"Owner Maintain" 
"Owner Increase" 
"Owner Tax" 
and/or bankruptcy "Owner Bankrupt" 
** Scores on the original questionnaire were scaled from 1 to 5, where 1= 
"Unimportant" and 5 
= 
"Important", however, in the ensuing multinomial probit analysis it is helpful to recode the 
responses for the dependent variables from 0 to 4 (see section 4.3). 
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4.2.2 Independent Variables. 
The explanatory variables in the regression models use a mixture of questionnaire data 
on the personal characteristics of the respondents (as summarised in table 2) and 
company data for the 1992 accounting year from the CD-ROM database FAME. Full 
details of the explanatory variables are provided in table 5. 
Table 5: Descriptions of Independent Variables 
Constant Constant intercept term. 
Turnover (£000m) Sales in sterling in hundreds of millions 
Turnover * Capital Dummy Sales in £000m times the capital goods dummy. 
Profit Ratio (%) Reported pre-tax profits divided by turnover. 
Diversification Sum of the total number of SIC product markets operated 
within. 
Capital Intensity Ratio of net tangible assets to the number of employees. 
Gearing Ratio of long-term liabilities and bank overdrafts to share 
capital and reserves. 
Risk Standard deviation of percentage returns on a firm's shares 
(note, non-quoted companies were allocated the industry 
equally weighted average score). 
Capital Goods Dummy Where D=1 denotes firms operating in the capital goods 
or oil and gas sectors. 
Profit-Related Pay Dummy Where D=1 denotes respondents who receive profit 
related pay as part of their remuneration package. 
Options Dummy Where D=1 denotes respondents who receive share 
options as part of their remuneration package. 
Risk Manager Dummy Where D=1 denotes respondents who described 
themselves as risk or insurance managers. 
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Personal Insurance Measures respondents' attitudes towards insurance for 
their personal possessions. A score of 1 denotes an 
expressed preference for fully comprehensive insurance to 
5 which denotes no cover. 
Company Insurance Measures respondents' attitudes towards property 
insurance for their company's assets. A score of 1 denotes 
an expressed preference for fully comprehensive 
insurance to 5 which denotes no cover. 
Long Term Risk Taker Indication of whether respondents felt that they were more 
(5) to less (1) likely to consider the longer term impact of 
their company's investment decisions than senior 
management. 
Of the firm specific variables "Turnover" was primarily included as a measure of 
company size and the "Profit Ratio" as a measure of profitability. The variables 
"Gearing Ratio" and "Diversification" were included to measure the possibility of 
financial distress and bankruptcy since firms with greater debt exposures and lower 
levels of product and or market diversification are usually more susceptible to these 
events. "Capital Intensity" was designed to give an indication of whether a firm relied 
primarily on labour or machines to manufacture its products. Unfortunately at the 
moment there is no easy way to measure a firms exposure to "Risk" since data on this 
is not commonly reported'7, however, it was decided to use the standard deviation of 
percentage returns on a firm's shares as a proxy using data kindly supplied by the 
London Business School Risk Measurement Service. Obviously this measure may 
contain a degree of noise (since it will include speculative changes in the value of a 
firm's equity, for example), yet it should provide at least an indication of the level of 
17 This may of course change if the recommendations of the Cadbury Committee on corporate 
governance (Cadbury 1992) finally become law. 
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total risk (i. e. the extent of cash flow fluctuations 
- 
see Shapiro & Titman 1985) faced 
by a firm. Furthermore, in recognition of the fact that the type and level of risk 
inherent in a specific industry could influence how much firms spend on risk 
management a dummy variable was included to pick up firms included in the FT 
Actuaries sector under Capital Goods plus Oil & Gas ("Capital Goods Dummy")'8. 
The Capital Goods plus Oil & Gas sector has generally been considered a high risk 
one, thus it was expected that firms operating within this sector would attach greater 
importance to risk management. Finally an interaction variable "Turnover * Capital 
Dummy" was included to look for differences in the marginal effects of turnover 
dependency between firms that operated in the capital goods sector (D = 1) and those 
that did not (D = 0). This was done because it was expected that the risk management 
decisions of firms operating in the Capital Goods plus Oil and Gas sector with its 
traditionally high exposure to risk and substantial economies of scale might be more 
affected by lower levels of turnover (in terms of greater expected bankruptcy costs). 
The respondent specific variables were included to test the hypothesis that a managers' 
personal attitudes and circumstances may influence a firm's risk management 
decisions. The "Profit-Related-Pay Dummy" and "Options Dummy" were included as 
an indication of the structure of each manager's remuneration structure. Obviously it 
would have been better to use precise information regarding the exact amount of profit 
related pay or share options received by managers as in Tufano (1996)19. However, 
given that such information is not generally reported in the UK (especially for non 
18 Unfortunately the final estimated sample (of 114 firms) was not large enough to permit a 
more detailed investigation of the impact that a firm's specific industry might have on its risk 
management behaviour. However in order to get some indication of this effect it was decided 
to examine whether the responses of those firms operating in the traditionally risky capital 
goods and oil and gas sectors were different from those that did not. 
19 Even Tufano (1996) lacked completely accurate data (see p 110-111). 
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board level executives) this was not possible. The "Risk Manager Dummy" was 
included to investigate whether a respondent's occupational background influenced his 
or her responses. Because of their experience and education risk managers may be 
more aware of the consequences of some risks than finance managers. The "Personal 
Insurance" and "Company Insurance" variables were included as a measure of a 
respondent's attitudes towards risk. Risk management research has long been 
concerned with trying to assess an individual's attitude towards risk and many quite 
complex methods have been utilised (e. g. Viscusi & 0' Connor 1984, Gegax et al 
1991, Rundmo 1992, Lypney 1993), however, it was felt that a rather more simple 
approach would be best in this case (in order to keep the size of the questionnaire 
down and increase the response rate). Individuals that purchase insurance are typically 
assumed to be risk averse (Mossin 1968). Consequently in the ensuing analysis the 
more insurance an individual deems necessary for their personal possessions and their 
corporation's assets the more risk averse they are assumed to be. Finally the variable 
"Long Term Risk Taker" was included to examine whether managers who believed 
themselves to take a long term view of their companies investment decisions placed 
more importance on risk management. Respondents were asked to compare 
themselves against senior management as a benchmark. 
4.3 Methodology for Regression Analysis 
The ordered but discrete nature of the questionnaire responses means that traditional 
linear regression analysis (such as Ordinary Least Squares) is not generally 
appropriate in this case. Instead it is better to use a technique which treats the 
dependent variables as ranked rather than continuous20. Therefore an ordered 
multinomial probit model y* = ß'x +E is investigated, where y* is the latent 
20 A simpler but less accurate method is to add respondents scores 
for each of the main 
categories in table 3 and then conduct a standard Ordinary 
Least Squares analysis (see 
Bra man & Cramer 1990, p 62-63). This was attempted (see Ashby & Diacon 1996), however, 
as expected the statistical significance of this analysis was very 
low. 
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(unobserved) dependent variable (e. g. the importance attached to managing 
environmental liability risks), ß' is a row vector of parameters (each denoting the 
impact of a change in a particular x on y*), x is a column vector of explanatory 
variables (e. g. firm size, diversification, etc. ), ands is a random disturbance with 
Standard Normal distribution21 (for further details see Greene 1997, Ch. 19). 
Because the opinions of respondents are only expressed using a five-point scale the 
exact value of y* is, as in much qualitative research, unobservable. However, the 
responses to the questionnaire can be used to provide censored information of the 
following form: 
y=0ify*<_µ, 
=1 If 0<y*<µ, 
=2if µ, <y*<µ3 
=3 if µ2<_y*<µ4 
=4if µ3<_y* 
[1] 
Where the µ's represent the boundary values between which respondents with a given 
y* select one of the five possible responses. Note that the first threshold parameter, µ,, 
is typically normalised to zero (as in table 4) giving one less parameter to estimate 
(Liao 1994). This can occur because ordinal scales - such as the ones used in the 
current questionnaire - are arbitrary and may start and 
finish at any value. 
An important characteristic of ordered probit analysis is that estimates are 
(usually) 
obtained by maximum likelihood. Consequently rather than seeking the 
"best fit" for a 
21 Note that 6 could also be assumed to have a logistic distribution - requiring the use of a 
logit 
model instead. The differences between 
logit and probit models are, however, fairly slight 
(see Greene 1997). 
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relationship as in conventional ordinary least squares it is the probability with which a 
particular value of y will arise from a given value of an explanatory variable that is 
investigated. Assuming that the random disturbance c has Standard Normal 
distribution with pdf ý and cdf I, this then implies that: 
Prob[y=0] 
= (D(-ß'x) [2] 
Prob[Y=1] 
= I(µ1-ß'x) 
- 
(D(-ß'x) 
Prob[y=2] 
_ 
cD(i2-ß'x) 
- 
0(µß-ß1x) 
Prob[y=3] 
= cß(µ3-ß'x) 
- 
(D(µ, 
-ß'x) 
and Prob[y=4] = 1- c(µ3-ß'x) 
The marginal effects of a change in a regressor on the probability that a given y will 
arise (Prob[y=j]) can then be obtained by partial differentiation of [2] to get: 
aProb[y=0]/ax 
= 
-ý(-ß'x)ß [3] 
aProb[y=1]/ax 
= 
[ý(-ßßx) 
- 
ý(µ, 
-ß'x)]ß 
8Prob[y=2]/8x =W i1-ßßx) 
- 
ý(µz-i")]ß 
aProb[y=3]/ax = [i(µ2-ß'x) 
-ß(µj-ß'X)]ß 
and 3Prob[y=4]/öx = i(µ3-ß'x)ß 
Greene (1997) notes that care should be taken in interpreting the signs of the 
coefficients ß in ordered multinomial models because the impact 3Prob[y j]/ax 
depends on J. For example if ß>0 then, from [3], aProb[y=0]/ax <0 and aProb[y=4]/ 
Ox >0 but the signs of the remaining marginal impacts are indeterminate. This is 
because any change in the overall probability distribution implies that some of its 
mass will be shifted both into and out of the ranges for the middle values of J. Thus 
when interpreting the results below all that can easily be established is whether a 
higher or lower value of x leads to an increased or decreased chance of a respondent 
selecting either a0 or 4. 
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5. Results. 
The results below provide an indication of whether the various hypotheses detailed in 
section 4.1 are true, at least in relation to large UK firms. Quite a large number of 
models are tested. Each model deals with a different one of the proposed motives for 
risk management that were outlined in tables 3 and 4. 
The estimation of each model was undertaken using the full usable sample of 114 
companies for which a complete data set was available. Note that the x'(15) statistic is 
the result of a likelihood ratio (Chi-squared) test of the null hypothesis that all non- 
constant parameters are zero. This provides an overall indication of the predictive 
power of each model in a manner similar to the F-test used for conventional ordinary 
least squares regression. It is commonly used as a replacement for the R2 statistic 
since this is meaningless in probit models. Coefficients and t-statistics are presented in 
the normal way, however given the assumption of a normal distribution the standard 
normal table rather than the t table is used to test the significance of each coefficient. 
One problem encountered with a small number of the following models is that there 
was an insufficient spread of responses in the dependent variable to conduct a full 
ordered multinomial probit analysis. This occurred in the "Government (Injury)", 
"Consumer Safety" "Consumer Liability", "Third Party Liability" and "Third Party 
Image" models where in each case almost all managers felt that risk management had 
an important (replying with a 4) or very important (5) role to play. In these models 
managers' responses have, therefore, been recoded into binary dependent variables 
with all responses from 1-3 coded as 0 and those of 4-5 given a value of 1. The 
subsequent regressions were then undertaken using conventional binomial probit 
analysis (see Greene 1997, Ch. 19). 
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5.1 Diagnostic Tests for Heteroscedasticity and Multicollinearity. 
Two possible explanations for unexpected signs and poor significance in the 
coefficients of cross-section regression models is the presence of multicollinearity and 
or heteroscedasticity. This section reports on the checks that were undertaken in order 
to rule out these two undesirable effects. 
Where explanatory variables are (approximately) linearly related a model can suffer 
from multicollinearity. Severe multicollinearity can have quite serious consequences 
for any econometric model, rendering both regression coefficients and t-statistics 
highly unreliable. The usual cause of multicollinearity is where two or more variables 
are included that measure the same basic effect. For example, in the current model 
"Sales" and the "Turnover * Capital Dummy" are constructed using the same basic 
data (a company's turnover in 1992) 
-a factor that might affect the legitimacy of the 
significance levels and coefficient signs reported below. However, the tests conducted 
to look for multicollinearity largely proved negative. In particular SPSS was used to 
generate Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs)22 and correlation coefficients for each of 
the explanatory variables. An investigation of the pair-wise correlation coefficients23 
for each of the explanatory variables revealed that as might be expected the degree of 
22 A Variance Inflation Factor shows how the variance of an explanatory variable is inflated by 
the presence of multicollinearity. More technically it can be defined as: 
1 
VIF= 
1-, 
where j; 1) is the squared multiple correlation coefficient between a given explanatory variable 
and all the other explanatory variables. As the extent of collinearity, as measured 
by i; 2. 
approaches 1 (perfect collinearity) the VIF Will increase and in the 
limit could become 
infinite. Of course if there is no collinearity bet een the explanatory variables the 
VIF will 
simply be 1. 
23 For full details of the results of this test see Appendix 2. 
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correlation between "Sales" and the "Turnover * Capital Dummy" interaction variable 
was quite high (-0.780). However, despite this high degree of correlation the relatively 
low VIF scores for these variables (3.579 and 3.994 respectively) would seem to 
indicate that multicollinearity is not a significant problem24. Full details of the VIF for 
each variable are presented in table 6, note that as a rule of thumb values greater than 
10 are usually taken as evidence of severe multicollinearity (see Gujarati 1995). 
Variable Variance 
Inflation 
Factor 
Capital Intensity 1.172 
Risk Manager Dummy 1.204 
Gearing 1.22 
Long Term Risk 1.23 
Profit Related Pay Dummy 1.264 
Diversification 1.322 
Options Dummy 1.378 
Profit Ratio 1.38 
Risk 1.566 
Capital Dummy 1.8 
Company insurance 1.869 
Personal Insurance 1.921 
Sales 3.579 
Sales * Capital Dummy 3.994 
Table 6: Variance Inflation Factors for Explanatory Variables 
The main problem with heteroscedasticity is that it can render hypothesis tests on a 
model's coefficients invalid, as such it is very difficult to conclude with any degree of 
24 As a further check for multicollinearity the regressions below were repeated without the 
"Turnover * Capital Dummy" interaction variable. The results of this analysis were not much 
different. 
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confidence whether reported t-statistics are accurate or not. Heteroscedasticity arises 
where the error variances in a regression model (i. e. E) are not constant. Typically the 
error variance will increase with higher values of an independent variable although it 
can also decrease. 
One of the most common causes of heteroscedasticity is where higher values of an 
explanatory variable give decision makers greater discretion in their choice over the 
dependent variable. In the current context this could arise for the variables: "sales", 
"profit ratio", "risk" and "gearing". For example the managers of more profitable firms 
may have much greater flexibility over the importance (and subsequent expenditure) 
that they attach to risk management (either because they simply have more money to 
spend or because shareholders are less concerned about their risk management 
activities). Similarly the managers of firms with higher levels of sales or lower levels 
of risk and gearing may also (since they are far from bankruptcy) be freer in the 
importance that they attach to the management of risk. 
In order to check whether the error terms of the variables "sales", "profit ratio", "risk" 
and "gearing" were heteroscedastic a Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test was used to 
examine the null hypothesis that the variances of the error terms of these variables 
were homoscedastic (see Davidson & McKinnon 1984, Greene 1997). Following 
Harvey (1976) the test is quite general and assumes that the variance of s is 
multiplicative: 
var [s; ]= [exp(y' z J]2 
Using this formulation the null hypothesis of a homoscedastic disturbance term 
(y = 0) 
could not be rejected at the 5% level in 14 of the 21 total regression models. 
However, 
the LM statistics of the remaining 7 models - "Turnover 
(Injury)", "Wage (Injury)", 
"Liability (Injury)", "Public Image". "Trade Creditor". "Existing Dividends" 
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"Bankruptcy" 
- 
were unfortunately large enough to provide possible evidence of 
heteroscedasticity. Table 7 reports the LM statistic calculated for each model. Note 
that with four degrees of freedom the critical 5% value from the Chi-squared 
distribution is 9.49. 
Model LM Statistic 
"Production (Injury)" 6.91 
"Turnover (Injury)" 14.20 
"Wage (Injury)" 14.60 
"Liability (Injury)" 12.95 
"Government (Injury)" 1.98 
"Production (Redun)" 5.13 
"Turnover (Redun)" 6.58 
"Wage(Redun)" 4.10 
"Consumer Safety" 7.12 
"Consumer Sales" 5.90 
"Consumer Liability" 9.29 
"Third Party Liability" 2.68 
"Third Party Image" 10.42 
"Third Party Ethics" 6.96 
"Creditor Trade" 12.92 
"Creditor Short Term" 6.32 
"Creditor Long Term" 3.37 
"Owner Maintain" 13.59 
"Owner Increase" 4.38 
"Owner Tax" 2.35 
"Owner Bankrupt" 10.07 
Table 7: LM Statistics 
However, despite the evidence that there could be heteroscedasticity in 7 of the 
regression models it is not believed to represent a serious problem. As Greene (1997) 
points out the presence of heteroscedasticity may not always have a significant effect 
on the coefficient estimates in a model (and as such is unlikely to explain why some 
96 
coefficients do not have the predicted sign). Moreover although quite robust, a 
significant LM test, as with the two other Neyman-Pearson tests (Likelihood Ratio 
and Wald), does not necessarily indicate that a model suffers from severe 
heteroscedasticity (Davidson & McKinnon 1984). The possibility that 
heteroscedasticity is not a serious problem is also further supported by the fact that 
when an attempt was made to correct the seven models for the presence of 
multiplicative heteroscedasticity (see Greene 1997) the significance of the explanatory 
variables' coefficients actually worsened. 
5.2 Results of Employee Regressions 
Table 8a: Results of Multinomial-Probit Estimations for Employee Variables 
n= 114, t statistics in [], doff=99 
"Productivity "Turnover "Wages "Liability 
(Injury)" (Injury)" (Injury)" (Injury)" 
Constant 2.630 1.303 2.448 2.090 
[2.97] [1.53] [2.94] [2.15] 
Turnover (000m) 0.170 0.883E-01 0.178E-01 
-0.629E-01 
[1.70] [1.77] [0.43] [0.76] 
Turnover * Capital Dummy 
-0.267 -0.893E-01 -0.140E-01 -0.163E-01 
[2.36] [1.52] [0.27] [0.17] 
Profit Ratio (%) 
-0.797E-02 0.208E-02 -0.953E-02 
0.116E-01 
[0.62] [0.16] [0.67] [0.67] 
Diversification 
-0.187 -0.825E-01 -0.786E-01 -0.104E-01 
[2.97] [1.75] [1.57] [0.17] 
Capital Intensity 
-0.319E-03 -0.887E-03 -0.561E-03 
0.213E-02 
[0.61] [1.27] [0.39] [1.16] 
Gearing 0.257E-02 
-0.107E-02 -0.181 E-02 
0.117E-02 
[1.5 1] [1.19] [1.43] [0.65] 
Risk 
-0.242E-01 0.974E-02 -0.305E-02 -0.649E-02 
[1.68] [0.62] [0.23] [0.46] 
Capital Goods Dummy 1.250 0.480 0.205 
0.229 
[1.20] [1.61] [0.74] [0.621 
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Profit-Related Pay Dummy 0.289E-01 
-0.622E-01 0.798E-01 
-0.715E-01 
[0.11 ] [0.22] [0.33] [0.25] 
Options Dummy 0.211 0.111 
-0.895E-01 0.286 
[0.68] [0.38] [0.34] [0.89] 
Risk Manager Dummy 0.204 0.960E-01 0.447 0.343 
[0.83] [0.40] [1.96] [1.24] 
Personal Insurance 
-0.326 
-0.109 -0.182 -0.901E-01 
[2.03] [0.75] [1.34] [0.51] 
Company Insurance 0.495E-01 
-0.285 
-0.373 -0.433E-01 
[0.27] [1.81] [2.27] [0.25] 
Long Term Risk Taker 0.120 0.987E-01 0.875E-01 0.767E-01 
[0.72] [0.61] [0.54] [0.41] 
0.945 0.634 0.691 0.811 
[3.11] [5.08] [5.15] [1.70] 
[L2 1.530 1.631 1.436 1.488 
[4.42] [9.39] [8.21] [2.87] 
. 
L3 2.745 2.144 2.100 2.385 
[7.43] [10.81] [10.01] [4.44] 
2(15) 37.4 19.2 27.6 16.2 
Significance 0.0006 0.156 0.016 0.299 
Table 8b: Results of Multinomial-Probit Estimation for Employee Variables 
n= 114, t statistics in [], doff=99 
"Government 
(Injury)" 
"Productivity 
(Redun)" 
"Turnover "Wages 
(Redun)" (Redun)" 
Constant 2.006 1.211 1.167 1.405 
[1.59] [1.55 [1.48] [1.71] 
Turnover (£000m) 0.799E-01 0.181 E-01 0.400E-01 0.482E-01 
[0.65] [0.22] [0.52] [0.64] 
Turnover * Capital Dummy 
-0.13 " -0.469E-01 -0.385E-01 -0.608E-01 
[0.98] [0.50] [0.44] [0.67] 
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Profit Ratio (%) 0.413E-01 
-0.215E-01 -0.912E-02 -0.203E-01 
[1.72] [1.69] [0.71] [1.55] 
Diversification 0.371E-01 
-0.365E-01 -0.201 E-02 -0.492E-01 
[0.45] [0.70] [0.39] [0.88] 
Capital Intensity 0.301E-02 
-0.222E-03 -0.204E-03 -0.202E-03 
[0.86] [0.14] [0.16] [0.12] 
Gearing 
-0.103E-02 0.803E-03 
-0.147E-02 -0.191E-02 
[0.92] [0.86] [0.92] [1.05] 
Risk 
-0.162E-01 -0.176E-01 -0.611E-02 -0.115E-01 
[0.86] [1.30] [0.44] [0.78] 
Capital Goods Dummy 0.482 0.157 0.222 0.332 
[1.05] [0.48] [0.67] [0.95] 
Profit-Related Pay Dummy 0.719E-01 
-0.650E-01 -0.733E-01 0.137 
[0.18] [0.27] [0.24] [0.511 
Options Dummy 0.837E-01 0.320 0.127 0.384E-01 
[0.21] [1.271 [0.42] [0.14] 
Risk Manager Dummy 
-0.172 0.537 0.435 0.527 
[0.48] [2.25] [1.66] [2.26] 
Personal Insurance 
-0.238E-01 -0.319 -0.213 -0.199 
[0.11] [2.11] [1.35] [1.27] 
Company Insurance 
-0.310 -0.364E-01 -0.259 -0.277 
[1.39] [0.25] [1.69] [1.83] 
Long Term Risk 
-0.418E-01 0.105 0.139 0.159 
[0.18] [0.67] [0.74] [0.86] 
_L j 0.452 0.614 0.477 
[4.55] [5.49] [4.61] 
[i2 1.060 1.36 1.058 
[7.80] [8.10] [7.28] 
1.702 2.169 1.620 
[8.83] [8.08] [8.70] 
X21ý) 21.7 18.83 16.81 21.96 
Significance 0.083 0.172 0.266 0.080 
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Tables 8a and 8b report the results of the employee regressions. The null hypothesis 
that the motivation for the management of employee injury and redundancy risk is 
randomly distributed is tested by the x2(15) statistic. This is rejected at the 5% 
significance level in the case of dependent variables "Productivity (Injury)" and 
"Wages (Injury)" and at the 10% level for "Government (Injury)" and "Wages 
(Redun)". There is, however, no strong evidence of any systematic application of risk 
management among respondents directed at reducing either of the labour turnover 
dependent variables, "Productivity (Redun)" or "Liability (Injury)". 
The insight that a firm's financial performance can influence its motivation for 
employee risk management can be investigated further by examining the estimated 
coefficients and their significance in Tables 8a and 8b. The motive which appears to 
be most influenced by a firm's financial performance and organisational 
characteristics is the improvement of employee productivity in relation to injury 
["Productivity (Injury)"]. As expected respondents were more likely to regard this 
motive as very important (i. e. choose the highest value of the dependent variable) in 
pion-diversified firms in the capital goods sector with high gearing ratios (which is 
significant at the 14% level). However, contrary to expectation firms that exhibit low 
variability of return on equity (i. e. those that were low risk) also found this motive to 
be very important. This result may be due to the fact that such firms actually exhibit 
less firm specific risk because the importance that they attach to this area means that 
they invest more heavily in related risk management. Another unforeseen result was 
that "Turnover" had a positive impact on the importance ascribed to this motive 
(albeit only at the 10% level). However, the negative coefficient of the interaction 
variable "Turnover * Capital Dummy" coupled with the fact that -0.267 dominates 
0.170 means that as expected the marginal effect of turnover is negative for firms 
operating in the capital goods sector (D=1) but positive for other firms (D=0). 
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With respect to the other significant models 
- 
"Wages (Injury)", "Government 
(Injury)", "Wages (Redun)" 
- 
the evidence of a strong relationship between the 
individual financial variables and the importance attached to risk management is 
patchy at best. There is some limited evidence that non-diversified firms attach greater 
importance to reducing employee wage-risk premiums in relation to the risk of injury 
(at the 12% level ). Moreover, profitable firms appear to attach a greater importance to 
complying with government regulations. This was not expected, although, it may be a 
reflection of Shavell's (1986) "Judgement Proof Hypothesis" 
- 
whereby profitable 
firms are more averse to the risk of fines or enforced liquidation because they have 
more to lose. Genn's (1993) argument that larger and or riskier firms will attach a 
greater importance to the management of liability costs and regulatory compliance is 
not, however, well supported. 
With respect to the personal influence of respondents an examination of the relevant 
coefficients in the various models of tables 6a and 6b shows a reasonable degree of 
conformity in their sign (if not always significance). For example, with only one 
exception ("Government (Injury)") the risk manager dummy variable has a positive 
sign and sometimes significant coefficient (in "Wages (Injury)", "Productivity 
(Redun)", "Turnover (Redun)" and "Wage (Redun)") across all the dependent 
variables: thus respondents who describe themselves as risk managers are more likely 
to regard employee risk management as important on almost all fronts. Similarly the 
two proxies for respondent risk aversion (level of preferred personal and company 
insurance) also generally exhibit negative and sometimes significant coefficients 
("Personal Insurance" in "Productivity (Injury)" and "Productivity (Redun)" and 
"Company Insurance" in "Turnover (Injury)", "Wages (Injury)", "Turnover (Redun)" 
and "Wage (Redun)") supporting the contention that respondents who appear to be 
risk averse are more likely to favour the management of employee related risks. In 
contrast the signs of the profit-related pay and options dummies were not always as 
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expected, although none of the coefficients of these two variables were significant in 
any of the models. 
5.3 Results of Consumer Regressions 
Table 9: Results of Multinomial-Probit Estimation for Consumer Variables 
n= 114, t statistics in [], doff=99 
"Consumer "Consumer "Consumer 
Safety" Sales" Liability" 
Constant 0.487 2.150 0.137 
[0.46] [2.25] [0.12] 
Turnover (£000m) 0.104 0.188 
-0.357E-01 
[0.95] [1.58] [0.57] 
Turnover * Capital Dummy 
-0.172 -0.197 -0.566E-01 
[1.461 [1.63] [0.67] 
Profit Ratio (%) 0.181E-01 
-0.939E-02 0.481E-02 
[1.07] [0.63] [0.30] 
Diversification 
-0.309E-01 -0.618-02 -0.103 
[0.45] [0.12] [1.55] 
Capital Intensity 
-0.307E-02 -0.172E-02 0.503E-02 
[0.04] [1.02] [1.51] 
Gearing 0.114E-02 0.643E-03 -0.530E-04 
[0.66] [0.44] [0.05] 
Risk 
-0.111E-01 -0.829E-02 -0.826E-02 
[0.64] [0.52] [0.49] 
Capital Goods Dummy 0.840 0.127 0.315 
[1.96] [0.37] [0.80] 
Profit-Related Pay Dummy 0.432 0.174 -0.150 
[1.19] [0.62] [0.43] 
Options Dummy 0.166 -0.349 -0.484E-01 
[0.46] [1.17] [0.12] 
Risk Manager Dummy 0.2O5 0.483E-02 
0.700 
[0.65] [0.02] [2.05] 
1O2 
Personal Insurance 
-0.254 
-0.197 
-0.284 
[1.20] [1.25] [1.27] 
Company Insurance 
-0.606E-01 
-0.163 0.110E-01 
[0.30] [1.01] [0.05] 
Long Term Risk 0.178 0.151 0.438 
[0.82] [0.91] [1.86] 
0.454 
[3.32] 
µ2 0.955 
[5.53] 
µ3 1.610 
[7.92] 
X 
2(15) 13.7 28.9 18.0 
Significance 0.475 0.011 0.206 
Table 9 reports the results of the consumer regressions. Of the three consumer models 
only one reports a x2(15) statistic that is sufficient to reject the null hypothesis that all 
non-constant parameters are zero, "consumer sales" at the 5% significance level. 
Again as with the employee regressions there is little evidence of a significant 
relationship between the importance attached to consumer risk management and a 
fine's financial performance. In fact the significant "Consumer Sales" model reports 
only two almost significant coefficients for both "Turnover" (12%) and the "Turnover 
* Capital Goods Dummy" (11 %). "Turnover" has a positive coefficient, the opposite 
to that expected. However, the negative coefficient of the interaction variable 
"Turnover * Capital Dummy" coupled with the fact that 
-0.197 dominates 0.188 
means that the marginal effect of turnover is negative (as expected) for firms 
operating in the capital goods sector (D=1) but positive for other firms (D=0). 
Although reporting an insignificant x(15) statistic it is also interesting to note that the 
"Capital Intensity" variable in the "Consumer Liability" model is almost significant at 
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the 10% level, indicating that the marginal impact is negative for j=0 (i. e. 
unimportant) and positive for j=4 (important). This would seem to provide further 
limited support of Shavell's argument that capital intensive firms are more likely to try 
to reduce their exposure to liability claims because they are less "judgement proof'. 
With respect to the personal influence of respondents it would appear that risk 
managers (significant at 5%) and those who take a longer term view (significant at 
10%) are much more aware of the importance of reducing their company's exposure to 
the risk of liability claims. Unfortunately, however, nothing else appears to be 
significant, although the signs of the coefficients are quite consistent and generally as 
expected. 
5.4 Results of Third Party Regressions 
Table 10: Results of Multinomial-Probit Estimation for Third Party Variables 
n= 114, t statistics in [], doff=99 
"Third Party "Third Party "Third Party 
Liability" Image" Ethics" 
Constant 1.652 2.012 1.643 
[1.66] [1.73] [1.94] 
Turnover (000m) 0.380E-01 0.327 0.631E-01 
[0.52] [1.59] [0.96] 
Turnover * Capital Dummy 
-0.709E-01 -0.358 -0.848E-01 
[0.85] [1.71] [1.20] 
Profit Ratio (%) 0.179E-01 0.992E-02 0.505E-02 
[1.17] [0.60] [0.46] 
Diversification 0.660E-01 0.409E-0 1 -0.218E-01 
[0.91] [0.49] [0.38] 
Capital Intensity -0.461E-04 -0.634E-04 -0.477E-04 
[0.06] [0.09] [0.08] 
Gearing 0.383E-03 -0.187E-0 
3 0.837E-03 
[0.40] [0.2 21 [0.7 
_'] 
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Risk 
-0.276E-01 
-0.292E-01 
-0.494E-02 
[1.79] [1.63] [0.34] 
Capital Goods Dummy 0.634 0.644 0.285 
[1.63] [1.32] [0.94] 
Profit-Related Pay Dummy 
-0.283 0.106 0.908E-01 
[0.91] [0.28] [0.33] 
Options Dummy 0.102 0.266E-01 0.188 
[0.29] [0.07] [0.62] 
Risk Manager Dummy 0.261 0.484E-01 0.215 
[0.89] [0.15] [0.92] 
Personal Insurance 
-0.671E-01 
-0.253 
-0.224 
[0.36] [1.18] [1.42] 
Company Insurance 
-0.332 
-0.241 
-0.245 
[1.76] [1.12] [1.67] 
Long Term Risk 0.648E-01 0.129 0.239 
[0.34] [0.57] [1.35] 
0.602 
[3.26] 
µ2 1.040 
[4.63] 
µ3 1.970 
[7.65] 
x2(15) 15.6 17.7 18.7 
Significance 0.335 0.222 0.178 
Table 10 reports the results of the third party regressions. Unfortunately, none of the 
three third party models proved to be significant. Moreover, several of the few 
significant or almost significant coefficients failed to exhibit their expected sign (for 
example, the effect of "Risk" significant at 10% in "Third Party liability" and 11 % in 
"Third Party Image" on the importance attached to risk management is negative). The 
most notable exceptions to this, however, are perhaps the company insurance 
coefficients in the "Third Part` Liability" and "Third Party Ethics" models (each 
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significant at the 10% level). This result provides continuing evidence of the 
importance of the respondent specific variables and, in particular, risk attitudes. 
5.5 Results of Creditor Regressions 
Table 11: Results of Multinomial-Probit Estimation for Creditor Variables 
n= 114, t statistics in [], doff=99 
"Creditor "Creditor "Creditor 
Trade" Short Term" Long Term" 
Constant 2.178 2.800 0.259 
[2.05] [3.20] [0.32] 
Turnover (£000m) 
-0.298 0.109E-01 0.795E-01 
[1.29] [0.16] [0.82] 
Turnover * Capital Dummy 0.321 
-0.160E-01 -0.839E-01 
[1.40] [0.19] [0.76] 
Profit Ratio (%) 
-0.158E-02 -0.205E-01 0.200E-02 
[0.10] [1.30] [0.14] 
Diversification 
-0.661E-01 -0.562E-01 -0.317E-01 
[0.99] [0.84] [0.50] 
Capital Intensity 
-0.327E-03 -0.292E-03 0.964E-03 
[0.23] [0.24] [1.24] 
Gearing 
-0.114E-02 -0.299E-03 -0.848E-03 
[0.69] [0.28] [0.49] 
Risk 
-0.181E-01 -0.160E-01 0.379E-02 
[1.13] [1.26] [0.30] 
Capital Goods Dummy 0.242 0.149 0.469 
[0.52] [0.44] [1.27] 
Profit-Related Pay Dummy 
-0.694E-02 0.115 0.530E-01 
[0.02] [0.38] [0.17] 
Options Dummy 0.185 -0.702E-01 0.268E-02 
[0.65] [0.27] [0.01] 
Risk Manager Dummy 0.212 -0.3-16 0.559E-01 
[0.66] [1.43] [0.22] 
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Personal Insurance 
-0.244 -0.272E-01 
-0.131 
[1.33] [0.15] [0.69] 
Company Insurance 
-0.340 -0.344 
-0.200 
[1.88] [2.03] [1.17] 
Long Term Risk 
-0.961E-02 -0.189 0.146E-01 
[0.05] [1.06] [0.09] 
0.486 0.481 0.400 
[3.98] [4.52] [4.18] 
µ2 0.728 0.740 0.834 
[4.96] [5.66] [5.77] 
µ3 1.425 1.293 1.166 
[6.39] [6.68] [6.5] 
x2(15) 31.9 20.0 12.6 
Significance 0.004 0.130 0.557 
Table 11 reports the results of the creditor regressions. Only the "Creditor Trade" 
model reports a x2(15) statistic sufficient to reject the null hypothesis that all non- 
constant parameters are zero (at the 5% level). Moreover, even in this model few of 
the coefficients for the explanatory variables are significant at conventional levels. 
There is absolutely no evidence of any significant relationship between the 
importance attached to risk management and a firm's financial or organisational 
characteristics. In fact the only variable exhibiting the expected sign that is actually 
significant at conventional levels is "Company Insurance" (significant at the 5% 
level)'-s. This would seem to provide further evidence that it is the personal 
characteristics of managers and in particular their apparent attitude towards risk that is 
having the greatest influence on the importance attached to risk management. 
Note also that the "Company Insurance" coefficient is significant at the 5"u level in the 
"Creditor Short Term" model as well. 
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5.6 Results of Shareholder Regressions 
Table 12: Results of Multinomial-Probit Estimation for Shareholder Variables 
n= 114, t statistics in [], doff=99 
"Owner "Owner "Owner "Owner 
Maintain" Increase" Tax" Bankrupt" 
Constant 1.090 1.502 1.271 0.933 
[1.34] [2.01] [1.63] [1.09] 
Turnover (£000m) 0.400E-01 0.264E-01 0.371E-01 0.340E-01 
[0.50] [0.32] [0.55] [0.40] 
Turnover * Capital Dummy 
-0.681E-01 -0.550E-01 -0.408E-01 -0.411E-01 
[0.79] [0.61] [0.52] [0.47] 
Profit Ratio (%) 0.995E-02 0.820E-02 0.127E-02 0.166E-01 
[0.72] [0.77] [0.11 ] [1.18] 
Diversification 
-0.430E-01 -0.207E-01 -0.120E-01 -0.170E-01 
[0.77] [0.38] [0.28] [0.31] 
Capital Intensity 
-0.235E-03 -0.258E-03 0.205E-02 -0.247E-03 
[0.29] [0.24] [1.71] [0.39] 
Gearing 
-0.159E-02 -0.115E-02 -0.102E-02 -0.120E-02 
[1.20] [1.02] [0.93] [1.18] 
Risk 
-0.189E-01 -0.195E-01 -0.212E-02 0.127E-01 
[1.64] [1.85] [0.17] [0.80] 
Capital Goods Dummy 0.656 0.518 0.341 0.343 
[2.02] [1.57] [1.11] [1.11] 
Profit-Related Pay Dummy 0.155 0.204 0.180 0.312 
[0.54] [0.71] [0.66] [1.21] 
Options Dummy 0.290 0.283 0.896E-01 0.123 
[0.99] [0.91] [0.33] [0.46] 
Risk Manager Dummy 0.315 0.291 0.211 0.277 
[1.25] [1.15] [0.91] [1.14] 
Personal Insurance 
-0.104 -0.139 -0.166 -0.227 
[0.61] [0.92] [1.06] [1 41] 
Company Insurance -0.165 -0? 21 -0.319 -0.311 
[0.95] [1.39] 12 U5] [2.02] 
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Long Term Risk 0.313 0.208 0.569E-01 0.180 
[1.97] [1.35] [0.39] [1.21] 
0.534 0.671 0.550 0.331 
[3.59] [4.53] [4.85] [2.90] 
µ2 1.180 1.462 1.107 1.029 
[6.20] [8.11] [7.28] [6.10] 
µ3 1.894 1.913 1.628 1.500 
[8.83] [9.53] [8.92] [7.78] 
X2(15) 24.6 21.5 22.6 23.3 
Significance 0.038 0.088 0.066 0.056 
Table 12 reports the results of the shareholder regressions. Interestingly all these 
models have x2(15) statistics that are sufficient to reject the null hypothesis that all 
non-constant parameters are zero. In the case of "Owner Maintain" the x2(15) statistic 
is significant at the 5% level while for "Owner Increase", "Owner Tax" and "Owner 
Bankrupt" the statistic is significant at the 10% level. 
However, despite the overall significance of the models the argument that a firm's 
financial and organisational characteristics may influence its risk management 
decisions is not strongly supported. There is, for example, some evidence that firms 
operating in the traditionally risky Capital Goods plus Oil and Gas sector are more 
likely to attach importance to maintaining or increasing dividends to shareholders 
(significant at the 5% in "Owner Maintain" and 12% in "Owner Increase"). Yet in 
each of the models the sign of the coefficient for the "Risk" variable is actually 
negative (and significant at the 10% level in "Owner Increase") - partially 
contradicting the hypothesis that high risk firms will attach greater importance to 
shareholder risk management. This could, however, again be due to the fact that lower 
risk fines are low risk simply because they attach more importance to risk 
management. 
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Unfortunately the significance levels for the respondent specific variables are not 
much better. Again in line with many of the other models in this analysis a 
respondent's attitude towards risk (as reflected by their attitudes towards personal and 
corporate insurance) appears to be having the most influence on the importance 
attached to shareholder risk management ("Company Insurance" is significant at the 
5% level in both "Owner Tax" and "Owner Bankrupt"). However, contrary to 
expectations the remuneration structure of a respondent did not have any significant 
impact on their responses. This would seem to contradict the claims made in the 
theoretical literature (see Agrawal & Mandelker 1987, Lypney 1993, Tufano 1996) 
that shareholders can manipulate managers' behaviour through their remuneration 
structure. However, since it was not possible to gather particularly accurate data 
regarding managerial remuneration the strength of this conclusion must be considered 
suspect. 
6. Conclusions. 
The purpose of this Chapter was to attempt to identify whether the various predictions 
of the modern finance approach explain why large UK companies spend money on 
risk management. Summary statistics from a survey of 127 risk, insurance and finance 
managers conducted in late 1993 indicated that respondents placed most emphasis on 
ensuring statutory compliance with government regulations and the avoidance of legal 
liability suits. In contrast, with the interesting exception of third parties, stakeholders 
(even shareholders) seem less able to encourage corporate risk management 
expenditure on their own. Whether this is due to information gathering problems or 
simply a lack of bargaining power, it would appear that market forces are not fully 
effective and that government intervention is still necessary in order to protect 
stakeholders (especially employees and consumers) against excessive levels of risk. 
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Subsequent estimations using a multinomial probit model revealed that the responses 
for around half of the hypothesised motives for occupational risk management are not 
randomly distributed but dependent on both a firm's financial characteristics and the 
circumstances of its management. However, the evidence in support of many of the 
specific hypotheses of the modem finance approach is rather limited. In fact in only 
the "Productivity (Injury)" model did a firm's financial or organisational 
characteristics have any real effect on manager's responses. Furthermore in this and 
many other models the signs of the significant coefficients were not always as 
expected. 
On the other hand there appears to be a much stronger relationship between the 
dependent and respondent specific explanatory variables. Most of the coefficients for 
the respondent specific variables exhibited the expected sign (with the exception of 
the profit related pay and options dummies). Moreover a much greater number of 
these coefficients proved significant. One unsurprising (although reassuring) result is 
that risk managers seem to attach more importance to many of the ascribed motives 
for risk management. However, rather more interesting is the influence of a 
respondent's attitude towards risk. In many of the models either the personal insurance 
or company insurance variables had a significant negative coefficient, as such it would 
appear that risk averse managers are more likely to regard risk management as being 
very important. A result which is in line with several previous studies and in particular 
two of the most recent by Mayers & Smith (1990) and Tufano (1996). 
Although the poor significance of the various financial and organisational variables in 
the current empirical study would seem to suggest that many of the predictions of the 
modern finance approach to risk management are not very general it is hard to be sure 
about this conclusion. Admittedly many of the other more in-depth empirical studies 
into the modern finance approach have also suffered from low significance levels, 
however, it is quite possible that this is due to the rather inferior quality of the data 
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used rather than the insignificance of the approach. Indeed even in the current study 
the use of ordered attitudinal data to measure the various dependent variables may 
have lead to a degree of bias26. Yet, despite the uncertainty that surrounds the 
accuracy of current empirical research it is hard 
- 
given the existing evidence 
- 
to 
accept that the modem finance approach represents a panacea for understanding 
corporate risk management decisions. As such it would seem instructive to try to find 
some new approaches from which to understand both why and how firm's invest in 
risk management. The aim of the next three Chapters is to propose just such an 
approach, the roots of which are based in neo-classical economics rather than modern 
finance theory. 
26 For example, although respondents were asked to answer all questions on the basis of what 
was important to their company, rather than themselves, it is impossible to be sure that their 
personal opinions did not influence their responses. Thus it may be that the questionnaire data 
collected reflected what respondents felt should be the motivations for their company's risk 
management programme rather than what their company's motivations actually were. 
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Chapter 4: 
Widening the Focus of Risk Management Research 
1. Introduction 
As stated in the introduction of this thesis risk management is in many respects quite a 
new discipline. Because of this newness it is, therefore, perhaps unsurprising that no 
distinct theoretical framework has yet been developed for risk management (e. g. see 
Kloman 1992, Williams et al 1995). In fact in many respects researchers in the field 
have behaved like magpies, borrowing the choicest ideas from other disciplines such 
as modern finance theory, organisational behaviour and to a much lesser extent 
economics. 
The relative paucity of economic theory in risk management research is probably at 
least partly due to the tendency of those few models that do exist to rely on expected 
utility theory and in particular risk aversion (e. g. Mossin 1968, Ehrlich & Becker 
1972, Dionne & Eeckhoudt 1985, Briys & Schlesinger 1990, Briys et al 1991, 
Sweeney & Beard 1992, Schlesinger 1993, Di Mauro 1994, Gollier et al 1997). Most 
of the non-economics based research in risk management has now largely rejected the 
assumption that a firm can be treated as an expected utility maximising, risk averse 
individual. In the mainstream modem finance based literature this is of course (see 
Chapter 2) based on the powerful predictions of the CAPM and the recognition that 
firms are often political entities (Schoemaker 1993), comprised of conflicting 
stakeholder groups. Similarly much of the now growing organisational behaviour 
based work into risk management has also emphasised the importance of stakeholders, 
however, these studies are based more on observed "human" violations of the axioms 
of expected utility theory (e. g. see Schoemaker 1982, Pidgeon et al 1992) than hard 
financial realities. 
Yet, despite the considerable objections voiced regarding the use of expected utility 
theory and risk aversion in corporate risk management research it is argued over the 
remaining few Chapters of this thesis that alternative economic based explanations for 
risk management should not be ignored. Indeed by focusing on the shorter term 
operational decisions of a firm it will be demonstrated that a much richer framework 
for understanding a firm's risk management decisions can be developed. The 
challenge, however, is to devise an economic framework for risk management that 
does not rely on risk aversion. 
The next section of this Chapter reviews the main arguments that can be put against 
the use of risk aversion and more generally expected utility theory in economic 
models of firm behaviour under risk. Admittedly in terms of a firm's long term 
investment decisions this issue has already been examined in Chapter 2, however, for 
many economists the CAPM based arguments of modem finance theory have not 
been seen as sufficient to reject their use of risk aversion. Yet, there are other firmly 
economic based arguments against its use, each of which will be examined here. 
Having reviewed the problems associated with using risk aversion and expected 
utility theory section 3 offers a new economics based approach to examining the 
behaviour of a firm under risk. The primary foundation for this approach is the 
assumption that firms are short run profit maximisers and thus effectively risk neutral. 
Admittedly much of the recent organisational behaviour based work into risk 
management has largely rejected the idea that a real world firm will simply try to 
maximise its profits in a risky or uncertain world, however, it is argued that 
apparently basic economic models do still have much to contribute to our 
understanding of the area. On this basis two main possible economic justifications for 
corporate risk management are then outlined. The first is that risk can, on occasion, 
represent a "pure penalty" (Martin 1981) to the firm that may either raise its operating 
costs or lowers its revenues. The second is that firm behaviour under risk can 
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sometimes be influenced by "technological non-linearities" which cause convexities 
or concavities in its profit function (see Aiginger 1987, Ch. 4 or Driver & Moreton 
1992, Ch. 4). Section 4 finally rounds the chapter off with a brief conclusion. 
2. "Aversion to Risk Aversion"': A Critique on the use of Risk Aversion in 
Economic Models of Firm Behaviour Under Risk. 
A major contribution of the modem finance approach has been its use of the CAPM to 
reject the traditional a-priori assumption in risk management research that firms can 
be treated as risk averse expected utility maximisers (see Chapter 2). Unfortunately, 
however, while this insight has been used to generate a wide range of interesting 
theories on the mainstream finance side of the risk management literature, many 
economists have actually used this work to further justify their focus on risk aversion 
(see Sandmo 1971, Leland 1972, Newbery & Stiglitz 1981, Varian 1990, Schlesinger 
1993, Di Mauro 1994, Gollier et al 1997, and especially Greenwald & Stiglitz 1987, 
1990). The problem rests on the fact that in the modem finance approach risk 
management is largely assumed to be the result of market imperfections that cause the 
firm's stakeholders to behave in a risk averse way (see Chapter 2). The reasoning 
adopted by these economists then goes that where certain stakeholders (especially 
managers and shareholders who are perhaps the most influential) are able to influence 
a fine's economic decisions (e. g. how much to produce of a given product and at what 
price etc. ) the behaviour of a firm can be proxied by a risk averse utility function. In 
short, although it is generally accepted that a firm cannot be regarded as a true risk 
averse individual, the suggestion is that where powerful stakeholder groups are risk 
averse it can be treated "as if' (Schlesinger 1993) it ist. 
I Goldberg (1990). 
2 Gollier et al (1997) sums this up quite well: 
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Admittedly the concepts of risk aversion and expected utility theory do provide a 
relatively simple and convenient way to explore the short run economic decisions of a 
firm in a world of risk (see, for example, Varian 1990). However, in what follows it is 
argued that this simplicity and convenience is bought at a very high cost. In particular, 
two main criticisms are explored. The first is that it is theoretically highly 
inappropriate to assume that firms may behave as if they are risk averse. The second is 
that incorporating risk aversion into economic models can shift the focus from a 
number of rather more relevant and interesting possible influences on firm behaviour 
under risk. 
The theoretical inappropriateness of the "as if' approach to risk aversion stems from 
the predictions of the social choice literature and in particular in the seminal work of 
Arrow (1951,1963). The purpose of Arrow's research was to examine a long running 
debate in the social choice literature regarding whether it is possible to aggregate 
individual preferences into a complete and consistent (i. e. transitive) social welfare 
function. Interestingly Arrow's argument was that this would not be possible, at least 
when the preferences of individuals' differed over three or more alternatives. 
Arrow's conclusion may seem surprising, however, his basic idea was not at all new. 
In fact the problem of accurately reflecting individual preferences within social 
choices has been recognised for centuries (e. g. see Condorcet 1785) and embodied in 
the so called 'paradox of majority voting'3. 
"... we only see it [risk aversion] as a proxy for taking into account the imperfections of capital 
markets, and more specifically the fact that shareholders cannot fully diversify their 
portfolios. ". 
For a good discussion of this paradox see Gravelle & Rees (1992). 
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Paradox of Majority Voting 
Consider a group of three individuals labelled i=1,2,3 who each possess a strict 
preference ordering over three alternatives (i. e. no one is indifferent between any of 
the alternatives): a, b and c. The preferences of each individual are then assumed to be 
(a, b, c)1, (b, c, a)2 and (c, a, b)3 which must somehow be aggregated into a combined 
social welfare function []. In order achieve this the individuals are then asked to 
indicate their preferences by voting on each pair of alternatives. 
Considering first each individual's preference ordering for the pair (a, b) : 
(a, b)1 and (b, a) 2, and (a, b) 3 [a, bJ 
I it is obvious that 2 is outvoted by 1 and 3. Voting on the pair (b, c) then yields: 
(b, c) 1 and (b, 02, and (c, b) 3= [b, cl 
I where 2 is again outvoted by 1 and 3. However, voting on the last pair (a, c) should 
paradoxically give rise to the following result: 
(a, c) and (c, a) 2, and (c, a) 3= [c, a] 
i. e. 1 is outvoted by 2 and 3. 
Example 1: Paradox of Majority Voting 
Example 1 provides a classic example of this voting paradox. It illustrates that the 
democratic process can produce an intransitive social ordering of individual choices 
- 
wllcrc in this case a is socially preferred to b and b is socially preferred to c but 
paradoxically c is also socially preferred to a. This loss of transitivity is quite serious, 
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effectively what it yields is a meaningless cyclical result that in no way represents the 
true preferences of any of the three individuals. 
Arrow's contribution was to formalise this paradox of majority voting into a much 
more general theory, now termed his "Impossibility Theorem"4. He did this by 
devising four "apparently reasonable (sic)" conditions or axioms that he felt any 
social welfare function should possess. What Arrow then argued was that no complete 
and transitive social welfare function could ever simultaneously meet all these 
axioms5. They are as follows: 
(i) Unrestricted or Universal Domain. This axiom requires that all logical 
combinations of individual preference orderings must be able to yield a 
transitive social welfare function. Thus even when a certain sub-group (such 
as a particular pressure group or union) of individuals shares the same 
preference ordering the assumption is that it will not be possible to achieve a 
universal social ordering unless the group's preferences can be aggregated 
with those of all other sub-groups. 
(ii) Non-dictatorship. Non-dictatorship means that no one individual has the 
exclusive authority to determine the social welfare function in all 
circumstances. As such any social preference ordering must be democratically 
determined, taking into account the views of all individual decision makers. 
Arrow's research is in fact more formally known as his "General Possibility Theorem" (see 
Sen 1988). 
For a good formal proof see Gravelle & Rees (1992, Ch. 17) or the original research by Arrow 
(196; ). 
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(iii) Pareto Inclusiveness. This reflects the Paretian focus of modem economics. 
What it requires is that if the majority of individuals prefer one alternative to 
another then this should be reflected in the final social welfare function. 
(iv) Independence of the irrelevant alternatives. In technical terms this means that 
any change in an individual's preference ordering that does not affect their 
preference between two other alternatives will not affect the social ordering of 
these alternatives, i. e.: 
If [a, b] then any change in (. )i which does not affect (a, b)i (such as a change 
in the individual's preference for c) will leave unchanged [a, b]. 
What this implies is that a social welfare function must only reflect the sum of 
individual preferences over a number of discrete pair-wise alternatives (i. e. as 
in Example 4.1 individuals can only vote for one of two alternatives at any 
one time). Consequently an Arrowian social welfare function is ordinal and as 
such is not affected by an individual's strength of preference for one 
alternative over another (i. e. whether one alternative is considered to be the 
very best and another the very worst)6. 
Although Arrow's research has primarily been associated with political choices the 
implications of his "Impossibility Theorem" can be applied to any group decision (see 
In order to see this more clearly imagine that there are two decision makers (1,2) with the 
preference functions: (a, b, c) j and (b, a, c)2. Now assume that 2's preferences alter to become 
(b, (-, a) ,. What this means is that in 2's opinion a is now the worst possible alternative - thus 
indicating a strengthening preference for b over a. However, following the independence of 
irrelevant alternatives condition this change does not help the formation of a social welfare 
function (even though 2's dislike of a is likely to be more intense that l's preference for it) 
since it is assumed to be immaterial. 
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Gravelle & Rees 1992, Ch. 17). Thus in relation to the behaviour of the firm Arrow's 
Theorem would seem to rule out the possibility of aggregating the divergent inter- and 
even intra-group preferences of stakeholders into a distinct corporate utility function. 
In short, if Arrow is correct a firm cannot exhibit subjective preferences and behave in 
the same way as an individual (or rather in accordance with the aggregated 
preferences of many individuals). Instead the only reasonable assumption regarding 
corporate behaviour is that a firm will simply select investment projects on the basis 
of first order stochastic dominance criteria (i. e. by selecting projects which yield the 
greatest expected value or profit for a given level of risk 
- 
see Hadar & Russell 1969) 
since its stakeholders will not be able to agree to it behaving in any other way. 
Admittedly, the strength of the implications of Arrow's "Impossibility Theorem" for 
corporate decisions do rather depend on the validity of his sometimes quite restrictive 
axioms7. Indeed at the level of inter-stakeholder relations the predictions of Arrow's 
theorem would not appear to be particularly valid. For example, one commonly 
accepted way round the Theorem is too relax the independence axiom and allow 
participants to exhibit a strength of preference (e. g. Sen 1970, Hammond 1977, 
Kaneko & Nakamura 1979). Specific stakeholder groups could, therefore, indicate 
their intensity of feeling for different risk increasing or reducing investment 
alternatives (e. g. insurance, physical risk control, advertising, research and 
development etc. ) by altering their aggregate compensation demands. Moreover it is 
even possible that certain cohesive groups (such as majority shareholders or senior 
managers) might be able to personally influence the behaviour of the firm by acting as 
a dictator. Indeed research into the behaviour of senior officers (May 1995, Tufano 
1996) has already revealed that their preferences can have a significant impact on the 
risk management decisions of firms. 
For a comprehensive review of all the criticisms that have been levelled at Arrow's 
Impossibility Theorem see Sen (1970,1986,1988). 
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On the other hand, taken at the level of intra-group relations Arrow's theorem is 
somewhat more plausible. A good example of this is the aggregation of third party 
preferences. Each individual third party is likely to possess very different priorities, 
some preferring the firm to invest in their immediate physical safety, with others 
placing more importance on: social wealth generation, long term pollution effects or 
technological improvements (etc. ). In addition, given the large number of people that 
are likely to comprise the total group it will not generally be possible for them to 
express their strength of preference for different alternatives (imagine trying to assess 
and then aggregate the subjective preferences of several million people) or for one 
individual to dominate the proceedings8. Of course some degree of cohesion may be 
provided by interest groups9, however, it is rare for large numbers of individuals to 
join such groups 
-a fact that does rather question the Pareto inclusiveness of their 
actions 10 
Other stakeholder groups while perhaps more cohesive than third parties are also 
likely to find it difficult to achieve global preference orderings that meet all of 
Arrow's axioms. For example, a firm's employees may all agree that they deserve 
more pay or improved job security, however, differences of opinion may well arise 
when they try to reconcile more contentious issues such as equal opportunities, safety 
8 Indeed as Sen (1986,1988) points out it is still not generally possible to reconcile the 
divergent preferences of large groups. 
For a good discussion of the role and function of pressure groups see Dunleavy (1991, Ch. 2 
& 3). 
10 Although occasionally wider society may share their objectives (see again Dunleavy Ch 2& 
3). 
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or job demarcation". Similarly the only real criteria that most shareholders are likely 
to be able to always agree upon is profit, with opinions regarding alternative 
objectives (such as corporate governance or the level of executive remuneration etc. ) 
not always reaching a consensus (see Boros 1995, Ch. 3)12. 
Thus, even though it may be possible for specific stakeholder groups to achieve joint 
(and potentially mutually beneficial) social preference orderings it is much less likely 
that the aims of these groups will accurately represent the specific "human" concerns 
of the individuals that comprise them. Indeed it would seem that just as in the 
political context, corporate applications of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem maintain a 
substantial "theoretical invulnerability" (Riker 1982, p 129), where even now it is hard 
to refute the reasonableness of its axioms in many cases. In short, while 
circumstances may arise in which it may be possible for stakeholders to reconcile 
their differences and encourage corporate behaviour that represents their subjective 
preferences, mutual agreements are by no means certain. As such it would generally 
appear to be preferable to justify observed corporate risk management behaviour on 
grounds other than risk aversion. 
II See, for example, the work on democracy in trade unions. Here it has already been observed 
that differences of opinion can exist between full time union officers and "grass roots" 
members as well as between sub-groups of "grass roots" members (see, Heery & Fosh 1990, 
Fiorito et al 1995, Terry 1996). 
12 A prime example of this was the debate concerning executive remuneration at British Gas in 
1995. Many small individual shareholders felt that the company's directors had granted 
themselves excessive pay rises in the face of employee redundancies and tried to restrict the 
size of future increases. However, the motion to restrict future pay increases failed because of 
a refusal by institutional shareholders to back the idea (see The Economist, 4th `larch 1995 & 
3rd June 1995). 
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The second major area of criticism against the use of risk averse utility functions in 
economics based corporate risk management research 
- 
that risk aversion can shift the 
focus from a number of rather more relevant and interesting economic scenarios 
- 
has 
been highlighted in the insightful work of Goldberg (1990)13. Calling risk aversion a 
"conversation-stopper" Goldberg observed that its use as a convenient analytical short 
cut in economic models has actively prevented many potentially more realistic lines 
of thought from being properly explored14. The crux issue is that giving a firm (or 
indeed an individual) a risk averse utility function can make any subsequent analysis 
of its behaviour rather complex. This will often then require the inclusion of 
numerous restrictions into a model (in terms of, for example, the relationship between 
the decision variable(s) and risk, the type of competition faced, or even the exact 
specification of cost, production and demand functions) that can rule out certain 
highly probable scenarios. 
In order to see this point more clearly consider the rather simple case of a perfectly 
competitive firm that must decide on how many inputs to use before knowing its final 
13 See also Allen & Lueck (1995) who criticise the use of risk aversion and expected utility 
theory in the economics of contracts literature. 
14 Interestingly this point was to some extent made earlier by Stigler & Becker (1977) who 
noted: 
"[T]he literature on risk aversion and risk preference [is] one of the richest sources of ad hoc 
assumptions concerning tastes..... [N]o significant behaviour has been illuminated by 
assumptions of differences in tastes..... 
..... 
[S]uch theories have been used as a convenient crutch to lean on when the analysis has 
bogged down..... They give the appearance of considered judgement, yet really have only 
been ach hoc arguments that disguise analytical failures. " 
Ilo\vever, although criticising the practical relevance of expected utility theory Stigler & 
Becker made no real attempt to justify or illustrate their point. 
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output level. The firm uses only one input (z) at a certain cost c. The market price (p) 
is also fixed, however, the level of final output that results from a given quantity of 
varies. Output (q) is therefore random and described in multiplicative form (see 
Chapter 5, section 3.1.3) as: 
4= f(z)s, where f' >O, f" <0 
Hence the variability of output is assumed to be positively related to both z and s 
where c >_ 0 is a random variable with a mean standardised to 1 and variance .2 >_ 0. 
Given these assumptions a risk neutral firm will attempt to maximise expected profits 
according to the following optimisation condition 
E[71] 
= 
E[Pf(z)c 
-Cz] [1] 
Where E is the expected value operator. 
The first and second order conditions are then simply: 
E[pf'(z)£ 
- 
c] =0 [2] 
or 
pf'(z) =c=0 [2a] 
and 
E[Pf"(z)E] <0 [3] 
Where [3] will be satisfied since f"<0. 
Now assume that the firm is risk averse with a concave utility function that is both a 
continuous and differentiable function of profits so that: 
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u'(m) > o, u"(n) < o. 
Consequently the firm has become an expected utility (rather than an expected profit) 
maximiser, its input decisions depending the following optimisation condition: 
E[U(7r)] 
= 
E'[U(Pf (z)E 
-cz)]" [4] 
The first and second order conditions for a maximum are, therefore, 
E[ U'(7t)(Pf'(z) E 
-c)] =0 [51 
E[U"(7r)(Pf'(z)E 
-C)z - U'(T[)Pfff(z)sl <0 [6] J 
Note that the second order condition for a maximum would still be satisfied for a risk 
averse firm when f"=0, however, such an assumption would preclude a comparison 
between its behaviour in the certain and risky cases (see Chapter 5 section 3.2.4, see 
also Sandmo 1971 or Pope & Kramer 1979). Thus in order to compare [5] with the 
risk neutral case rearrange it to get 
E[U'(7t)pf'(z)c] 
= 
E[ U'(71)] c 
Then noting that the expected value of the product of two random variables (in this 
case the marginal utility of profit and output) is simply the covariance of the two 
variables plus the product of their means (i. e.: E[-v. 1 J= cov(- , v) + E(_YJE[I J), rewrite 
this expression to get 
Pf'(ý) E[U(n)] + cov(U'(7T)" P. f'(ý )E) = E[L''(ý)]c 
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Following Eeckhoudt & Gollier (1992, Ch. 11) move the covariance term over to the 
right hand side and divide both sides by E [U' (n )] to get finally: 
(u' (7t), 
pfU(Z)E) 
[7] 
Comparing equation [7] with that of [2a] it should become clear that the behaviour of 
a risk averse firm is not only influenced by the tangible revenues and costs that can be 
generated by different levels of z but also by the additional term: 
cov(U'(n), pf'(z)E) 
This term describes the impact that risk has on the utility E[U'(it)] 
function of the firm and in effect represents the "psychological" cost of risk 
(Eeckhoudt & Gollier 1992 p190-191). Given that decision makers should all prefer 
more wealth to less the value of the denominator will always be positive, however, 
the value of the numerator 
- 
which effectively denotes the impact of risk on the 
marginal utility of profits 
- 
and hence the sign of the expression will depend on a 
firm's attitude towards risk. Under risk aversion the numerator will be negative, 
meaning that a risk averse firm will demand a lower level of z than it would in a 
world of certainty15. In short, the negative sign of the numerator essentially reflects a 
risk averse firm's desire to reduce its exposure to risk by lowering its demand for 
inputslG. To see this remember that in expected utility theory the slope of a risk averse 
decision maker's utility function of wealth is positive but concave. Hence the 
marginal utility of wealth received by a risk averse decision maker will decline for 
higher (i. e. more beneficial) realisations of the state of nature. 
I ý, Of course for a risk neutral firm the value of this term will be zero. 
16 Remember that given multiplicative risk a reduction in z will lower a firm's exposure to output 
fluctuations. 
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Perhaps the most obvious theoretical problem to arise out of this example is that the 
inclusion of risk averse behaviour in economic (or indeed financial) models adds 
quite an elaborate non-linear term to the analysis 
-a concave marginal utility function 
of wealth. The issue is that a risk averse decision maker is not only concerned about 
his or her expected returns but also the extent to which actual returns may vary. This 
will, therefore, need to be reflected in the model along with an acceptance of the 
additional complexities that this can bring. 
Examples of the complexities that a non-linear utility function can bring to economic 
models of firm behaviour abound in the literature. For example, Leland (1972) found 
it impossible to predict how the presence of demand risk would affect the behaviour 
of a risk averse, price setting monopolist except in the extremely limiting case of 
additive risk. Furthermore, the exact preferences of even a quantity setting monopolist 
could only be determined where the firm's expected returns were assumed to be 
increasing in the level of risk'7. Similarly research into the economic impact of 
multiple sources of risk (e. g. Ratti & Ullah 1976, Eeckhoudt & Kimball 1991, 
Machnes 1993, Wong 1996) has also suffered from the complexities that risk aversion 
can bring. In fact many of the resultant models have found it necessary to specify not 
only the exact relationship that exists between different risks (i. e. whether they are 
independent or exhibit a positive or negative covariance) but also the nature of higher 
and quite esoteric moments of a decision maker's utility function18. 
17 Leland calls this his "Principle of Increasing Uncertainty" 
18 For example to get a clear result from their model Eeckhoudt & Kimball (1991) had to define 
a decision maker's utility function down to the fourth derivative. They claimed that this 
indicated the degree of "prudence" exhibited by a decision maker. 
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A further important theoretical problem regards the (limited) generality of the results 
of models using risk aversion. As shown in equation [7] the concept of risk aversion 
is based on a firm's (or individual's) subjective (although supposedly rational 
- 
see 
von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944, Schoemaker 1982) preferences for certainty over 
risk. However, where firms are given subjective preferences the ensuing model will 
need to account for the fact that they could differ in their personal distaste for risky. 
Without such a recognition situations could arise in which an increase (or decrease) in 
risk may affect each individual firm in a market somewhat differently. Take the 
simple example of a small increase in the mean and a large increase in the variance of 
E. At first glance such a change might be expected to cause all risk averse firms to 
reduce their demand for z. However, for firms that exhibit very low levels of risk 
aversion such a situation may actually be beneficial (since the expected productivity 
of z has increased), thereby, prompting them to actually increase their demand for z. 
In order to combat the problem of differences in the strength of individual risk 
preferences without imposing highly limiting assumptions on the nature of a firm's 
risk preferences (e. g. quadratic utility), changes in risk have needed to be quite 
closely specified in terms of both their impact on the mean and riskiness of s. The 
usual way to do this is to stick to changes which exhibit second (and sometimes even 
third order) stochastic dominance (see Hadar & Russell 1969 and Levy 1992) such as 
the introduction of a Rothschild & Stiglitz (1970) mean preserving spread20. 
However, while this can help to yield unambiguous results it does rather restrict the 
In fact these differences in tastes may not just depend on the extent to which U"<O (and hence 
the strength of the negative covariance between U'(7t) and pf'(z)E) but also on higher 
(and rather esoteric) moments of a firm's utility function such as U"' or even U"". 
20 For a change in risk to exhibit second order stochastic dominance it must be preferred by all 
risk averse decision makers, i. e. those exhibiting U'>_0, U"<_0. Third order stochastic 
dominance requires that: U'>_0, U"50, U"'>-O. 
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situations that can be modelled. Indeed the above example of a small increase in the 
mean coupled with a large increase in the riskiness of E would probably need to be 
excluded. 
Thus it would seem that the use of a risk averse utility function in economic models 
can often create more costs than benefits. What is needed, therefore, is an alternative 
method to explain why a firm's short run operational decisions may be influenced by 
its exposure to risk. The purpose of the next section is to develop an economic 
framework that can accomplish this. 
3. Developing Economic Rationale for Risk Management that Does Not Rely 
on Risk Aversion. 
3.1 Introduction 
Despite the rather strong objections that were outlined in section 2 against the use of 
risk averse utility functions, economic theory does have a lot to contribute to our 
understanding of corporate risk management decisions. However, in order to be of any 
real value economic based research into risk management will need to move away 
from the idea that firms may behave "as if' they are risk averse. In fact in what 
follows this notion is rejected completely, instead it is assumed that a firm is a simple 
short run (expected) profit maximiser. Such a focus may seem surprising to some21, 
yet it will be shown that economic models built around even quite basic behavioural 
assumptions can be used to extend the circumstances under which risk management 
could be used by a firm. 
21 For example, Smith &. Williams (1991) suggest that risk management will be of no value to a 
myopically profit maximising firm. 
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Admittedly the use of even non-expected utility based concepts such as profit or 
indeed value maximisation have recently received quite extensive criticism in certain 
corners of the risk management literature. The main brunt of criticism has come from 
the organisational behaviour based research of authors such as Clarke (1992), Pidgeon 
et al (1992), Anand & Forshner (1995) and Glendon & McKenna (1995). The basic 
tenet of this work is that given the complexity of real world organisational 
environments and the often irrational desires of stakeholders it is unrealistic and 
sometimes even dangerous (Toft 1996)22 to think about or model risk in an objective 
way. Instead these authors argue that rather than following supposedly rational23 goals 
such as profit or value maximisation a firm's risk management decisions are typically 
influenced by what are commonly termed heuristics or less formally "rules of thumb". 
The idea that firms will use heuristics largely arose out of the extensive psychological 
based empirical research that has been conducted into the real world decision making 
processes of individuals under risk24. Of particular relevance in the seminal work of 
authors such as Kahneman & Tversky (1973) and their observed "Availability 
Heuristic" 
- 
where in an experimental study they found that events which could be 
recalled or imagined easily were given higher probabilities. In another experimental 
study Slovic et al (1980) proposed two further widely recognised heuristics 
- 
those of 
"dread risk" (the extent to which a risk is feared) and "unknown risk" (the extent to 
22 Toft's (1996) rather emotive argument is based on the premise that rational models of risk 
management lead us to overlook the impact that human actions and attitudes can have on the 
risk of major disasters. 
ý3 Rational behaviour can be quite hard to define (see Sugden 1986,1989). However, for the 
purposes of this section it can be considered to be the maximisation of some objective 
function (e. g. profit, growth or utility) with full information and unlimited powers of 
reasoning. 
24 For two good recent reviews of this area see Pidgeon et al (1992) and Shiller (1997). 
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which a risk is understood by a decision maker). More heuristics have since been 
identified (most of which again based on experimental observations) dealing with 
issues such as the influence of past actions (Tversky & Kahneman 1974), framing 
effects (Schoemaker & Kunreuther 1979, Hershey & Schoemaker 1980, Tversky & 
Kahneman 1981) and even the media (Slovic 1987, Nelkin 1988). 
Given the quite large number of empirical studies it is hard to deny that heuristics will 
not colour at least to some extent the real world decision making processes of either 
influential individuals (e. g. MacCrimmon & Wehrung 1986 & 1990, March & 
Shapira 1987, Lypney 1993, Mitchell 1995) or even certain groups within firms (see 
Pidgeon 1991, Pidgeon et al 1992, Turner 1994, Yardley et al 1997). However, 
despite this fact rational economic models of risk management are far from redundant 
(although some might like to see it that way, for example, Clarke 1992). As 
Schoemaker (1993) points out rational economic models have an important role to 
play in our understanding of a wide range of corporate behaviour. In particular, 
rational models keep the analysis tractable, enabling the consideration of complex 
issues such as the strategic interdependence of firms (see Chapter 6). Moreover, 
although the risky decisions of certain individuals and groups may depend on 
heuristics it is hard to believe that the firm as a whole will not in some way be 
influenced by rational criteria such as profit maximisation (Hay & Morris 1991, p292- 
296) 
- 
particularly when senior management remuneration is closely tied to profits 
(see Agrawal & Mandelker 1987, Lypney 1993, Tufano 1996)25. Indeed, as will be 
shown in Chapter 6, in the corporate context certain heuristics could actually be used 
as part of a rational strategy to increase profits. 
Thus it is without any further apology that the analysis proceeds with the assumption 
that firms are rational expected profit maximisers. Despite this assumption, however, 
Although some would dispute this view (e. g. Mitchel 1995). 
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it will be demonstrated that even an apparently risk neutral firm is rarely going to be 
completely indifferent to risk or risk management. This concern originates out of two 
main observations that have been made in the general "economics of uncertainty" 
(Hey 1979) literature. The first is that risk can, on occasion, represent a "pure penalty" 
(Martin 1981) to the firm, which either raises its operating costs or lowers its 
revenues26. The second is that firm behaviour under risk can sometimes very closely 
mimic that of a risk averse or even risk preferring individual when it is influenced by 
what are commonly termed "technological non-linearities" in its profit function (see 
Aiginger 1987, Ch. 4 or Driver & Moreton 1992, Ch. 4)27. 
3.2 Risk as a pure penalty 
In order for risk to represent a pure penalty for the firm the profits arising out of each 
possible state of nature can be no better than would occur in a world of certainty and 
must also sometimes be worse (Martin 1981). Hence, profit under certainty represents 
the upper bound of profit under risk meaning that a firm cannot benefit in any way (at 
least directly 
- 
see Chapter 6) from its exposure. The presence of risk will, therefore, 
cause an unambiguous reduction in the firm's expected profits, which it is likely to try 
to control through risk management. 
2() Theoretically it is also possible that risk could confer a pure benefit onto a firm (see Nickell 
1978, p72-74), however, Driver & Moreton (1992, p46-47) argue that such an eventuality is 
much less likely in practice. 
27 Aiginger (1987) makes a third observation that where a risk neutral firm is given some form 
of costly ability to alter their decision variable(s) ex-post (i. e. once the final state of nature is 
known) they may also cease to be indifferent to risk. However, as he himself recognises in 
almost all cases of ex-post flexibility the fundamental drivers of firm behaviour are pure 
penalties and technological non-linearities (for example, see Turnovsky 1973, Hartman 1976, 
Bernanke 1983, Ghosal 1995). 
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A classic example of risk as a pure penalty is the price rigidity model for a profit 
maximising, perfectly competitive firm under demand risk described in Aiginger 
(1987, Ch. 4) and Driver & Moreton (1992, Ch. 4). In this model a perfectly 
competitive firm is assumed to make its output decisions (q) based on a fixed market 
price (p) but before random consumer demand for its product is known (as denoted by 
the random variable X)28. The aim of a profit maximising firm is then to achieve 
optimum profits by maximising the difference between total revenue (r) and total 
costs (C). 
Before proceeding further consider the certainty case in which a firm's revenue and 
costs will simply be a function of the only non constant variable: q. The profit 
maximising firm will, therefore, attempt to maximise its profits according to the 
following conditions: 
i= r(q) 
-c (q), [8] 
7t' =r'(q)-[9] 
7t "= rff(q) 
- 
c"(q) < 0. [10] 
Noting that p= r'(q) for a perfectly competitive firm (given the fact that it faces a 
perfectly elastic demand curve 
- 
see for example, Gravelle & Rees 1992, Ch. 10) this 
then yields the standard result 
- 
that an individual firm will maximise its profits at the 
level of q which equates the market price with its marginal costs. However, when 
exposed to demand risk the firm's behaviour is likely to change since in maximising 
28 A prime example of this approach is the classic "newsboy" problem, in which a newspaper 
seller faced with a fixed cover price and random consumer demand must decide how many 
papers to purchase from his or her central distributor. 
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its profits it will not only need to consider how a change in q may affect its marginal 
revenues and marginal costs but also the possible values (x) that X could take. The 
reason for this is the fixed market price that prevents supply and random consumer 
demand from always being in equilibrium. This then forces the firm to resolve a new 
dilemma between raising output to make the most of high demand states or lowering 
it to reduce the possibility that produce will be wasted when demand is low. 
Given that even in a world of risk a firm should seek to produce a level of output that 
equates the fixed market price with its marginal costs it should attempt to resolve this 
dilemma by assuming that its sales will be equal to the minimum of production or 
demand (see Aiginger 1987, Ch. 4)29. More formally this results in the following 
profit maximising condition: 
it = min[r(X), r(q)] 
-c (q), 
or 
7r Z-c (q), 
where 
Z r(X) when 
X<q 
r(q) when X>q 
[i1] 
[l la] 
Assuming that f(x) is the probability distribution function of X with the cumulative 
distribution function F(x), such that: 
F(-v) = prob ft < q), 
It is worth noting that where the firm does not follow the standard marginal cost pricing 
assumption of perfect competition (e. g. where price is determined by a fixed mark-up) the 
results of this model may change (see Driver & Moreton 1992, Ch. 4). 
134 
1-F(x) = prob (x > q), 
then from [ II a] the expected value of Z will be: 
E[Z] 
= r(X)F(x) + r(q) (1-F(x)) 
and 
dE[ZJ/dq 
= r'(q) 
- 
r'(q)F(x) 
Thus the first and second order conditions for the firm's profits to be at a maximum 
are: 
dE7t/dq 
= r(q) 
- 
r-'(q)F(x) 
- 
c(q) =0 [12] 
d2Em/dq2 
=r ºº(q) [l 
- 
F(x)] 
-r º(q)f(x) -c "(q) < 0. [ 13 ] 
Compared to [8] equation [12] has one additional negative term (- r'(cq)F(x)) that 
(since r'(q) > 0, F(x) > 0) serves to directly reduce the expected marginal revenue and 
hence output of the firm. This term represents the tangible pure penalty element of 
risk. In this case the pure penalty comes from the positive potential30 for unsold (i. e. 
wasted) production in low demand states (where x <_ q) coupled with the fact that 
when demand is high the fixed market price prevents the firm from doing any better 
than it would in a world of certainty31. 
30 Since under the axioms of probability: 0 <_ F(-) >_ 1. 
31 To see this remember that no perfectly competitive firm can do better than produce the level 
of q that ensures p= r'(q) = c'(q) (the profit maximising condition in a world of certainty). 
Any increase in q above this level will simply reduce the profits of the firm 
- 
since it will be 
producing where p= r'(q) < c' (q)). 
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In the above example the fixed price induced pure penalty has effectively caused a 
downwards (or more specifically right-wards) shift in the marginal revenue function 
of the firm. More generally, however, pure penalties can have an adverse affect on 
either the marginal revenue or marginal cost function of the firm. The broad effects of 
both are detailed in figures 1 and 2. 
Figures 1 and 2 about here 
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the impact of revenue and cost related pure penalties 
respectively. In figure 1 the impact of a pure penalty has resulted in a downward 
(right-wards) shift in the perfectly competitive firm's marginal revenues. This adverse 
shift has then caused output (which falls from qc to qr) and profits to fall (where 
ABqcO > CDqrO). On the other hand figure 2 shows the impact of a cost related 
penalty. In this case the penalty causes the firm's marginal cost function to shift 
upwards (left-wards), however the net result is the same: output and profits will both 
fall (where in this case ACqcO > ABqrO). 
In addition to the supply and demand dis-equilibrium model examined above several 
other possible causes of cost and revenue related pure penalties have been identified 
in the economics literature. In fact as a limited amount of recent research has shown 
many of the agency and transactions costs put forward by the modern finance 
approach to risk management can also be considered as pure penalties in an economic 
context. Most notable perhaps are the works of Greenwald & Stiglitz (1993) and 
Schileider (1992)32 who explore the economic impact of bankruptcy costs33 and 
32 See also Parry & Parry (1991) and Di Mauro (1994) who undertake a similar analysis to 
Schneider. However, their work relies much more heavily on the existence of risk aversion. 
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employee compensation claims/productivity respectively. In each case it is 
demonstrated that the presence of risk can serve to directly increase a perfectly 
competitive finn's marginal costs, thereby, providing a possible incentive for 
investment in risk management. However, while the predictions of the modem 
finance approach can be used to provide a number of interesting pure penalty based 
economic justifications for risk management, other equally attractive additional 
possibilities exist. For example there is the case of random output in the face of fixed 
demand (Aiginger 1987, Chung 1990) or the impact of a single unreliable input in a 
two factor fixed coefficient production process (Roodman 1972, see also Martin 1981 
for a similar model). Moreover, whenever a firm is exposed to a "pure" risk (i. e. a risk 
whose outcomes are always negative 
- 
see Chapter 2, section 2) it is likely to 
experience some form of cost or revenue related pure penalty (McKenna 1986). 
3.3 Technological Non-Linearities. 
Where the presence of a particular risk leads to a reduction of profits in every state it 
is not difficult to see how its presence should motivate an expected profit maximising 
firm to invest in risk management. However, exposure to many risks can lead to not 
only adverse but also beneficial states of nature in which the firm's profits are higher 
than they would be in a world of certainty. Thus in order for the presence of such 
risks to affect the risk management decisions of a firm it will generally be necessary 
to prove that the losses associated with adverse states will be either greater or less 
than the gains in beneficial ones34. Of course one way to do this is to rely on expected 
33 Note that depending on the specification of a model the possibility of costly bankruptcy could 
also create a technological non-linearity (Smith & Stultz 1985, Greenwald & Stiglitz 1993). 
34 Perhaps because of its roots in pure risk (see Chapter 2, section 2) most of the academic 
research into risk management has assumed that it will only be used to reduce a firm's 
exposure to risk. However, more recently it has been suggested that risk management may 
have a role to play not just in decreasing risk but also in profitably increasing it as well (e. g. 
Doherty & Smith 1993, Stultz 1996). 
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utility theory and risk averse or risk preferring utility functions. However, if (see 
section 2 above) it is accepted that expected utility theory is not an appropriate basis 
on which to model the behaviour of firms an alternative explanation will be required. 
One more appropriate, way of expressing the apparent risk averse or risk preferring 
preferences of a firm is to make use of technological non-linearities (see Aiginger 
1987, Ch. 4 or Driver & Moreton 1992, Ch. 4). Technological non-linearities can 
affect the behaviour of a profit maximising firm when two elements are present. First 
the firm must make its price and or output decisions ex-ante (i. e. before the state of 
the world and hence its final profits is known) 
- 
this forces it to maximise expected 
rather than actual profits. Second the presence of a technological non-linearity must 
cause the firm's total and or marginal profit function to become strictly concave or 
convex in the random variable(s) faced35. The situation is then analogous to that of a 
expected utility maximising individual (von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944, Pratt 
1964, Arrow 1965), the only difference being that a firm's behaviour is firmly rooted 
in its desire to maximise profits (or more specifically, expected profits) rather than 
utility. 
In order to fully understand the impact of technological non-linearities on a profit 
maximising firm assume that its profits are a function of a decision variable Y and a 
stochastic variable X, i. e.: 
7t =71 (X, Y) 
35 Note that strict non-linearity in a firm's total profit function is sufficient to show that the 
presence of risk will affect its expected profits. However, in order to show that the presence of 
risk will influence a firm's price/output decisions (as is generally case under risk aversion) a 
strictly non-linear marginal profit function is also necessary (see Nickell 1978, Ch. 5). 
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The formal condition for the firm's apparent indifference, aversion or preference for 
risk then depends on there being a linear, strictly concave or strictly convex 
relationship between the response of profits to a small change in the decision variable 
(Y) and the stochastic variable (X). In other words36: 
If 7r is concave, nYxx < 0, Y is lower under risk than in a world of certainty. 
If 7tY is convex, t > 0, Y is higher under risk than in a world of certainty. YXX 
If 7ty is linear, 7t\xx = 0, Y is the same under risk than in a world of certainty. 
Formal proof that the strict convexity or concavity of the profit function of an 
expected profit maximising firm will influence its decisions can be derived using 
Jensen's Inequality (see Aiginger 1987 Ch. 4 or Eeckhoudt & Gollier 1992 Ch. 3). 
Jensen's Inequality essentially states that for any strictly concave (convex) function of 
a random variable the expected value of that function will always be below (above) its 
equivalent value in a world of certainty. Specifically this implies that: 
If m is a strictly concave (convex) function of the random variable X then: 
E[ir Y(X)] < r[E(X)I (E[i r(X)I > 71 r[E(X)]) 
Figure 3 about here 
36 Interestingly the formal requirements for an expected profit maximising firm to lose its 
indifference to risk comes from the Rothschild & Stiglitz condition for the optimal value of a 
decision variable to be smaller under uncertainty than the optimal value under certainty for 
any risk averse decision maker (Rothschild & Stieglitz 1970 & 1971). Indeed, as Aiginger 
(1987) points out it is quite a trivial exercise to modify the Rothschild & StWlitz condition to 
illustrate the impact of technological non-linearities. 
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7ty 
(Response 
in Profit to 
a change 
in Y) 
Figure 3: Impact of a Mean Preserving increase in Risk When i, r 
is Concave in Y 
X, X, X 
To see this result more clearly consider the graphical example of the impact of a 
negative technological non-linearity (i. e. one that reduces the expected profits of a 
firm) illustrated in Figure 3. Here the firm's marginal profit function (ny) is assumed 
to be strictly concave in the random variable X (i. e. n'xx < 0). Any value of n 
associated with a certain value for Xwill then be greater than the expected value of 'ty- 
corresponding to any possible random X values (i. e. Xl and X, ) obtained in a mean 
preserving spread (Rothschild & Stiglitz 1971). Marginal (and indeed total) profits 
are, therefore, lower in a world of risk causing the point of zero marginal profit to be 
reached sooner than under certainty and thus reducing the firm's demand for Y. 
In the corporate context technological non-linearities will generally arise where 
circumstances conspire to cause concavities and convexities in a firm's revenue, cost 
or production functions37. For example, all things being equal, a concave revenue 
function should cause a firm's profits to become more concave, while a convex 
production function (in which productivity increases with input use) will do the 
opposite. Many different factors have already been identified that could cause a firm's 
revenue, cost or production function to become strictly concave or convex, however, it 
should be noted that most research has focused on the impact of negative 
technological non-linearities38. Some causes of negative technological non-linearities 
have even been considered by authors within the modern finance approach to to 
justify investment in risk management 
- 
such as a progressive tax function (see 
chapter 2 section 3.3 and especially Eeckhoudt et al 1997), the risk of costly 
37 Even the "attitudes"' of individuals towards risk may be influenced by technological non- 
linearities. For example, the investment decisions of managers may be more due to 
concavities and convexities in their remuneration structure than a basic psychological liking 
or disliking for risk (e. g. see Lypney 1993). 
8 Although, see Oi (1961) for an interesting and rather enlightened discussion of a positive 
technological non-linearity. 
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bankruptcy (Smith & Stutlz 1985) or an increasing marginal cost of credit (Froot et al 
1993). Yet, other interesting possible causes of technological non-linearities remain to 
be properly considered in the risk management literature39. For example, one prime 
cause of a negative technological non-linearity identified in the economics literature is 
imperfect competition and the effect that this can have on the structure of a firm's 
revenue function (e. g. Leland 1972, Nickell 1978, Turnbull 1986, Klemperer & Meyer 
1986,1989). Indeed as will be shown in Chapters 5 and 6 the presence of risk in an 
imperfectly competitive industry can generate some quite surprising predictions 
regarding both a firm's production and risk management decisions. Moreover another 
interesting cause of a technological non linearity is the case of multiple unreliable 
inputs explored by Ratti & Ullah (1976). In Ratti & Ullah's model a firm uses two 
inputs (i. e. K and L) to produce its final output. Unfortunately the services rendered by 
these inputs are assumed to be random (where k= uK and L= vL and it, v are 
random variables with a unit mean) meaning that final output fluctuates. Then 
assuming that the elasticities of the marginal product curves are non-increasing 
functions of factor services and the two inputs compliment each other less and less as 
the productivity of one or other increases Ratti & Ullah demonstrate that exposure to 
two randomly productive inputs will create a technological non-linearity that reduces 
expected profits since the firm is forced to utilise inefficient combinations of k and 
L 40. 
9 See A iginger (1987) for a comprehensive review of the role of technological non-linearities in 
economic models of firm behaviour under risk. 
40 Note that Pope & Just (1977) do criticise Ratti &t 1llah's result and assumptions. 
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4. Conclusion 
In many respects the conclusions of this chapter appear contradictory. On the one 
hand it was argued that a firm's decisions are not motivated by "human-like" concerns 
such as risk aversion, while on the other it was shown that an apparently risk neutral. 
expected profit maximising firm is still unlikely to be indifferent to risk. However, the 
crux issue is that risk 
- 
even speculative risk 
- 
can have a tangible and often negative 
impact on both a firm's revenue and cost functions. In short the presence of risk can 
often complicate corporate decision making, thereby, increasing the chance that a firm 
will make a mistake and often reducing its profitability. 
Viewed under a framework of pure penalties and largely negative technological non- 
linearities risk management would appear to be an important investment for a firm, 
adding value by directly increasing the profitability of its operations. However, what 
has not yet been determined is the exact relationship between a firm's exposure to risk 
and its demand for risk management. Each type of risk (e. g. demand, cost or 
technological risk) is likely to influence a firm in rather different ways - affecting both 
the type of risk management tool that is chosen and the extent to which it is used. 
Moreover the economic environment in which a firm finds itself in (such as the extent 
of a firm's market power or its cost conditions for example) is likely to have a 
significant effect on its preferred risk management strategy. It is these important 
issues that are discussed in the next two Chapters. 
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Chapter 5: 
Risk Management and the Theory of the Firm 
1. Introduction 
To some the title of this Chapter might appear to indicate that its contents are merely 
an attempt to reinvent the wheel. It was in fact Cummins (1976) who first used this 
title twenty years ago for his seminal paper on firm behaviour under risk (see Chapter 
2, section 2 for more information). However, although stressing the need for a risk 
management decision framework that incorporates the global objectives of a firm 
Cummins's use of this phrase is somewhat misleading. What Cummins was actually 
proposing was a framework for corporate risk management decisions based upon the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) not the neo-classical economic theory of the 
firm that is applied here. 
A major problem with just using the CAPM (or its derivatives such as Levy's 1978 
Generalised CAPM 
- 
see Chapter 2) as a means to predict/explain corporate risk 
management behaviour is that it gives a rather one-dimensional view of the world. 
The trouble is that although CAPM based risk management models can be used to 
investigate the impact of risk on the long term market value of a firm, they are much 
less effective in evaluating shorter term concerns such as a given risk's influence on 
(expected) profits. In particular one point that has been largely overlooked by both 
Cummins and much of the subsequent CAPM based "modem finance" research into 
risk management is that increases in risk may not always be followed by a rise in a 
firm's short run expected returns'. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 4, a considerable 
I Admittedly some of the research (although this does not include Cummins) into the modem 
finance approach for risk management has recognised that tax or bankruptcy effects may lead 
to a negative relationship between risk and expected profits. However, these are only two 
reasons out of the many discussed in Chapter 4. moreover empirical studies have shown that 
the real world significance of tax or bankruptcy related costs in motivating risk management 
(especially those related to tax) is often quite small (see Chapter 3). 
body of economics based research has already demonstrated that increases in risk will 
often represent a tangible and immediate cost to a firm. Using this insight the current 
Chapter goes onto demonstrate that it is possible to explain corporate risk 
management expenditure without having to resort to the assumption adopted by most 
modern finance based risk management models 
- 
that some of the firm's stakeholders 
are (or at least act as if) risk averse. 
Integrating risk management into the neo-classical economic theory of the firm can 
also extend our understanding of corporate risk management decisions in other ways. 
For example, one major benefit is that the relationship between a firm's primary 
operational decisions (i. e. how much to produce, what inputs to use or price to charge, 
etc. ) and its expenditure on risk management can be more firmly established. Modern 
finance based risk management research has never really addressed the impact that a 
firm's operational decisions can have on the size or nature of its risk management 
expenditure. Admittedly authors such as Shapiro & Titman (1985), Smith & Stultz 
(1985), MacMinn (1987), Cho (1988) and Froot et al (1993) have considered how the 
size of a firm's cash flow fluctuations, bankruptcy costs or leverage may affect the 
scale of its risk management operations, however, in none of these cases has a formal 
link between risk, risk management and a firm's price, input or output decisions ever 
really been made. This Chapter, therefore, attempts to provide an answer to this 
question, by showing how risk management can have a direct and significant 
influence on a firm's operational decisions. 
Finally (as will primarily be argued in Chapter 6) economic theory can be used to aid 
our understanding of the strategic role of risk management. For example, industry 
commentators have already suggested that real world firms consider their rivals 
derivatives strategies when devising their own hedging plans (Bank of America 1995, 
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Bishop 1996, Lawless 1997), however, what is lacking is a formal theoretical 
framework to explain the such behaviour. 
Unfortunately, economic models of firm behaviour under risk are not without their 
complications. One major issue is that the predictions of a particular model are highly 
dependent upon the rather large number of specific assumptions that need to be made. 
Changes in the nature of the firm (i. e. its cost conditions or whether it is a price or 
quantity setter), its competitive environment and the form of risk that it will face 
(Aiginger 1987 Chs. 5-7) can all have a significant impact on the final outcome. 
Consequently, the analysis in this Chapter is necessarily restricted to only a small 
number of cases. In particular, it will focus on examining the planned output and risk 
management decisions of firms that face what is commonly termed technological risk 
(e. g. Walters 1960, Gravelle & Rees 1992, Ch. 21). Using this basic framework the 
behaviour of firms operating within three different market forms will then be 
considered, those of perfect competition, monopoly and oligopoly. 
Section two commences with a brief critical discussion of the work of previous 
authors who have attempted to explain how the presence of risk may influence the 
behaviour of both expected utility and expected profit maximising firms. In particular 
it is argued that no one has yet properly considered a firm's incentive to actively 
control its exposure to risk in an economic context. Section three then attempts to 
address this problem by outlining a model in which an expected profit maximising 
firm must decide whether or not it wants to directly control the variance of random 
fluctuations in its production capacity. Section four provides some solutions for this 
model using the three selected market forms of perfect competition, monopoly and 
oligopoly. Under perfect competition it is shown that since each firm faces a perfectly 
elastic (constant) demand function the presence of firm specific output fluctuations 
will not affect the expected profits of such firms (although industry wide risks may 
still have an effect). This yields the standard result of the modern finance literature - 
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that a risk neutral firm will not generally purchase risk management unless it 
alleviates either agency or transactions costs. However, in what follows it is argued 
that perfect competition is simply a special case of a more general model. For 
example, in both monopoly and oligopoly markets a firm's marginal profit function 
may become concave in its exposure to output fluctuations, this can then cause output 
and expected profits to fall prompting investment in risk management. 
2. Integrating Risk Management with the Theory of the Firm Under Risk. 
The purpose of this section is to briefly review a number of previous attempts at 
explaining how the presence of risk may influence the behaviour of both expected 
utility and profit maximising firms. A key feature of this research is the suggestion 
that firms will not generally be indifferent to risk, moreover, it appears to be widely 
accepted that most firms (even expected profit maximisers in some cases) should wish 
to control their exposure. However, despite these observations only a very small 
number of papers have actually explicitly examined the economic impact of risk in a 
formal corporate risk management context. In particular what remains to be fully 
explored is an expected profit maximising firm's incentive to endonegously (i. e. 
internally) control its underlying exposure to risk. 
Surprisingly, in much of the earliest economic based research into the behaviour of 
firms under risk it was assumed that risk was exogenous and that a firm would be 
unable to alter the underlying distribution of the random parameter(s) that it faces 
(e. g. Walters 1960, Oi 1961, Tisdell 1969, Sandmo 1971, Leland 1972, Ratti & Ullah 
1976, Applebaum & Katz 1986, Gravelle & Rees 1992, Ch 21). The practice of 
formal risk management is, therefore, effectively assumed away. Indeed the only way 
that a firm can influence its exposure to risk (if at all) in these highly simplistic 
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models is to adjust its primary operational decisions 
- 
such as by altering its preferred 
output or price level2. 
Recent research has attempted to more fully examine a firm's incentive to control its 
exposure to risk in an economic context. Take, for example, the pioneering research 
of Pope & Kramer (1979) and the subsequent related research by MacMinn & 
Holtmann (1983) and Ramaswami (1992). The crucial insight of these papers is that 
the randomness of output does not simply rely upon the number of inputs demanded 
(as in the standard multiplicative case with exogenous risk) but also on the specific 
nature of an input and whether it serves to increase or decrease a firm's exposure to 
risk3; i. e. 
q 
=z+h-7E; E(s) =0. 
The above formulation is taken from Pope & Kramer, however, it aptly (if 
simplistically) describes the approach followed by the two later papers. Random 
output, as denoted by 4, is determined by the quantity demanded of the single input 
and the random variable E. The term h is then used to denote whether the input is risk 
2 Note that a prime example of an exogenous risk model is outlined in Chapter 4 (section 2). 
Here a risk averse perfectly competitive firm was exposed to multiplicative technological risk 
(of the form ci =f (z)E) and forced to make its input decisions before final output is known 
(as denoted by z and q respectively). Given multiplicative risk it was then demonstrated that 
the risk averse firm can beneficially lower its exposure to output fluctuations by reducing its 
demand for inputs. However, the variance of E and hence the level of risk surrounding the ex- 
post productivity of : is unalterable. 
Common examples of risk decreasing inputs given in the literature include fertiliser and 
irrigation. However, there are many other non-agricultural possibilities (for example, safety 
training, machine maintenance, sprinkler systems etc. ). 
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increasing or decreasing. Specifically when h is positive an input is said to be risk 
increasing, conversely when negative it is risk decreasing. 
Unfortunately, although the research of Pope & Kramer, MacMinn & Holzmann and 
Ramaswami recognised that a firm can actively control its exposure to risk, their 
approach's capacity to explain corporate risk management decisions remains 
extremely limited. One particularly undesirable characteristic of all these models is 
that the firm is assumed to be risk averse. The trouble with risk aversion is that it 
places limits on the assumptions that can be incorporated into economic models of the 
firm4. Indeed in each model the impact that a risk increasing or reducing input can 
have on output variability had to be quite closely defined. The upshot being that even 
in the most general framework by Ramaswami (1992) it is still not possible to 
incorporate the fact that changes in risk could influence a firm's mean profits 
. 
Similarly, although each model does allow the firm to face both risk increasing and 
risk decreasing inputs at the same time, the level of one of these inputs is typically 
fixed. This reflects a major simplification since in a true endogenous risk model a 
firm should be able to choose its desired level of both conventional risk increasing 
inputs (such as labour and capital) and risk decreasing risk management ones at the 
same time. Admittedly Pope & Kramer do at least consider (in passing) the case 
where a firm may simultaneously employ different levels of both a risk increasing and 
a risk decreasing input. However, their work is not very general and they are unable to 
predict firm behaviour in all but a few simple cases'. Moreover, Pope & Kramer did 
not allow for any real interaction between risk increasing and risk decreasing inputs, 
4 For a general critique on the use of risk aversion in economic models see Chapter 4, section 2. 
For example Pope & Kramer predict that where inputs are substitutes the fir in is likely to 
switch from risk increasing to risk decreasing inputs. However they are unable to make a 
similar prediction in the case where inputs are compliments. 
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instead a change in input use could only affect the overall distribution of possible 
output states and in no way affected the reliability of other inputs6. 
Another interesting attempt to more fully endogenise the impact of risk has been the 
now quite established research into the economic value of risk financing 
arrangements7. Many different tools have been discussed from the use of derivatives 
markets (Newbery & Stiglitz 1981, Anderson & Danthine 1983, Britto 1984, 
MacMinn et al 1989, Froot et al 1993, Bowden 1995, Moschini & Lapan 1995, 
Haruna 1996) and mutual insurance groups (Newbery & Stiglitz 1981, Martin & Yu 
1990) to capital and product diversification (Diamond 1967, Newbery & Stiglitz 
1981, Bowden 1995) and inventories (Newbery & Stiglitz 1981, Aiginger 1987, Ch. 
6, Bowden 1995). However, whatever the mechanism used the basic result is the 
same, surplus income is stored in favourable (e. g. high output) periods and then used 
in more adverse states, the net result being a more stable income stream. 
The primary advantage of the risk finance based literature is that a firm is usually 
allowed to select both conventional operational and risk management inputs at the 
same time. This has yielded some interesting results, perhaps the most notable of 
which is that when risk financing tools are purchased a firm will often increase its 
demand for profitable risk increasing inputs (such as labour or capital). Yet, there are 
still problems with this research. One is that the results tend to be highly tool 
6 For example, it is generally accepted that investment in risk control devices will directly 
increase the reliability of the firm's other inputs (see Feller 1957, p416-421). Thus if the firm 
was to invest in say regular machine maintenance this should reduce the probability of future 
breakdowns and help to stabilise output. However, in Pope & Kramers' model such interaction 
is not possible. 
For a definition of risk financing see Appendix 4. 
pecific8. Thus just because some model predicts that a firm may use futures to 
ontrol the effects of one type of risk (e. g. commodity price fluctuations) does not 
can that it will use options or insurance in the same context. Moreover, perhaps 
even more disturbing is the fact that although models incorporating risk financing 
tools allow the firm to shift income between states it is still not allowed to directly 
control the underlying distribution of the risks that it faces. 
Currently perhaps the best attempts to endogenise risk have come from the traditional 
economics of insurance literature. Of particular relevance is the work of authors such 
as Ehrlich & Becker (1972), Dionne & Eeckhoudt (1985), Briys & Schlesinger 
(1990), Briys et al (1991), Parry & Parry (1991) and Sweeney & Beard (1992). 
Importantly these authors observed that it is possible to directly influence the 
underlying distributions of many risks (both in terms of the mean and variance of a 
random parameter). By incorporating this assumption into their models they then 
concluded that economic decision makers are likely to invest a positive amount in 
what they define as the major risk management tools of. insurance, "self insurance" 
and "self protection"9. 
However, despite the explicit recognition in the economics of insurance literature that 
it is possible to directly control risk the applicability of these models to the corporate 
context is severely limited. One major problem is that almost all of the literature's 
8 The only real exceptions to this are Moschini & Lapan (1995) who considered the demand for 
both futures and options and Bowden (1995) who investigated the interaction between futures 
use, diversification and inventories. However, both papers focused on risk averse firms, 
moreover Bowden failed to consider the case of output induced price fluctuations (see section 
4 below). 
The term "self insurance" is an unfortunate one since it refers to the financing of retained 
losses, which are, by definition, uninsured. However, despite the theoretical objections it 
remains in common usage (see Williams et al 1995, p200). "Self protection" is used to 
describe physical loss control tools such as sprinkler systems or regular machine maintenance. 
predictions are derived through the use of risk aversion (see Chapter 4 for a discussion 
of the problems associated with using risk aversion in the corporate context)'°. 
Moreover, in not one of these models has there been any attempt to understand how 
the combined presence of risk and risk management may influence other important 
business/operational decisions such as the demand for productive inputs. 
Admittedly some attempt to address these criticisms has been made by Schneider 
(1992)11. Schneider explicitly considered the interrelationships between the labour and 
self protection decisions of a profit maximising, perfectly competitive firm in the face 
of both cost and technological risk. Interestingly what Schneider revealed was that in 
the face of cost risk (where the compensation claims of employees are random) labour 
and risk management will tend to be complements, while under technological risk 
(where the productivity of employees varies) they can be substitutes. 
However, while insightful, Schneider's predictions are still based on a number of 
rather undesirable assumptions. For example, one issue is Schneider's rather simplistic 
assumption that a firm's exposure to cost and or technological risk can only result in 
the creation of pure penalties (see Chapter 4, section 3.2). Indeed all Schneider 
considered was a firm's exposure to the risks that labour compensation claims would 
be higher and productivity lower than in a world of certainty. Yet, in the real world 
there may be states of nature in which the costs or productivity of a firm's labour force 
10 The only work to explicitly consider the actions of a firm is by Parry & Parry (1991). 
However, all they really consider is the purchase personal liability insurance for risk averse 
employees. As such risk is not fully endogenised in their model. 
>> See also Di Mauro (1994) for a similar approach. However. Di Mauro's results rather 
unfortunately rely on risk aversion. 
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(or indeed any other input) actually improve 
- 
due perhaps to some unforeseen 
technical advancement, macro-economic factors or the whim of employees. 
Furthermore, no attempt was made by Schneider to extend his work into the 
monopoly or oligopoly cases, even though such market forms could change his model 
quite considerably. The trouble is that where the market price is not constant but 
instead influenced by the operational or risk management decisions of a firm a rise in 
either the level of risk or its related costs will not necessarily reduce a firm's profits12. 
This could then lead to a situation in which a given increase in risk could cause either 
an increase or a reduction in the demand for risk management 
- 
the exact result 
depending on the relationship between marginal cost, the market price and a fine's 
profits (for more on ideas such as this see Chapter 6). 
Thus it would appear that research into economic relationship between risk and risk 
management has some way to go. While it can predict how the presence of risk may 
affect the firm's production decisions it is not yet totally clear how this relationship 
may be influenced by risk management. The next two sections attempt to respond to 
this problem by presenting a more comprehensive model of the interaction between a 
firm's business and risk management decisions than has yet been attempted. 
3. An Economic Model of Corporate Risk Management Behaviour 
Before proceeding further a number of assumptions need to be made clear. These 
assumptions are important in that they keep the analysis reasonably tractable and will 
hopefully lead to some unambiguous results. However, it is with caution that many of 
these assumptions are made. In a world of risk the behaviour of a firm can be very 
12 For a discussion of the benefit of cost increases see especially Salop & Scheffman (1983) and 
Seade (1985). 
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sensitive to the exact specification of a model. Relaxing or changing the following 
assumptions could lead to significant changes in the model's predictions. 
For convenience the assumptions of the model will be grouped into two sections: 
3.1 Assumptions about the type of risk faced. 
3.2 Assumptions about firms and the nature of competition. 
3.1 Assumptions about the type of risk faced. 
3.1.1 Firms face technological risk. 
In what follows it will be assumed that the primary source of risk faced by firms is 
technological (see Walters 1960, Diamond 1967 & 1980, Roodman 1972, Ratti & 
Ullah 1976, Newbery & Stiglitz 1981, MacMinn & Holtmann 1983, Martin & Yu 
1990, Haruna 1996). Technological risk arises where the output that results from a 
given level of inputs is uncertain (for example: the weather may affect crop yields, 
strikes many hinder production or machines breakdown). In its most general form it 
can be described as: 
4 =f(z, c) where z= (z1, z.,.......... 7id 
Where q denotes output as a constant linear function of a vector of inputs z (e. g. 
labour, machinery, land, etc. ) and the state of nature as described by the random 
parameter- c. Note that the tilde is used to indicate that q is now a random variable (see 
Newbery &. Stiglitz 1981, Chs. 5 and 10). 
It is worth noting that output fluctuations caused by technological risk are distinct 
from those that may arise out of random changes in a firm's costs (which could be due 
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to fluctuations in input prices or financing costs, for example)13. The primary 
difference is that firms experiencing technological risk are forced to make their 
production decisions (i. e. decide on their chosen level of z) before the state of the 
world and hence their final output is known (ex-ante); while those facing cost related 
risks are usually able to make their input/output decisions after their actual costs are 
known (ex-post)14. This difference significantly alters the decisions that a firm is 
likely to make. Under cost risk the firm can be confident that the inputs it uses will 
generate a certain level of output and hence is able to maximise actual profits. 
However, under technological risk the firm must decide on its input level before it 
knows what its final output and hence profits will be. This forces the firm to 
maximise expected rather than actual profits, subjecting it to the predictions of 
Jensen's inequality (see Chapter 4, section 3.3). 
3.1.2 Technological risk is in the form of capacity fluctuations 
Technological risk may either directly affect the total capacity of a firm (i. e. its 
possible final output) or the productivity of a specific input or combination of inputs. 
For simplicity and clarity this Chapter will focus on the capacity case and as such 
assumes that each firm effectively uses only one input 
-z (e. g. Newbery & Stiglitz 
1981, MacMinn & Holtmann 1983, Haruna 1996). This allows the analysis to focus 
on the direct relationship between technological risk and output rather than on the 
impact that input specific fluctuations in reliability may have on the technical 
13 For an explanation of how random cost fluctuations may affect the behaviour of firms see, 
Gal-Or (1986), Shapiro (1986) and Sakai (1990 & 1991), Diacon (1991), Schneider (1992), 
Di Mauro (1994). 
14 Note that this may not apply to cost fluctuations which are caused by liability suits or fines. 
Such costs take time to be realised, consequently it is entirely possible that a firm will have 
made its production decisions (and perhaps even sold the finished output) before it knows for 
certain the number and size of any liability claims or fines it is required to pay (e. g. see 
Schneider 1992. Di Mauro 1994). 
154 
efficiency of production (see, Walters 1960, Roodman 1972, Ratti & Ullah 1976 and 
Turnbull 1986 for examples of the input specific approach). 
3.1.3 Technological risk is multiplicative. 
A further important assumption regards the type of technological risk that the firm 
will face. Unfortunately in its most general form: q=f (z, 6) the introduction of 
technological risk does not provide unambiguous results, consequently it is necessary 
to specify whether it is additive or multiplicative15. 
Additive risk is typically of the form: 
q= (Z) F- 
Where s is a random increment to output of mean zero. In the presence of additive 
risk the reliability of a firm's input(s) is not affected by the volume of inputs (i. e. 
planned output) chosen, for example, a flood might destroy a constant amount of 
crops (since only those on the flood plane will be affected), irrespective of the number 
of seed sown. 
Multiplicative technological risk is of the form: 
4=f (Z)F, 
I For example, Feldstein (1971) investigated the impact of technological risk in its most general 
form, however, he failed to provide any clear results, revealing that the demand for risky 
inputs by both a risk averse and risk neutral firm may be either greater or less than it would be 
in a world of certainty. 
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Where c >_ 0 is a random variable with a mean standardised to 1 and variance a2 > 0. 
Thus what multiplicative risk implies is that the variability of a firm's final output 
increases with its planned level of production. 
Note that the exact specification of technological risk (i. e. whether it is assumed to be 
additive or multiplicative) can have quite a significant effect on the results of a model 
- 
particularly in terms of the impact of technological risk on a firm's input decisions 
(e. g. see Newbery & Stiglitz 1981, Gravelle & Rees 1992, Ch. 21). However, 
multiplicative risk is generally thought to be the more realistic case and as such will 
be the specification used here. Indeed as Newbery & Stiglitz (1981, Ch. 5) point out 
additive risk is at best a simplification, since it is difficult to see how the level of 
output risk will not increase with planned input use in most cases16. 
3.1.4 The level of technological risk is endogenous. 
One of the most unique features of the model in this Chapter is that a firm is directly 
able to influence the reliability of the inputs that it uses. As shown in Section 2 
numerous authors have already investigated a firm's ability to influence its exposure 
to risk. However, only the literature on individual risk management decisions has ever 
really attempted to fully endogenise risk. In what follows, therefore, it is this 
literature which is adapted to explore how an expected profit maximising firm might 
attempt to manage its underlying exposure to technological risk. 
Following the work of Briys et al (1991) expenditure on risk management is assumed 
to influence the variability of the ith firm's final output in the following way: 
16 For example, imagine that a factory uses machines that possess a 10% probability of failure. 
This if it increases the number of machines it has from 100 to 110 it is realistic to expect that 
the c \pected number of broken machines in any period will increase from 10 to 11. However. 
undo º- additive risk the machine failure rate would have remained at 10. 
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ß2 (m; ý =a exp(-ß; m; ) 
Where, ß! denotes the variance of the firm's random parameter c, m; is the level of 
investment in risk management and the efficiency of risk management (i. e. the degree 
to which one unit of risk management reduces the firm's output fluctuations) ßl is 
assumed to be constant. 
Figure 1 about here. 
Further note that for analytical convenience the relationship between ni and 6i is 
assumed to be exponential. As shown in figure 1 such a relationship implies 
continuous but decreasing returns to risk management17. A firm is, therefore, faced 
with choosing a level of m; between the two extremes: 6? (co) =0 and 6 (0) =6, 
allowing the rate of change of 6 (m; ) to be expressed as the partial derivative: 
ößß(mr)ßý6'ým) 
ö m, 
The primary advantage of this approach is that it can be applied to any risk 
management tool that reduces the variability of a firm's final output. Admittedly this 
does not apply to all risk management tools. For example, hedging on the futures 
market will have no effect on the variance of a firm's output (although it will help to 
stabilise any resultant price fluctuations). However, this model does cover all physical 
risk control tools (as in Briys et al 1991) and certain aspects of a number of risk 
financing ones'8 
17 Thus the more the firm invests in 171 the lower will be the resultant change in G. 
18 \Vhile it may not seem immediately obvious that the purchase of risk financing tools will help 
to reduce C Y, is in fact possible. Take, for example, a standard property insurance 
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61 
ml 
Figure 1: An Exponential Relationship Between 6 and ml 
3.2 Assumptions about firms and the nature of competition. 
3.2.1 All decision makers are risk neutral. 
Most economic models of firm behaviour under risk have assumed that they (or rather 
their owners and managers) are primarily risk averse (see Sandmo 1971, Leland 1972, 
Newbery & Stiglitz 1981 and even more recently: Gravelle & Rees 1992, Haruna 
1996, Karagiannis & Gray 1996). Typically this yields the standard result that the 
presence of risk will cause a firm to make sub-optimal price or output decisions. The 
simple rationale for this is that a risk averse decision maker dislikes risk, 
consequently the argument goes that he or she will 
- 
even at the expense of a 
reduction in expected wealth 
- 
almost always attempt to reduce the variability of their 
income. 
However, in the light of the strong theoretical and practical objections to corporate 
risk aversion outlined in Chapter 4 it will be assumed that all firms are risk neutral. 
Consequently, a firm will be indifferent to risk unless it represents either a pure 
penalty or reduces mean profits through the influence of technological non-linearities. 
3.2.2 All firms are input (quantity) setters in the final goods market. 
Under perfect competition this is a trivial assumption since firms are, by definition, 
price takers. However, because of their market power monopolistic and oligopolistic 
firms who are exposed to technological risk may select either the input z19 or price as 
their primary operational decision variable. Yet, despite this possibility it will be 
contract. This can provide firms with a variety of risk reduction services from free risk 
management advice to the rapid provision of funds post loss 
-a move that should help the 
firm to quickly repair or replace lost assets and thus stabilise its output. 
19 Remember that under technological risk final output is uncertain. Thus a firm can only adjust 
its planned output level by altering, its use of :. 
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assumed, at least for now, that all firms are input (or rather planned/expected output 
setters). The main reason for this is to assist in the comparison of the current analysis 
against that of previous research into technological risk 
- 
most of which has adopted 
this assumption2O. However, this does mean that the results of the model are unlikely 
to be applicable to price setting firms. 
In the case of technological risk the main difference with price setting firms is that the 
market they operate in may end up in dis-equilibrium. Take the conventional Bertrand 
(1883) model of price setting behaviour in which the firm sets a price and is then 
supposed to accurately supply all that the market demands at that price (i. e. the firm 
acts as a quantity taker). The problem is that when faced with technological risk such 
a firm can no longer be confident that it will be able to accurately meet consumer 
demand. Instead in many states the firm may well find itself left facing the costly 
implications of either unsold production or unsatisfied customers. Firm behaviour (in 
terms of their price and or risk management decisions) will now depend not just on 
the combined costs of these eventualities (which is effectively a marginal revenue 
related pure penalty) but also on any differences between their associated costs. For 
example, where the costs of unsold production (disposal, storage costs, etc. ) exceed 
those associated with unsatisfied customers (such as a permanent loss of market 
share) the optimum price level may be less than in a world of certainty. On the other 
20 The paucity of research in the case of price setting firms under technological risk is, however, 
not reflected in the case of demand risk. See, for example, Leland (1972), Klemperer & 
Meyer (1986,1989), Aiginger (1987) and Gradstein et al (1992) for detailed discussions of 
how price setting firms may behave when faced with the possibility of random fluctuations in 
consumer demand. 
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hand the optimum price level might be expected to rise as the costs associated with 
unsatisfied customers increase21. 
3.2.3 Production capacity is fully variable and purchased at a constant positive 
price. 
This implies that the relationship between a firm's input demand (z) and the price of 
inputs (c) is simply: 
czi, where, c>0 
Admittedly this assumption is not wholly realistic (primarily since an increase in a 
non perfectly competitive firm's demand for zi might usually be expected to bid up its 
market price), however, it does simplify the analysis considerably. Indeed it has been 
adopted by almost all of the current models of firm behaviour under technological 
risk (see, for example, Walters 1960, Roodman 1972, Ratti & Ullah 1976, Pope & 
Kramer 1979, Newbery & Stiglitz 1981, MacMinn & Holtmann 1983, Martin & Yu 
1990, Ramaswami 1992, Karagiannis & Gray 1996). 
3.2.4 Assumptions about the firm's production function. 
In the monopolistic and oligopolistic cases the standard simplifying assumption (see 
Shapiro 1989a, Martin 1993, Ch. 2) that the ith firm's final output is a constant 
function of its input use is adopted, i. e.: 
qi =Zici. 
21 For a discussion of these issues in fixed price but perfectly competitive markets see Aiginger 
(1987, Ch. 5), Chung (1990), Driver & Moreton (1992, Ch. 4). 
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However, such an assumption is not generally desirable under perfect competition. In 
this case the presence of constant returns to z, means that a firm's optimum choice of 
inputs is likely to be indeterminate. 
In order to see this note that with constant returns to zl a perfectly competitive firm 
operating in a world of certainty would simply maximise: 
E[it(zi)] 
= Pz, 
-CZ' 
This then yields the following first and second order conditions: 
aE 
= p-c= 
azi 
a2E 
aZ, 
- 
Unfortunately these conditions say very little about the behaviour of a firm. While the 
first order (marginal profit) condition approximates the standard result under perfect 
competition, that a firm will maximise its profits at a level of z; that causes the market 
price to equal its marginal costs the non-existence of a second order condition means 
that the exact level of zi that will yield this result is indeterminate. In short any level 
of zl could be an optimum. 
Thus when examining the case of perfect competition the standard assumption that a 
firm's production function will be both differentiable and strictly concave is adopted 
(see Newbery & Stiglitz 1981, Ch. 4, Gravelle & Rees 1992, Chs. 7& 21), i. e.: 
q; = f(z; ), where f'>O, f" <0. 
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An individual firm's profit maximising choice of zi can now be determined, for 
example in a world of certainty it will now be: 
aE 
-pf'(zi) 
-c=0, 
azi 
a2E 
az =pf"(z) < 0. 1 
3.2.5 Assumptions about market demand. 
Throughout this Chapter it will be assumed that market demand is characterised by 
the following well behaved inverse function: 
p=a-bQ, a, b>O 
Where p denotes price and Q total industry output. 
The advantage of using a linear, downward sloping demand function is that it makes 
it much easier to achieve unique solutions for z and 171 (indeed without these 
assumptions it would frequently be impossible to do so). However, it should be noted 
that the results achieved below may not carry over to less restrictive demand 
specifications. For example relaxing the linearity assumption could well lead to 
significant changes in the behaviour of a firm (see Newbery & Stiglitz 1981, 
especially Chs. 10 & 18). Moreover these differences are likely to be especially acute 
in the rather more realistic case of oligopolistic markets 
- 
more on this in Chapter 6. 
3.2.6 There exists a rational expectations equilibrium. 
A market or regional economy is in a rational expectations equilibrium if the optimal 
plans of producers and consumers are compatible in each state and generate a state 
16-2 
distribution of prices that is consistent with the distribution they anticipated when 
making these plans (e. g. see Newbery & Stiglitz 1982, Gravelle & Rees 1992, p659- 
662). 
Broken down this implies the existence of three inter-related assumptions: 
- 
That all firms possess full knowledge about the distribution of the random 
parameter E. This means that a firm will be able to reliably calculate the 
relationship between its mean output, profits and input use. 
- 
That firms are fully aware of the impact that their input decisions and 
subsequent output fluctuations may have on the market price and behave 
accordingly (see Muth 1961). 
- 
The market price will adjust to ensure that consumers will buy all that is 
supplied (i. e. the market will clear). 
Although these are common assumptions in the literature (e. g. Sandmo 1971, Leland 
1972, Ratti & Ullah 1976, Newbery & Stiglitz 1981) they are, admittedly, quite 
strong. One issue is that if markets do not clear (i. e. where there is the potential for 
dis-equilibrium) then it is possible that additional pure penalties (or perhaps even pure 
benefits) may arise to change firm behaviour (see Chapter 4, section 3.2)22. Moreover, 
in the absence of sufficiently reliable information about E (or its eventual impact) a 
firm's expectations regarding future prices are unlikely to be consistent with the final 
realised distribution (see Aiginger 1987, Ch. 2 and Driver & Moreton 1992, Ch. 4 for 
reviews of this literature). This can then have serious consequences for the final 
22 Although the inclusion of additional pure penalties would probably serve to simply increase 
the benefits of risk management and the circumstances in which it would be of value. 
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predictions of the model according to both the strength and direction of the bias (i. e. 
whether and to what extent the impact or risk is over or under estimated). 
However, despite the strength of these assumptions it would be difficult to generate a 
meaningful and unambiguous model without them. For example, expectations bias 
can occur in many ways and be due to many different factors (managerial hunches, 
information availability and framing effects, etc. ) a fact which is likely to require 
some additional and rather "ad hoc" assumptions (Newbery & Stiglitz 1981, p136- 
137). Similarly the absence of market clearing could give rise to many different and 
potentially conflicting pure penalties and or benefits depending on the factors 
involved (sticky or fixed prices, market form, etc. 
- 
see Aiginger 1987). 
3.2.7 One period model 
Throughout this Chapter it will be assumed that firms only operate for one period. 
Hence all equilibrium outcomes are for the short run 
- 
meaning that when exposed to 
risk a firn can only adjust its use of risk management or demand for inputs and may 
not choose to enter or leave the industry. This is the most common assumption in 
models of firm behaviour under risk, however, it should be noted that in the perfectly 
competitive case a number of long run equilibrium models do exist (e. g. Applebaum 
& Katz 1986, Haruna 1996). 
3.2.8 Finns move simultaneously. 
Thus no form of communication is possible. In an oligopolistic market this also rules 
out the possibility of a sequential equilibrium (for more on this see Chapter 6). 
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4. The Behaviour of Firms Within Different Market Forms. 
4.1 Perfect Competition 
Before proceeding with the rather more realistic cases of monopolistic and 
oligopolistic markets it is worth reviewing the impact that technological risk can have 
on perfectly competitive firms. Whether explicitly or implicitly financial models of 
risk management behaviour have usually assumed perfect competition in the output 
market (see, for example, Doherty 1985, Shapiro & Titman 1985, Mayers & Smith 
1987, MacMinn 1987 and Cho 1988). Indeed in what follows it is demonstrated that, 
in the current model at least, perfect competition largely supports the hypothesis that 
a firm is only likely to invest in risk management if it helps to alleviate the impact of 
capital/financial market imperfections such as agency and transactions costs. 
A perfectly competitive market is one in which there are many small producers and 
consumers, none of whom are able to influence the market price. All firms are 
generally assumed to be identical both in terms of their production technology and the 
characteristics of the product that they sell. There are also zero entry and exit costs, 
allowing firms (at least in the long run) to come and go at will. The primary 
implications of these assumptions is that individual firms are price takers that each 
face a perfectly elastic (i. e. horizontal) demand function (although the industry 
demand function is typically downward sloping). As such, in a world of certainty 
anyway, a firm's choice of profit maximising output is said to depend on purely its 
input costs and production considerations (i. e. the technical efficiency of its 
combination of inputs), its marginal revenue being fixed at the market price. 
One implication of a fixed market price in a single input model is that a firm's profits 
would appear to be a constant linear function of its capacity decisions23. As such risk 
23 Although in a two input model a perfectly competitive firm's profits function may well 
become concave because of the adverse effect that sub-optimal combinations of these inputs 
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management would seem to offer no direct economic value in a perfectly competitive 
market since technological risk will not directly affect the profits of a risk neutral firm 
(see Pope & Kramer 1979, MacMinn & Holtmann 1983, Ramaswami 1992, Gravelle 
& Rees 1992, Ch. 21, Eeckhoudt & Gollier 1992, Ch. 11). However, it is important to 
note that the clarity of this result rests on the assumption that each firm experiences 
independent random output fluctuations. Where firms face positively correlated 
output fluctuations the irrelevance of risk management is much less clear. In this case 
it is shown that both a firm's profits and its choice of 7 may be affected by 
technological risk (see for example, McKinnon 1967, Newbery & Stiglitz 1981, 
Anderson & Danthine 1983, Britto 1984, Moschini & Lapan 1995, Haruna 1996) 
providing a potential rationale for risk management. Yet despite this fact it is argued 
that a perfectly competitive firm will still often not invest in risk management. This 
supposition rests on the basis that it is the fluctuations in the market price that result 
from positively correlated output fluctuations which reduces a firm's profits, not the 
variance of its individual output. 
Dealing first with the case of independent output fluctuations, a risk neutral firm (as 
denoted by the subscript "i") operating in a perfectly competitive industry will (since 
E[c, ]= 1) maximise: 
E[7º(z1)] 
= Pf (z) -c; -rýii,. [1] 
Where r denotes the industry wide unit cost of risk management. Note that because 
firm i is operating in a perfectly competitive industry the price that it will receive is 
independent of its own choice of z; but will be influenced by the aggregate demand 
for z since this will affect expected industry output. However, given that each 
may have on the technical efficiency of production (see Walters 1960, Roodman 1972, Ratti 
& Ullah 1976). 
166 
individual firm's output fluctuations will not be sufficient to affect the market price it 
is assumed, for simplicity, that p is exogenously determined. 
It then simply follows that: 
aE 
=Pf '(Z1)-c=0, 
aZ; [? ] 
Proposition 1. Providing that E[c ] =1 both expected profit and the level of output 
produced in a perfectly competitive industry will be unaffected by the presence of 
independent technological risk24. Firms will not, therefore, find it profitable to 
manage their exposure to firm specific risk unless it helps to reduce either agency or 
transactions costs. 
Figure 2 about here 
Figure 2 provides a simple illustration of this result. Imagine that the profit 
maximising level of certain output for any perfectly competitive firm is q* (as 
represented by the point of intersection between the demand and supply curves: P(q) 
and s respectively)25. However, instead the firm experiences multiplicative 
24 Given that 
ýE 
=r=0 the second order condition for [2] to be at a maximum is: 
a»1; 
a2 E 
=pf"(ý; )<o 
aZ; - 
Which requires that f" < 0. 
ýý Note that for convenience the subscript i has been dropped for this example. 
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ýIr R* = E[ 3 qh 4=f; (z; e, ) 
Figure 2: The Perfectly Competitive Firm Under Independent 
Technological Risk 
technological risk of the form q=f (z)c, E[E] =1 and for the same level of 7 that 
would produce q* units under certainty faces an equal chance of one of two states of 
nature arising: sl in which q1 units are produced and s17 where the firm is able to 
produce q,, units. At first glance such uncertainty might seem to be undesirable since 
the firm can no longer be sure how much it is going to be able to produce in any one 
period. However, since the price that it receives for its product is unaffected by its 
output a risk neutral firm will be indifferent to the presence of technological risk. This 
can be proven by comparing the loss in revenue that is associated with the adverse 
state of nature (as illustrated by the area: ABq *q, ) against the gain accrued in the 
beneficial one (BCghq *). Holding price constant it is simple to show that since E[c 
]=1: BCq`lq *- ABq *q1 
= 0, meaning that the gains and losses associated with the 
presence of technological risk will exactly off-set one another. Expected revenue will, 
therefore, remain the same as it would be in a world of certainty and the firm will 
derive no economic benefit from either altering its input decision or investing in risk 
management. 
Where the output fluctuations of all the firms in the industry are positively correlated 
the behaviour of each individual (ith) firm could change. In order to see this consider 
the simple case of perfectly positively correlated output fluctuations (see especially 
Newbery & Stiglitz 1981, Ch. 10)26. Here the output of each firm is assumed to 
depend on its input level z; and the value of its random variable E, 27. However, the 
value of s in each state is assumed to be precisely the same for all firms, causing not 
only an individual firm's output to fluctuate but the aggregate industry level of output 
26 Less than perfect positive or even negatively correlated output fluctuations could also be 
modelled in a similar way. However, these possibilities have not received much attention in 
the literature. 
27 Possible examples of random factors that could affect an industry as a whole include the 
weather and general strikes. 
168 
as well. A firm with rational expectations (see section 3.2.6) should, therefore, expect 
market supply to also become random according to the following expression: 
0=Y. f(zý) E. 
Where: 
E[E] 
=1 E[s; ] =1 
n 
62 = 6ý >0 
n; 
and n denotes the number of firms in the industry. 
Then assuming that the final goods market clears (see section 3 above) fluctuations in 
market supply will have a knock on effect on the market price causing it to also vary. 
In the current context with an inverse demand function of the form p=a- b(Q) this 
will imply that (see MacMinn et al 1989): 
P=a-b(Q)=If (Zjý 
As market supply fluctuates the market price will adjust in order to ensure that supply 
is equated with consumer demand. Thus in a world with perfectly positively 
correlated output fluctuations it will not only be final industry output that varies with 
E but also the market clearing price, i. e.: 
p=c1-h ýf(zý)c 
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Given the presence of randomness in both aggregate output and the market price the 
ith firm will now maximise: 
E[ng] 
- 
Pf (z, )s; 
-cz, -rm, 
= a-b f(z; )E f(zi)E. -czi-rmm. 
Rearranging and noting that s; = s, and E[c2]=1 +o2 this can then be rewritten as: 
= a-bj] f(zý)(l+ß'(m)ý fýz; ý-C 
-rmý 
or 
[3] 
= p-b 1 f(zi) 62(m) f(zi)-cz; 
-rm [4] 
where, 
ß2(m)= 
1 y62(»r, ). 
11 
1 
Differentiating [4] then yields the following first order condition for a firm's choice of 
28 
OE 
= p_b 
.f 
(z; ) I62(»r) 
. 
f'(z; )-c=0 [5] 
cýý 
28 The second order condition necessary for [5] to be a maximum is: 
OE 
- P-h 
. 
f1&(m) f"(:, )<0 2 
ýý Bich again requires that f"<0. 
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Proposition 2. Where the output fluctuations of a perfectly competitive firm are 
positively correlated with those of all other farms in the industry it will no longer be 
indifferent to the presence of technological risk. Instead marginal profits and the 
optimal level of z1 will be lower than in a world of certainty29. 
In order to see this result more clearly rewrite equation [5] to get: 
Pf'(z1) 
- 
c=b f(zý) ß2(m) 
Since bYf (z; ) 6' (m) should be positive a comparison of [5] against [2] reveals 
that: 
PfI(zi) 
-c>0 
Providing proof that the presence of positively correlated output fluctuations should 
reduce both the optimal level of z, and expected profits30. 
29 Note that this result is not robust in a long run equilibrium model. In this case, some firms will 
probably leave the industry, meaning that those remaining may not suffer from a loss in 
expected marginal profits (e. g. see Applebaum & Katz 1986, Haruna 1996). 
30 Note, however, that in the case of a positively sloped demand function (as might be the case 
for giffen or veblem goods) this result would be reversed. With a positively sloped demand 
function: p=a+b(Q), consequently equation [5] would be rewritten as: 
aE 
= p+b Yf(z, ) 6'(»1) f'(=, )-C=o 
Hence the presence of positively correlated output fluctuations would actually benefit a firm. 
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The rationale behind this result stems from the fact that positively correlated output 
fluctuations create a technological non-linearity (as denoted by the term: 
CY between each firm's marginal profit function and total industry 
output. The primary cause of this technological non-linearity is the presence of a 
linear, downward sloping industry demand (and hence revenue) function. To see this 
remember that the point elasticity of demand on a downward sloping linear demand 
curve will vary from relatively more elastic over higher prices to relatively more 
inelastic over lower ones. Hence, the percentage increase in the market price that will 
accompany low output states will be less than the associated decrease in high ones. 
Then given multiplicative risk31 marginal industry profits will be concave in Q 
causing each firm's expected share of these profits and their resultant demand for z; to 
fall (see Chapter 4, section 3.3 for a detailed discussion about the nature of 
technological non-linearities). 
Given the adverse effects of positively correlated output fluctuations it would seem 
reasonable to suppose that firms will invest in risk management. Yet, this is still 
unlikely. Under perfect competition an individual firm's investment in m; will not 
have a significant impact on the variance of total industry output. Hence risk 
management would seem to be of little value to an individual firm. However, it is 
worth noting that the optimum level of risk management for the industry as a whole is 
not zero. Instead if firms could agree to jointly invest in risk management the 
aggregate level of in would be: 
31 The presence of additive technological risk would reduce the total profits earned by the 
industry but would have no effect on marginal profits. This is because each firm's exposure to 
output fluctuations (and hence its expected marginal profits) is invariant to its demand for 
inputs (see Newbery & Stiglitz 1981 Chs. 5,10). 
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aE 
bß62(m)yf(zi) 
-r=0 am [6] 
Of course public good problems aside (since each firm that contributes towards 
increasing m will not only reduce its own exposure to price fluctuations but also the 
price fluctuations faced by all the other firms in the market) perfectly competitive 
firms can not, by definition, act together. By jointly agreeing to invest in risk 
management perfectly competitive firms would actually raise the market price for 
their product. However, this would then imply that such firms are capable of 
exhibiting strategic behaviour which in perfectly competitive market is not possible32 
Thus it would seem that whether perfectly competitive firms face independent or 
positively correlated output fluctuations they are unlikely to invest in risk 
management unless it can reduce the impact of agency and transactions costs. 
However, a couple of important qualifications do need to be made clear. Firstly by 
changing the assumptions of the model (e. g. the market clearing conditions - Chung 
1990 or the number of inputs 
- 
Roodman 1972, Ratti & Ullah 1976, Pope & Just 
1977) additional, firm specific, pure penalties and technological non-linearities could 
be created which might be reducible through personal investments in risk 
management. Secondly, it should be remembered that while perfectly competitive 
firms may not unilaterally attempt to improve the reliability of their inputs they might 
still invest in certain risk financing tools such as futures or government price 
stabilisation schemes. These tools can help to directly stabilise price fluctuations and 
will, therefore, reduce an individual firm's (rather than the entire industry's) exposure 
to the adverse effects of positively correlated output fluctuations (Newbery & Stiglitz 
1981, Anderson & Danthine 1983, Britto 1984, MacMinn et al 1989, Haruna 1996). 
32 Such agreements would not be possible in a one period, simultaneous move model anyway. 
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4.2 Monopoly 
In the monopoly case there is only one firm operating in the industry. Firm output and 
industry output are, therefore, the same thing meaning that in the current model (from 
section 3.2.5) the monopolist faces a downward sloping demand curve. 
The fact that a monopolist will face a downward sloping demand curve can have a 
significant affect on its behaviour when it is faced with technological risk. As such it 
is surprising that very little research has been done in the area. Indeed the only author 
to really consider this possibility is Turnbull (1986) and even he focused on the rather 
straightforward and unrealistic case of a cost based pure penalty related to a positive 
threat of a total loss in the supply of a specific input. In what follows, however, the 
analysis of a monopolist under technological risk (as in a world of certainty) is treated 
as a natural extension of the standard perfectly competitive model used above. 
Being the only firm in the market a monopolist's choice of 7 and in will be set to 
maximise: 
E[it(z)] 
= 
(a 
- 
c)z 
- 
b(a2 (m) + l)z` 
- 
rm [7] 
where the second term of the right hand side is simply the expected value of bq 2. 
Remembering that for a monopolist 
a6, (m) 
= 
-ß6' (, n) (see assumption 3.1.4) the 
a»t 
first order conditions for [7] to be a maximum are as follows33: 
33 Given that the monopolist is utilising two variables (z and in) three second order conditions 
are required: one for z, 
02E 
_-2b(a2 (171)+1)<0, 
o2 
one for in, 
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aE 
_ 
(a 
-c)-2b(a2(m)+1)z =0 [8] az 
aE 
= 
bß62 (m)z2 
-r=0 [9] am 
Then assuming that the second order conditions are satisfied equations [8] and [9] can 
be used to generate the following two results: 
Proposition 3. Under multiplicative technological risk the optimum level of input 
demand for a monopolist will decrease as 62 (m) increases. 
In order to see this result more clearly rewrite [8] to get: 
ýa 
- 
cý 
- 
2bz 
= 
2bz0 2 (m), 
then, note that in a world of certainty [8a] will simply reduce to34, 
[8a] 
a' E 
=-b(3'6'(m)z2 <0 
amt 
and the joint condition, 
2 
a2E a2E a2E 
>0. az` öm2 c92 (3m 
Note that since, 
2 
a2 E= 2bß62 (m)z> 0 
azöm 
the joint condition will be satisfied when ß2 
(in) 
< 1. 
34 Since Q==. 
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aE 
= 
(a 
- 
c) 
- 
2bz 
= 
0. 
az 
Finally assuming 62 (m) >0 it is possible to show that a profit maximising monopolist 
experiencing multiplicative technological risk should choose a level of z that satisfies 
the following inequality: 
(a-c)-2bz>0. [8b] 
Equation [8b] then proves that input demand will be lower than in a world of 
certainty. 
As in the case of positively correlated output fluctuations under perfect competition 
the explanation behind this result rests on the presence of a demand/revenue induced 
technological concavity (o2 (m) + 1) in the monopolist's marginal profit function. 
Because the monopolist is the sole supplier in a market as its final output varies so 
will the market price for its product. Then given the combined effects of a downward 
sloping linear (or indeed concave) demand function and multiplicative risk the 
presence of output induced price fluctuations will (via Jensen's Inequality) cause the 
expected marginal profits of the monopolist to fall. The returns on the monopolist's 
investment in extra capacity are, therefore, lower than they would be in a world of 
certainty prompting it to reduce its demand for z. 
Proposition 4. Even when risk management is costly (i. e. r> 0) an expected profit 
maximising monopolist is likely to want to invest in a positive level of m. 
The proof of this proposition follows from rewriting [9] as: 
bpcy'(nt)Z2 
=r 
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The left hand side of this equality denotes the marginal benefit of risk management, 
the right its marginal cost. In a world of certainty, where a' =0 the left hand side 
would fall to zero indicating that no profit maximising firm will rationally invest in 
risk management, however, whenever a firm is exposed to technological risk (i. e. 
62 > 0) the marginal benefits of risk management will become positive. It then 
follows that a firm should invest in m up to the point where the marginal benefit of 
risk management (in terms of the efficiency with which risk management can reduce 
the costly effects of technological risk) is equal to its marginal cost. 
Given the first order conditions [8] and [9] it is also possible to examine the effect 
that changes in the exogenous parameters (such as (2 and r) may have on the 
behaviour of a monopolist. Following Dixit (1986) let 0 denote the change in an 
exogenous parameter. By using Cramer's rule it then follows that: 
aZ Jäe 
IHI 
am 
_ 
IHz1 [11] 
ä6 HI 
where IHI is the determinant of the second order direct and cross partials 
for [8] and 
[9], i. e.: 
a2E a2E 
HI 
_ 
az2 azam 
a2 E a2 E 
and a: amt 
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and JH, I is the determinant of IHI with the first column replaced by the column vector 
_a2E 
_a2E 
T a' 
' 
and Iis the corresponding determinant with the column vector in 
the second column of H 
Using [ 10] and [ II ] now assume that there is an exogenous change in the maximum 
possible level of risk (i. e. 0= ßZ) that a firm can face so that35: 
-`9ZE 
= 
2bzs-ß"' >0 ÖZa62 
and 
-ö2E = -bßZZ£_ßin < ý. 
A little computation then yields: 
aZ 
=0 [10a] 
a6- 
am 
= 
2(1- 62 (171)) > 0, so long as, 1> ß' (M). [1 la] 
a(3 2 
What [1 Oa] and [ 11 a] indicate is that an exogenous change in the maximum possible 
level of technological risk (i. e. (y2) faced by the monopolist will only affect its choice 
of in. Thus when a firm is able to invest in risk management its input decisions would 
seem to be independent of the level of 6'. At first glance this result might appear 
surprising, however, it is consistent with the Separation Theorem outlined in the 
For example in the real world exogenous increases in risk could be the result of factors such 
as global warming or changing technolo, y,. 
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futures literature (e. g. Anderson & Danthine 1983, Haruna 1996)36. Moreover, it is 
also intuitively appealing. A firm that attempts to control its exposure to risk by 
reducing its demand for inputs is likely to produce less and as a result suffer a 
substantial opportunity cost in terms of forgone sales. But by investing in risk 
management no sales are lost meaning that it should be the preferred risk control 
option37. 
However, altering a2 does not give the full story, what also needs to be considered is 
how a change in the unit cost of risk management may affect z and m. 
Letting 0=r will imply that: 
-a2E 
=o 
azar 
and 
-a2E =1. 
amar 
36 The Separation Theorem effectively states that a firm's planned output level will only depend 
on the non-stochastic futures price and as such is independent of both a firm's attitude towards 
risk and the probability distribution of the spot price. 
37 It is also interesting to note that this result is largely consistent with one of the claims made by 
the "traditional" risk management literature (e. g. see Carter & Crockford 1974, Mehr & 
Hedges 1974) 
- 
that the role of risk management should be to free managers from non-core 
distractions (such as having to worry about the risk of fire or machine breakdowns) thus 
allowing them to concentrate on their main business activities (deciding what and how much 
to produce etc. ). In fact it is possible that this traditional motive for risk management arose out 
of an implicit awareness of the economic impact of technological risk. See also Stultz (1996) 
for an interesting modern take on traditional risk management views that vv ould seem to 
support this hypothesis. 
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Consequently, the values for both 
az 
and 
am 
are negative which means that a 
ar ar 
marginal increase in the unit cost of risk management has the effect of decreasing 
both the demand for z and (as might be expected) the monopolist's utilisation of m. 
This result not only illustrates the importance of cost effective risk management but 
also provides evidence that z and m are complimentary goods38. For example, as the 
unit cost of risk management increases the budget constrained monopolist will be 
forced to reduce its demand for m, thereby, increasing its exposure to technological 
risk. Increased exposure to risk will, however, reduce the value of z causing the firm 
to lower its planned output. Conversely as r falls the firm is able to increase its 
investment in m thus reducing its exposure to risk and enabling it to raise expected 
output. 
In the light of these comparative statics it would seem that technological risk can have 
a significant adverse effect on the expected profits of a monopolist. Such firms are, 
therefore, likely to invest considerable amounts in risk management. However, it is 
important to remember that the cost of risk management is also crucial. If the unit 
cost of risk management is too high the monopolist may be forced to reduce its 
demand for in. This is then likely to have a serious knock-on effect on both planned 
output and expected profits. 
4.3 Oligopoly 
An oligopoly can be loosely defined as a market in which a few large firms dominate 
(e. g. see Gravelle & Rees 1992, Ch. 12, Martin 1993, Ch. 2). One major characteristic 
of these small numbers is that any one firm's behaviour will not only affect its own 
profitability but also that of its rivals. Because of this interdependence oligopolists 
38 Note that this result contradicts that of Schneider (1992). However given that Schneider 
focused on pure risk this is not surprising. 
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face a strategic situation where the optimal decisions of one firm are influenced by 
those of all the other firms in its industry. 
Despite the analytical complexity presented by the introduction of strategic 
considerations, economic models of oligopolistic behaviour under risk do exist39. 
However, with the exception of a few disparate papers (e. g. Dekel & Scotchmer 1990, 
Young & Bolbol 1992, Jensen 1992, Stenbacka & Tombak 199440) the impact of 
technological risk and indeed risk management has been largely neglected. Instead 
most authors have focused on how the presence of demand risk may influence the 
price, output and longer term investment (such as advertising) decisions of firms (e. g. 
see Sherman & Tollison 1972, Harris 1986, Klemperer & Meyer 1986,1989, 
Paraskevopoulos et al 1991, Gradstein et al 1992, Wong 1995). The purpose of the 
current section is to begin to redress this imbalance. However, because of the 
complexity associated with oligopolistic models of firm behaviour this section will 
primarily focus on analysing the productive input decisions of oligopolists exposed to 
technological risk (although it will show that they are unlikely to be indifferent to 
managing their exposure to risk). The next Chapter will then explore the wide range 
of factors that may influence the strategic risk management decisions of oligopolistic 
firms in more detail. 
39 As Driver & Moreton (1992) point out: 
"Most of the literature on uncertainty deals with either perfect competition or monopoly. The 
interdependence of decision making means that oligopoly is a much more difficult object of 
study. ". 
40 The form of technological risk investigated by Jensen (1992) and Stenbacka & Tombak 
(19)94) is not the same as that considered here. Instead these authors focused on an 
oligopolist's incentive to adopt untried (but potentially profitable) new technologies, the 
efficiency of which could not be determined ex-ante. 
181 
Although oligopolistic markets can contain quite a large number of heterogeneous 
firms it will be assumed that there are only two identical firms operating within the 
industry. This is a common approach, its primary advantage being that the results of 
such a model can be shown relatively simply and clearly41. Admittedly these results 
may not easily generalise out of the homogeneous duopoly case, however, it does 
provide a useful starting point for subsequent research. 
Taking into account the strategic nature of oligopolistic decisions the profit 
maximising condition for the ith duopolist under technological risk is: 
E[it (z, z2)] =(a-c)z; 
-b(ß? (m, )+l)z; 2 -b{p6, (n)62(m2)+1}zz1-rn 
, 
fori, j 
=1,2; i #j[12] 
Note that equation [12] contains an additional term to the perfectly competitive and 
monopoly cases. The term: b{ pß, (m, )6, (in, ) + l} z; z,, (which arises from taking the 
expected value of (-b4142)) represents the impact that a rival's input decisions will 
have on the residual demand curve and subsequent market price faced by a firm. As 
such it illustrates two important effects. Firstly it recognises that in a world with 
technological risk rival output is also likely to fluctuate, meaning that the proportion 
of total consumer demand available to a firm will vary. This implies that in a world of 
technological risk a duopolist will face two sources of risk rather than just one: 
random output fluctuations caused by unreliability in its own inputs and random 
fluctuations in its residual demand curve caused by the unreliability of its rival's 
inputs. Secondly the term recognises that rival output fluctuations may be positively 
or negatively related (as the correlation coefficient p is positive or negative 
respectively) with those of the ith firm 
-a fact which could further influence the 
degree to which the market price for a firm's product will vary. 
41 For proof of the dominance of this approach see Shapiro (11)89a) or Martin (1993 ). 
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Equation [12] then yields the following first order conditions for :; and m, : 
aE 
_ 
(a 
- 
c) 
- 
2b{ß2 (m; ) + 1}zi 
- 
b{pß, ým, ý6, ým, ý + 1} =0 [13] azi 
aE 
- 
bßiß2 (m; )z. +b 
ß 
pß, (m, )6, (»i, )z; z1 
-r=0 [14] am; 2 
From equations [13] and [14] it should immediately become clear that, just as in the 
monopoly case, duopolistic firms are unlikely to be indifferent to either the presence 
of technological risk or investment in risk management. However, a comparison with 
the optimisation conditions of a monopolist reveals that the motivations behind the 
behaviour of a duopolistic firm are likely to be somewhat more complex. Moreover as 
they stand equations [13] and [14] do not reveal any specific details about either the 
nature or extent of these motivations. Because they are competing in a duopoly the 
decisions of one firm will affect those of the other, consequently, in order to get the 
complete picture it is necessary to see how firm i's decisions about z and in will affect 
J's choices and vice-versa. 
Given the rather complex interactive nature of a duopolist's decisions it is instructive 
to first consider how technological risk will influence its selection of zl when risk is 
exogenous. The equilibrium level of zi in the industry (: *) can then be found by 
solving the following simultaneous equation: 
aE 
= 
(a 
- 
c) 
- 
2b{62 +i} z; 
- 
b{pa, ß, + 1}: =0 
aE 
= 
(a 
-c)-2b{6 +1}z1 -b{pß, ß, +1}z; =0 
1 
18, 
Some tedious computation (in which the expression for firm i's reaction function is 
substituted intoj's first order condition) then yields42: 
(a 
- 
c) 
* 
. 
[2( (77+ 1) 
- 
(p6,6, 
+ l)] b Zi. =22 for i# j [15] 4( + l)(ß2 + 1) 
- 
pß, ß, + l) 
Given identical firms the second order conditions for a maximum require 
aE 
to be 
a'E a'E a'E 2 
negative and the Hessian determinant H=2- >0. From [13] 
we have: 
aZE 
= 
-2b(6 +1) <0 
az 
and 
a2E 
_ 
-b{pß, ß, + 1}, 
az, aZ, 
so that the final second order condition is satisfied when the denominator of [15] is 
positive. 
As should now be obvious from equation [15] it is quite difficult to specify the exact 
impact that technological risk will have on a duopolist's optimal demand for zI. The 
trouble is that instead of being simply influenced by the impact of its own exposure to 
2A useful check to test the validity of any model of firm behaviour under risk is whether or not 
it reduces to the standard result under certainty. In fact this is indeed the case, when .2=0, 
[15] becomes, 
a-c 
b 
'_ 3 
NN laich is the standard Cournot result in a world of certainty. 
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technological risk a duopolist must also consider the implications of its rival's 
exposure as well. This gives rise to several, potentially conflicting, effects: 
1. Own risk effect 
Firstly a duopolist's demand for zi will, just as in the monopoly case, be influenced by 
a technological non-linearity between its marginal profits and random output. Again 
given that the duopolist faces a linear, downward sloping demand curve, fluctuations 
in final output should serve to reduce its expected marginal profits, thereby, lowering 
In order to see this result more clearly remember that where each firm is exposed to 
an identical level of risk and p=1 equation [15] will reduce to: 
__ 
(a-c) 
z1 =- Z2 3b(62 + 1) 
In short equation [15] produces the standard Cournot result 
- 
that expected industry 
output (Q = z, + z, ) will be exactly 1 /3rd greater than that of a monopolist. The only 
difference being that in this case expected industry output is 1/3rd greater than that of 
a monopolist experiencing multiplicative technological risk. 
2. Rival risk effects 
Interestingly the impact of increased rival exposure to risk is rather mixed. On the one 
hand the presence of firm j's risk in the denominator of [15] would seem to indicate 
that as the value of 6 increases zi* should also rise. Intuitively this is not very 
surprising 
- 
given the technological concavity between a fine's marginal profits and 
its final output increased exposure to technological risk will, logically, cause the 
expected marginal profits of firm j to fall. This should then induce j to lower its 
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output, providing firm i with an opportunity to increase its market share43. However, 
the presence of th2 2 term 4(a; + 1)(C Y2 l) in the denominator indicates that increases 
in a rival's exposure to risk can also serve to reduce zi*. The rationale behind this 
rather counter-intuitive result stems from the fact that firm/s output fluctuations will 
be translated into fluctuations in the residual demand curve of i. Such fluctuations can 
then increase the extent to which the market price for i's product will vary across 
different output states, thereby, potentially intensifying the technological non- 
linearity effect between marginal profits and final output (for more on ideas such as 
this see Chapter 6, section 2.3). 
3. Correlation coefficient effects 
Where the correlation coefficient p#0 the behaviour of a duopolist will be influenced 
by several effects. For example, as might be expected in the case where p>0 the 
demand for inputs in the industry as a whole will reduce under technological risk 
(since this will increase the degree to which the market price fluctuates). Moreover, 
increases in the standard deviation of either a firm's own or its rival's output 
fluctuations will serve to intensify the adverse effects of a positive correlation 
coefficient. However, rather less expectedly its presence in the denominator means 
that where firms are exposed to different levels of risk it may also (despite being non- 
linear) serve to widen the gap between firm's input levels44. Thus a low risk firm may 
gain an additional relative advantage over its rival by becoming increasingly 
43A standard characteristic of (Cournot type) duopoly behaviour is that firms' optimum output 
levels are negatively related 
- 
thus as the optimum output level of one firm increases its rival's 
optimum output level should fall and vice-versa. In a world of technological risk this result 
would, therefore, seem to still stand. However, in the current example a duopolist's optimum 
output is not simply determined by known demand, cost or production conditions but also the 
extent of its exposure to technological risk. 
44 That is, if >0 then it is increasing in p 
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dominant (in terms of being able to produce a higher level of expected output than its 
rival) as the correlation between E, and c, increases. Note that these results will be 
precisely reversed on the case where p<0. 
Thus it would seem that the impact of technological risk on zi * will depend critically 
on whether firms are exposed to the same or different levels of risk. In the case where 
each firm is exposed to the same amount of technological risk its presence will, just 
as in a monopoly, cause an unambiguous reduction in zi *. In fact to the extent that the 
correlation coefficient is positive (i. e. p> 0) the adverse impact of technological risk 
on the marginal profits of a duopolist would appear to be relatively greater than for a 
monopolist. However, in the case where firms are exposed to different levels of risk 
(either by default or through the deliberate management of risk) the impact of 
technological risk is much less clear cut. On the one hand higher output and price 
fluctuations mean lower optimum output levels for a duopolist, providing its rival 
with an opportunity to dominate the market. Yet, on the other hand one firm's 
exposure to technological risk could also serve to increase its rival's exposure to price 
fluctuations, creating a potential competitive advantage. 
Having shown that a duopolist is unlikely to be indifferent to risk the next step is to 
examine the relationship between this concern and its investment in risk management. 
However, given the somewhat conflicting effects that a unilateral change in a 
duopolist's exposure to risk may have on zi * (and ultimately its profits) it is hard to 
achieve any precise predictions as to the optimal level of risk management in 
duopolistic industries. In fact the joint solutions for z i* and mi* would require 
equations [13] and [14] to be solved for four unknowns (zl and zj as well as ml and 
nn. ). Unfortunately this involves extremely complicated and often ambiguous multiple 
solutions, which need to be checked against the second order conditions to determine 
which, if any. are true maxima. Therefore, a more detailed analysis of this problem is 
left to the next Chapter where game theory is used to help simplify and clarify this 
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issue by modelling the interaction between duopolists' risk management decisions as 
a two-by-two risk management game. 
5. Conclusion 
The purpose of this Chapter has been to show that even in a world with perfect capital 
markets and where every stakeholder is risk neutral a firm may still invest in risk 
management. Indeed this result appears to be quite general. Except in the limited case 
of perfect competition with independent output fluctuations a risk neutral firm should 
actually be able to increase its expected profits if it can reduce its exposure to 
technological risk. 
Of perhaps most interest is the case of Cournot duopoly since this more accurately 
represents the behaviour of real world firms. Here it was argued that where duopolists 
are exposed to different levels of (technological) risk its presence can have either a 
positive and negative effect on their profits. This is largely due to the impact that 
technological risk can have on a duopolist's ability to compete since any enforced 
reduction in its (mean) optimum output level will enable its rival to capture an 
increased market share and dominate the market. Thus it would seem that duopolists 
are, a-priori at least, likely to be particularly keen to invest in risk management, 
however, due to its analytical complexity a more detailed examination of this 
proposition is left until the next Chapter. 
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Chapter 6: 
A Strategic Framework for Risk Management 
1. Introduction 
In the last chapter a number of specific examples were developed to show that even 
an expected profit maximising firm is likely to want to control its exposure to 
(technological) risk. The main driving force for this lack of indifference was 
imperfect competition, where both monopolists and duopolists could suffer greatly 
from the adverse impact that unpredictable random output fluctuations may have on 
the prevailing market price for their product and subsequently expected revenues. In 
particular, duopolists appeared to have the most to gain from controlling their 
exposure to technological risk. However, the strategic nature of a duopolist's 
decisions meant that its exact reaction 
- 
in terms of its risk management and input 
decisions 
- 
was unclear. This was largely due to the conflicting effects that 
technological risk could have on both its own and its rival's ability to compete. Higher 
output and price fluctuations meant lower optimum output levels for a firm, providing 
its rival with an opportunity to dominate the market. Yet, conversely one firm's 
exposure to technological risk could also have an adverse effect on its rival's ability to 
predict the demand for its product, thereby, creating a potential competitive 
advantage. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide some rather more specific predictions as to a 
duopolist's (or indeed oligopolist's) preferences regarding risk and risk management. 
Admittedly models examining the impact of risk on the strategic behaviour of firms 
are nothing new. Yet, with the exception of a few disparate pieces of research (Dekel 
Scotchmer 1990, Eldor & Zilcha 1990, Allaz 1992 and perhaps Young & Bolbol 
1')921) no one has yet developed a significant strategic role for risk management. In 
young & Bolbol do not explicitly consider the corporate demand for risk manaýýement, 
however, their model could be easily adapted to do so. 
particular, it will be confirmed that risk management is likely to be of considerable 
importance to strategically interdependent firms. However, this may not always stem 
from risk management's ability to confer a competitive advantage. Instead, depending 
on the exact specification of the game to be played, a number of further interesting 
possibilities could arise. 
The analysis begins in a simplified and effectively static environment in which 
identical but self interested duopolists are required to simultaneously decide on their 
exposure to risk. This exposure is then allowed to condition the nature of competition 
played out in the final output market and hence the exact payoffs of each firm. Using 
such a framework many different outcomes are possible, however, particular attention 
is given to several interesting symmetric Nash equilibrium solutions2 that could be 
attained. These include both "Risk Wars" and "Certainty' Wars" in which firms 
respectively expose themselves to excessive degrees of risk and certainty and also 
potentially costly Co-ordination Equilibria where either Pareto inefficient levels of 
risk or certainty could arise. 
The analysis is then extended to incorporate rather more dynamic interactions 
between duopolists. In particular the possibility that self interested duopolists may 
become aware of and attempt to control their tendency to select jointly Pareto 
inefficient outcomes is explored. The theoretical basis for this analysis is that of a 
multi stage game with "closed-loop" equilibria (e. g. see Fudenberg & Tirole 1986, 
Shapiro 1989a, Slade 1995). The essential characteristics of such games is that at each 
stage firms are able to fully remember and make strategic decisions conditioned on 
what has gone before. A firm may, therefore, make commitments to its rival to either 
2A Nash equilibrium can be defined as an equilibrium from which no firm would unilaterally 
wish to deviate (for a good discussion of this topic see Rasmusen 1994. Ch. 1). 
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punish it for engaging in inefficient, non-cooperative, behaviour or rather more 
interestingly to punish itself if it was to do the same. Using this insight it is then 
argued that some of the tools which firms can use to control their exposure to risk 
(such as external insurance, captive insurance, physical risk control devices etc. ) may 
be employed as commitment devices in "risk games". As such risk management may 
be more than a simple internal control device (in a similar manner to non-executive 
directors) but could also be used to improve a firm's external relations with its 
competitors as well. 
The next section commences by developing a static two-by-two risk management 
game in which non-cooperative firms may expose themselves to Pareto inefficient 
levels of risk (both too little and too much). Section 3 then extends the analysis to the 
rather more realistic case of multi-stage closed-loop games and examines how certain 
risk management tools (in particular insurance and risk sharing arrangements) could 
be used to improve on the equilibrium solutions reached in static games. Finally 
section 4 rounds the Chapter off with a brief conclusion. 
2. Risk Management as a Static Two-by-Two Game 
Before proceeding it is worth reconsidering equation 12 in Chapter 5 (section 4.3), the 
profit maximising condition of the ith (quantity setting) duopolist facing technological 
risk: 
EI ? L(:, 1 
)J 
= 
((1 
- 
C)Zi 
- 
b(6i (mi) + 1)Zi2 
- 
b{p 
1 
(111, )6,, (m2) 
+ 1} Z, z1 
- 
rink 
,ZýJ 
What this equation demonstrates is that technological risk can impact upon a 
duopolist in three mains ways: first, i's expected profits are decreased by its own 
output variations via the term c y, 2 , second expected profits are 
decreased by the 
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covariance term to the extent that p is positive, and third profits are affected by the 
technological risk and expected output of its rival. 
Given equation [12] it is not difficult to see how the behaviour of even a seemingly 
risk neutral duopolist will be influenced by the presence of risk3. However, what is 
rather less obvious is the extent or even direction of this influence on the iths 
duopolist's choice of z; and m;. The cause of this ambiguity flows from the strategic 
interdependence of duopolists' decisions. On the one hand a firm's own exposure to 
technological risk (and or any correlation with this and its rival's exposure to 
technological risk) causes it to reduce its demand for inputs (and thus expected 
output), thereby, providing its rival with a competitive advantage. However, on the 
other hand variability in a firm's own output will hinder its rival's learning processes 
and expose them to the potentially costly effects of a fluctuating residual demand 
curve (so called demand risk). In short a duopolist's (or indeed oligopolist's) exposure 
to technological risk need not necessarily be a bad thing: while it may decrease its 
revenues, it can 
- 
by preventing its rival(s) from making the right production decisions 
- 
harm its competitor(s) as well. 
As already stated in Chapter 5 (section 4.3) the rather conflicting effect that 
(technological) risk may have on the relative fortunes of a duopolist (or indeed 
oligopolist) makes it almost impossible to achieve a unique, all encompassing 
prediction regarding its behaviour. The trouble is that even in the highly specific and 
simplified world exemplified by equation [12] several different Nash equilibrium 
solutions are possible 
-a firm's choice between different levels of risk or certainty 
depending on how the precise values of the given variables in a model (for example 
the nature of the industry demand curve, the value of p or the cost of risk 
management) influence the costs and benefits of each possible strategy. What is 
3 For formal proof of this proposition see Chapter 5, section 4.3. 
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needed, therefore, is an analytical framework that helps to both structure and interpret 
the multiplicity of possible results. The framework proposed here is game theory. 
Developed initially by von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944) game theory is a widely 
accepted framework for the analysis of strategic interdependence in economics based 
duopoly and oligopoly models (see Schmalensee 1988, Shapiro 1989a&b, Martin 
1993, Ch. 19). Although it does have its detractors (for example, Geroski 1988, 
Pelzman 1991) it remains an invaluable tool for describing the complex strategic 
behaviour of firms. In the words of Shapiro (1989b): 
"Game theory has emerged as the predominant methodology for analysing business 
strategy. Much of the work of the new I. O. [Industrial Organisation] involves 
specifying a game among competing firms and solving that game in extensive form 
using the non-cooperative solution concept of Nash equilibrium or one of its 
refinements...... At this time game theory provides the only coherent way of logically 
analysing strategic behaviour. " 
Firm 2 
Certainty, Risk 
Firm 1 Certainty (C, C) (A, B) 
Risk (B, A) (R, R) 
Payoffs to: (Firm 1, Firm 2) 
Table 1: A Static 2x2 Risk Management Game 
Using the methodology of game theory table 1 illustrates the duopolist's conflict 
between risk and certainty as a non-cooperative game of complete symmetric 
information with identical firms. Note that although the game 
is treated as being 
static, this is something of a misnomer. The essential feature of this game 
is that each 
firm makes a (simultaneous) decision regarding its exposure to risk before it selects its 
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optimum input/planned output (or indeed price) level. As such there is a degree of 
dynamism in this model that would not be present in a conventional Cournot (quantity 
setting) or Bertrand (price setting) duopoly game. However, despite this dynamism 
two-stage games such as in table 1 are often treated as being static (see, for example, 
Spence 1977b, Dixit 1980, Fudenberg & Tirole 1984 & 1986, and Shapiro 1989a or 
Martin 1993 for a review). The rationale behind this comes from the simplifying 
assumption that a firm will behave naively, taking both the first stage (strategic) and 
second stage (tactical) decisions of its rivals as given4. Thus in the current context this 
is achieved by assuming that each duopolist takes both its rival's exposure to risk and 
resultant input decision as given. As such a firm cannot pro-actively influence in any 
way the strategic risk management decisions of its rival. 
A further simplifying assumption to be adopted in this section is that each firm is 
restricted to choosing between only two discrete levels of risk (Risk and Certainty). 
This approach differs from the continuous risk case used for perfectly competitive and 
monopolistic firms in Chapter 5 and is much less realistic. However, having only two 
discrete levels of risk will substantially improves the tractability of the analysis while 
still allowing the consideration of the same equilibria that could arise in a game where 
a fine's choice of risk is taken to be continuous. 
In addition to focusing on only two discrete levels of risk a further difference with 
Chapter 5 is that much of the discussion in this section will be kept quite general. The 
main reason for adopting a higher level of generality is to allow a firm's payoffs (A, 
B, C or R) to be influenced by the widest possible variety of factors (such as the 
More formally this is known as an "open-loop" strategy (e. g. see Fudenberg & Tirole 1986, 
Slade 199-5). Such a strategy is admittedly unrealistic, however, it is commonly used to 
simplify models with multiple dependent variables. Moreover, as will be demonstrated the 
equilibria that are derived from open loop strategies can also arise in more complex games 
(Fudenberg & Tirole 1986). 
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impact of demand, cost or technological risk related pure penalties and technological 
non-linearities or even expected utilities 
- 
if required). However, for the sake of 
continuity with Chapter 5 (and the majority of the little past research that does exist) 
the subsequent analysis will focus primarily on the case of price taking duopolists 
producing substitute products (i. e. the case of strategic substitutes). Moreover, a 
technical appendix (Appendix 3) is provided at the end of the thesis in order to 
provide a more specific insight into the behaviour of a quantity setting duopolist faced 
with a linear inverse demand function and technological risk. 
One corollary associated with the level of generality assumed in this analysis is that a 
rather large number of Nash equilibrium strategies are possible5. For reasons of space 
the analysis is, therefore, restricted to several interesting symmetric games from 
which can be derived the following pure strategy alternatives6: 
2.1 "Certainty" Equilibrium 
A "Certainty" equilibrium will arise if C>B and A>R so that each firm will earn a 
higher payoff by choosing Certainty no matter what the choice of its rival. Thus 
5 Guyer & Hamburger (1968) note that, in general, there are 726 distinct 2x2 games. 
GA pure strategy arises where a player decides to always choose the same action whenever a 
game is played (i. e. in this context a firm adopting a pure strategy would select either Risk or 
Certainty instead of randomly mixing between both). 
A symmetric game is one in which each player has the same number of pure strategies and the 
payoff to any strategy is independent of the player to which it is applied to (i. e. in the case 
where one firm selects risk and the other certainty it does not matter whether it is firm 1 or 2 
which selects risk as the payoff received by each would be exactly the same 
- 
B) 
- 
see Weibull 
(1995) for a good discussion of symmetric games. 
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Certainty is the dominant strategy for each firm, meaning that the prevailing Nash 
equilibrium will also be (Certainty, Certainty)7. 
A "Certainty" equilibrium is perhaps the most straightforward and least contentious 
outcome for a two-by-two risk management game. Indeed whenever the presence of 
risk (whether it be technological, demand or cost related) can be shown to have a 
significantly adverse impact on the profits earned by a duopolist such an equilibrium 
is likely to arise. However this outcome relies on the fact that available risk 
management instruments are sufficiently cost effective. Moreover, in other industries 
the strategic benefits of risk (in terms of an increased competitive advantage) may 
well outweigh its associated costs. In such environments other equilibrium outcomes 
are possible. 
2.2 "Risk" Equilibrium 
A "Risk" equilibrium will arise if B>C and R>A. As such it is the inverse of the 
"Certainty" case 
- 
Risk is the dominant strategy for each firm meaning that the Nash 
equilibrium will be (Risk, Risk). 
In a "Risk" equilibrium neither firm will find it profitable to control or remove its 
exposure to risk. While such a result may seem surprising it is worth bearing in mind 
that where risk management is expensive or inefficient it is entirely possible. 
However, the existence of a "Risk" equilibrium does not necessarily mean that each 
firm will always prefer Risk to Certainty, merely that Certainty is currently too 
A dominant strategy is a firm's strictly best (i. e. most profitable) response to any strategy that 
its rival might pick. Note also that a dominant strategy equilibrium will, by definition, be a 
Nash equilibrium (although not all Nash equilibrium are dominant). For a good discussion of 
this subject see Rasmusen (1994, Ch. 1). 
196 
expensive to achieve. Therefore, if a firm could find some way to improve the cost 
effectiveness of its risk management programme it might well do sog. 
2.3 "Risk War" 
A "Risk War" equilibrium outcome can arise if B>C>R>A. However, although the 
dominant/Nash equilibrium solution will be the same as in the "Risk" equilibrium case 
(Risk, Risk), there is a major difference between the two. 
The difference is that in a "Risk Wan" the chosen equilibrium outcome (Risk, Risk) is 
actually Pareto inferior to that of (Certainty, Certainty). In fact both firms could be 
made better off if they switched to a joint "Certainty" equilibrium. However, in the 
absence of an enforceable co-operative agreement such a switch is not possible. The 
problem is analogous to the classic Prisoners' Dilemma problem in game theory (e. g. 
see Rasmusen 1994, Ch. 1). Consider, for example, firm 1. Firm 1 knows that if both 
it and its rival were to choose Certainty joint profits would be at their highest. 
However, firm 1 also knows that if firm 2 was to choose Certainty it could do better 
by selecting Risk (since B>C), moreover, it should realise that if firm 2 was to select 
Risk and it had selected Certainty its payoff would be the lowest possible (A). In 
short, the dominant individual strategy for firm 1 is to expose itself to risk since 
whichever strategy 2 then chooses it cannot do worse than if it had selected Certainty. 
It then follows that since the game is symmetric, firm 2's reasoning should be exactly 
the same, leading to the conclusion that the dominant strategy equilibrium is, rather 
unfortunately, (Risk, Risk). 
8 It is, however, worth noting that in the case of strategic complimentary (i. e. price setting firms 
producing substitute products or quantity setting firms producing complimentary products) 
firms may directly benefit from exposing themselves to risk. This is because it encourages 
them to set a higher (and more profitable) price for their product (see Gradstein et al 1992). 
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Interestingly the possibility of a "Risk War" has already been considered in the 
mainstream industrial economics literature. Perhaps the best known (and seminal) 
example is that of Brander & Lewis (1986)9. What they suggest is that an incorporated 
quantity setting oligopolist may try to strategically exploit its exposure to certain risks 
(such as multiplicative demand or cost risk) by purchasing debt'°. The reasoning 
behind this is based on the debt agency conflict outlined by Jensen & Meckling 
(1976) (see also Chapter 2, section 3.1). A firm that purchases debt becomes relatively 
less concerned about the effects of adverse (i. e. low demand/high cost) states because 
of the limited liability effect of equity capital' 1. Effectively debt serves to increase the 
convexity of a firm's marginal profit function providing leveraged fines with an 
incentive to increase their exposure to risk by say (ex-ante) raising their output (as in 
the case of multiplicative demand or cost risk). This fact can then be exploited by an 
oligopolist since by purchasing debt it can provide itself with a credible12 means to 
raise its output and dominate the market. However, if all firms follow suit (as is likely 
if they want to avoid losing market share) the perceived benefits of the strategy will 
soon disappear. Instead the whole situation could degenerate into what is essentially a 
See also Fershtman & Judd (1987) and Rotemberg & Scharfstein (1990) who reach very 
similar conclusions but explore a firm's ability to exploit rather different agency relationships 
- 
such as those between managers and shareholders. 
10 Brander & Lewis also claimed that their argument could apply to price setting firms, however, 
Showalter (1995) has since shown that this is not generally the case. 
I1 The argument being that a higher level of output should increase the expected benefits of 
favourable (i. e. high demand/low cost) states while having a much less significant effect on 
the expected costs of adverse ones (since the worst that can happen is that shareholders will 
lose their initial stakes when the firm goes bankrupt). 
12 Without altering its second stage payoffs no firm would rationally increase its output above 
the standard C ournot duopoly or oligopoly level (e. g. see Shapiro 1989a). 
198 
"Risk War", where non-cooperative firms purchase excessive levels of debt, driving 
risk and output up but industry profits down. 
Yet, as Brander & Lewis largely admit the type of "Risk War" they discuss (where a 
firm uses its own exposure to risk to directly increase its output) may not occur in 
every oligopolistic market. The problem is that Brander & Lewis' result relies on the 
assumption that higher draws of a random variable leads to an increase in the firm's 
marginal profits. However, there are many situations in which the opposite may in 
fact be the case. 
Take, for example the case of identical duopolists facing multiplicative technological 
risk and a linear downward sloping demand function as examined in Chapter 5 
(section 4.3)13. Here it is not difficult to show that a strategically motivated firm 
which purchases debt will rationally try to decrease rather than increase its exposure 
to technological risk. To see this re-write equation [13], the first order condition for z; 
(i. e. the level of input utilisation of the ith firm), as follows14: 
aE 
=E[(a-c)-2bz; E; ]-bz, =0, fori, j=1,2; iß j [13] az 
What equation [13] reveals is that since demand is downward sloping the marginal 
benefit (in terns of increased revenue) received through the use of an additional input 
will be negatively correlated with the realised values of the random variable F i. As 
13 Other examples include the case of price setting firms facing demand and cost risk (Showalter 
1995) and competition through advertising (Brander & Lewis 1986). See also Bolton & 
Scharfstein (1990) for a similar discussion in relation to the strategic exploitation of 
bankruptcy risk. 
14 Remember b(6j (»11) + 1ý:, 2 = bý:, and note for simplicity the assumption that p=0. 
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such the firm will find that in high output states its profitability can be improved by 
demanding fewer inputs, while in low output states it would be better off increasing its 
demand for z;. Thus when a firm (or rather managers acting in shareholders' interests) 
purchases debt its aim will be to reduce its demand for zi since doing so will enable it 
to more fully exploit "good" (high final output) states of nature while the costs 
associated with such a strategy (lower profits in low output states due to insufficient 
input use) will be attenuated by its ability to declare bankruptcy in "bad" states of 
nature and make creditors the residual claimants. In short the purchase of debt will, in 
the face of technological risk, actually commit a firm to compete less aggressively, 
thus providing its rival(s) rather than itself with the ability to dominate the market. 
Even though a Brander & Lewis' type "Risk War" can not occur where higher draws 
of the random variable decrease a firm's marginal profits another type of "Risk War" 
could. The rationale behind this stems from the fact that the adverse consequences of 
one firm's exposure to risk may also expose its rival(s) to additional risk related pure 
penalties or technological non-linearities. Consequently, where rival risk related costs 
are relatively high it may well be profitable for a firm to increase its own costly 
exposure to risk. 
The possibility that one firm's exposure to risk might be translated into additional risk 
related costs for its rival(s) has not been well treated in the literature. In fact the only 
real piece of work in the area is that by Young & Bolbol (1992)15. Using the dominant 
firm model of oligopoly they investigated the incentives of a large (quasi-monopolist) 
incumbent firn in an industry to deter the entry of a competitive (i. e. price-taking) 
fringe of rivals by exposing them, via random fluctuations in its own output, to 
IS See also Dekel & Scotchmer (1990). However, there is no potential for risk wars in their 
model. Instead they argue that firms may actually benefit from joint increases in technological 
risk. For more on this see sections 2.4 and 3.2 below. 
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demand risk. By assuming that fringe firms make their (irreversible) entry decision 
ex-ante but their output decisions ex-post (i. e. after the random market price for the 
product was revealed 
- 
see Oi 1961) Young & Bolbol were able to show that such 
firms would, in the face of a strictly convex cost function, rationally reduce choose 
not to enter16. Then providing that the costs associated with a fringe firm's exposure to 
demand risk outweigh those related to output risk they argued that it should be in an 
incumbent firm's interests to deter entry in this manner. 
Unfortunately, although explicitly dealing with an oligopolist's strategic incentive to 
expose both itself and its rivals to risk, Young & Bolbol's research does not explain 
how this might translate into a "Risk War". Indeed as in much of the research into 
entry barriers the dominant firm's incentive to expose itself to output fluctuations 
largely stems from the fact that it has various special advantages over its rivals (i. e. 
the ability to influence the prevailing market price and make its production decisions 
ex-ante)17. However, despite this oversight there are situations when even completely 
identical duopolists or oligopolists may find that one firm's exposure to risk can have 
a disproportionately costly effect on that of its rival(s). It is this observation that can 
then be used to explain the existence of what from now on is termed a Young & 
Bolbol type "Risk War". 
Take the case of identical duopolists who via their own exposure to technological risk 
can expose their rival to fluctuations in its residual demand curve (i. e. demand risk). 
Here the preconditions for a Young & Bolbol type "Risk War" stem from the fact that 
technological and demand risk can each have a quite different impact on a firm. For 
16 Young & Bolbol (1992) also considered the case where fringe firms are risk averse. However, 
such an eventuality is much less plausible (see Chapter 4). 
17 For an excellent review of this literature see Martin (1993, Chs. )-4). 
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example it may be that each firm is exposed to the risk of costly bankruptcy, the 
probability of which is positively related to their profit fluctuations. Given the 
existence of a such a pure penalty any increase in risk (whatever the source) would 
appear to have a deleterious effect on the final profits earned by these firms. However, 
with a downward sloping demand function the penalty associated with increased 
exposure to technological risk is likely to be less than that of a similar increase in the 
variability of demand. Where movements in price and output are negatively related a 
high level of output will be associated with a low price and vice versa. This negative 
relationship means that any firm which exposes itself to technological risk should find 
that its income will remain fairly stable (or at least more stable than that of a firm 
facing a similar level of demand risk) because of the compensating movements in 
price. In short a firm which exposes itself to technological risk may be able to benefit 
from this natural hedge (see Appendix 4 for a definition) between price and output 
while significantly increasing the demand risk related profit fluctuations and hence 
expected bankruptcy costs of its rival' 8. In this context (and assuming that each firm is 
aware of the strategic benefits associated with increased output fluctuations) it is then 
not difficult to see how a "Risk War" equilibrium might arise. 
More generally a Young & Bolbol type "Risk War" could arise whenever a duopolist 
is able to expose its rival to some risk related pure penaltyl9. In fact it is interesting to 
18 An interesting point worth noting is that the strength of this hedge will depend on the 
elasticity of demand. Where demand is more elastic, price will not be significantly affected by 
output thereby reducing the strength of any hedge that may exist between them, the opposite 
being the case for inelastic demand. However, while the costs associated with increasing 
output risk may rise when demand is elastic the benefits of such a strategy may also increase. 
Where demand for a product is elastic consumers tend to be very price sensitive, 
consequently, even a small change in the price of one firm's product is likely to have a 
significant affect on the demand for those of its rivals'. Hence with elastic demand a firm need 
only slightly increase its output fluctuations in order to expose its rivals to significant levels of 
demand risk. 
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note that many of the issues discussed in the modern finance approach to risk 
management (such as the attitudes of employees, creditors, suppliers etc. to profit 
fluctuations 
- 
see Chapter 2) can create pure penalties that could lead to "Risk Wars". 
As such when considering these issues it may be necessary to not just consider their 
direct impact on a firm's profits but also their strategic implications. For example, a 
firm that can improve its relationship with its stakeholders may not only be able to 
reduce their compensation claims but also place itself in a more dominant position in 
its industry (in terms of increased market share) by reducing its rival's ability to 
expose it to demand risk related pure penalties. 
The following example illustrates these arguments rather more formally. Although 
highly simplified it does provide a clear justification for a Young & Bolbol type "Risk 
War". As before assume that there are only two identical duopolists in the industry, 
however, they now each have the ability to costlessly expose their rival to some risk 
related pure penalty ý, where: 4>0 20. When a duopolist is exposed to this pure 
penalty its profit maximising condition is therefore: 
7i; 
(qi, 
qi) -(a -c-ý)q -bqi2 -bgiqi for i, j= 
Immediately it should be obvious that the presence of the pure penalty 4 (however 
large or small it is) will serve to reduce the total profits of a duopolist. However, what 
is also crucial is that the extent of the negative impact of ý is taken to be 
multiplicative in q; 
. 
Without this assumption the presence of ý would simply serve to 
reduce the total profits of the ith firm and would have no impact on either its marginal 
19 For a discussion of the types of pure penalty that could exist see Chapter 4 (section 3.2). 
20 Note that providing the strategic benefits of creating ý were to exceed any associated costs, 
assigning a cost to this activity (probably in the form of some own risk related pure penalty or 
technological non-linearity) would not alter the predictions of the model. 
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profits or the optimum level of q; 
. 
In this case the strategic benefits of exposing a rival 
to a fixed pure penalty would be very small, in fact a firm would only benefit from 
doing so if 4 was sufficiently large to drive its rival out of the market altogether. 
The first order condition for a firm exposed to some level of f is then21: 
a7 l' `=a 
-c-4-2bqj-bq1 for i, j =1,2; i #-j 
aq; 
Using this first order condition and that of a duopolist operating in a world of 
certainty the following two-by-two game can then be generated. Note that in this case 
the "Risk" action no longer corresponds to a firm's decision to expose itself to risk but 
rather its rival. 
Firm 2 
Firm 1 
Certainty (ý=O) Risk (4>O) 
Certainty 
«=o) 
I1 (a-c)' 
9b '9 b <<, ýý2 4 <<, - 9 (4b b 7b!
Risk 
1 (a- c+ýý 1 (a-c)' 4 ýý> o) 9G 
J9b1h9tbJJ 
Payoffs to: (Firm 1, Firm 2) 
(a-c-ý)' 1 (a-c-4)z 
9b J9 b 
Table 2: A Pure Penalty Risk War 
21 As in the no risk case the second order condition for a maximum is simply: 
,ý= -2bgi <0 ilt1 
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By comparing the payoffs for each strategy it should become clear that although 
(Certainty, Certainty) is the Pareto superior equilibrium, (Risk, Risk) is the dominant 
strategy. As such it would seem that where each firm possesses the ability to expose 
its rival to a pure penalty a "Risk War" is quite likely (especially when ý is quite 
large). However, if a firm can find some way to prevent or at least attenuate its rival's 
ability to expose it to the pure penalty it may not only be able to prevent a "Risk War" 
but also increase its market share (and profits). For example, if firm 1 was to find 
some way to reduce the impact of the pure penalty (say by improving employee or 
-consumer relations, etc. ) it might then be able to achieve a payoff of 1 
((ac+)2 
9b 
and become the dominant firm in the market. 
Justifying a Young & Bolbol type "Risk War" on the basis of increased rival exposure 
to risk related technological non-linearities is rather less straightforward. Again 
consider, for example, a firm's use of technological risk to expose its rival to demand 
fluctuations22. Although it is possible to show that fluctuations in a rival firm's 
residual demand curve can reduce its expected profits there are only a small number 
of restricted cases in which this is likely to outweigh the costs associated with a firm 
increasing its exposure to technological risk. The trouble is that in this case the impact 
of residual demand risk depends on both the type of demand risk faced (i. e. whether 
risk is taken to be an additive or multiplicative function of a firm's position on its real 
or inverse demand curve) and the exact specification (linear, quadratic etc. ) of the 
industry demand curve (see Newbery & Stiglitz 1981, Chs. 8& 18, Aiginger 1987, 
Ch. 5). Indeed in certain cases it can be argued that fluctuations in a firm's residual 
22 Young & Bolbols' own model also illustrates this problem quite well. In order for the 
dominant firm to strategically increase its exposure to output fluctuations fringe firms had to 
face a convex cost function and make their output decisions ex-post. 
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demand (or inverse demand) function will have no or even a positive effect on its 
expected profits/market share. 
Figure ]a and lb about here. 
Figures la and lb illustrate two possible cases in which a (quantity setting) firm's 
exposure to demand risk will have no effect and a positive effect on expected profits 
respectively. In each case firms are exposed to the risk of a discrete additive shift in 
their real (as opposed to their inverse23) residual demand function (D), consequently 
the precise form of risk can be defined as: 
qi =f(p)+£, E[c]=0, VarE=6224 
Dealing first with 1a- the case of an additive shift in a linear demand function25 
- 
the 
presence of risk can be shown to have no effect on the expected profits of a firm. In 
this case (since E[c]=O) the losses associated with producing too much in the low 
demand state (as denoted by the area: ABEF) will be exactly offset by the gains 
23 As Aiginger (1987, Ch. 5) points out neither demand specification is intuitively more 
plausible than the other (although real world markets may historically adopt one in preference 
for the other). In many ways this is rather unfortunate since each specification can yield quite 
different results. However, whichever specification is used risk wars could still arise 
- 
albeit 
under different circumstances. 
24 As opposed to: 
P =f(9; ) +E, E[c]=0, Vars =6' 
in the inverse demand case. 
2S Note that under additive risk it is the intercept of the demand function that varies rather than 
its slope (as would be the case for multiplicative demand risk). 
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Figure 1 a: Additive Fluctuations in a Linear Demand Function 
qi' q1 
P 
C 
B 
)ý 
A 
Figure lb: Additive Fluctuations in a Strictly Convex Demand Function 
qi* q1 
associated with a greater than average price in the high demand one (the area BCDE). 
As such a firm will be indifferent to the presence of demand risk seeking neither to 
adjust its optimal output decision (as denoted by q. *) or invest in risk management. 
Alternatively in lb the presence of demand risk will actually increase a firm's 
expected profits. The result flows from the fact that the firm's random demand 
function is now strictly convex. This causes the firm's total profit function to become 
convex in 6: such that the higher draw of c (which creates the demand state Dh) will 
cause a larger gain (BCDE) than the loss (ABEF) associated with the equivalent low 
one (which creates the state D). It is then straightforward to show (via Jensen's 
inequality) that for any level of output (e. g. q; *) an expected profit maximising firm 
will, paradoxically, benefit from increased exposure to demand risk26. 
Yet, despite the fact that increased exposure to demand risk need not necessarily be 
bad, there are certain circumstances under which it will have an adverse effect on a 
firm's profits and or behaviour. For example, in the case of additive shifts in a strictly 
concave real demand function, Jensen's inequality can be used to derive the reverse 
result to that described in lb. Moreover, there are several cases in which both real and 
inverse multiplicative demand shifts can have an adverse effect on both the profits and 
output decisions of firm (see for example Nickell 1978, Ch. 5, Newbery & Stiglitz 
1981, Ch. 18, Klemperer & Meyer 1986,1989). 
Figure 2 about here. 
)0 Note that in this case the result would be precisely reversed if the fluctuations were in a firm's 
inverse demand function (see Newbery & Stiglitz 1981, Ch 18). 
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Figure 2 illustrates one case in which the adverse impact of technological risk induced 
multiplicative demand risk could be sufficient to create a "Risk War". Here demand 
fluctuations are described in multiplicative form as27: 
qi =f(P)E, E[E]=1, Var6=62 
The (real) market demand function for a firm's product is then assumed to be strictly 
concave in both random price and output fluctuations. Since this will cause each 
firm's total profit function to become strictly concave in these random fluctuations, it 
is not difficult to see (via Jensen's inequality) how the presence of either technological 
or demand risk will cause expected profits and generally output to fa1128. What is then 
required for a "Risk War" is to show that the adverse impact of demand risk is greater 
than for technological risk and indeed this should be the case. The reason for this 
stems from the fact that under demand risk the output level of a quantity setting firm 
is fixed ex-ante. As such there is no natural hedge to help deflate the impact of any 
resultant price fluctuations. Consequently the price fluctuations faced by firms 
experiencing demand risk (such as PD's and Pp') are likely to be greater than for a 
similar level of technological risk (i. e. PT>> and PTA), thereby, causing a larger drop in 
both optimal output and profits. 
27 Note that the impact of technological risk on output is defined as in Chapter 5 in 
multiplicative form: 
CJi =z E1, EýEI ý= I, CIl' El = 61_ 
28 In order for the presence of risk to cause a reduction in income all that is required is that a 
firm's total profit function be strictly concave in the random variable faced. However, for risk 
to affect output a firm's marginal revenue function must also be strictly concave. 
Unfortunately. in the demand risk case this does not immediately follow. although, as Nickell 
(1978, Ch 5) points out it will occur for linear and quadratic real demand functions or for 
products where the elasticity of demand is constant and less than -1 (i. e. elastic). 
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2.4 "Certainty War" 
A "Certainty War" will arise when A>R>C>B. This is effectively the opposite result 
of a "Risk War", but instead of (Risk, Risk), (Certainty, Certainty) ends up being the 
dominant but Pareto inferior equilibrium solution to the game. 
As with a "Risk War" the rationale behind a "Certainty War" is based on the classic 
Prisoner's Dilemma. In this case the Pareto superior equilibrium is (Risk, Risk), 
however, this is not the dominant strategy for each individual firm. The problem is 
that a firm will not rationally choose to expose itself to Risk since doing so will yield 
lower (individual) payoffs than if it had chosen Certainty, no matter what action its 
rival chooses. However, since both firms are then likely to choose Certainty their joint 
profits will actually be lower than would occur if they both selected Risk. The two 
firms will, therefore, need to find some way to agree to increase their exposure to risk, 
unfortunately this will not be easy since no one firm will do so unless it can be sure 
that its rival will follow suit. 
The possibility of a "Certainty War" arising out of an oligopolist's exposure to risk 
(whatever its source) has not been well treated in the literature. However, one or two 
interesting papers do exist. Take, for example, Dekel & Scotchmers' (1990) 
investigation of "Certainty Wars" in the technological risk case. Although they 
focused on the rather narrow case of accidental spills in the oil industry their model 
illustrates all the essential elements of a "Certainty War". 
Dekel & Scotchmers' argument rests on the fact that oil spills can cause sufficient 
disruption in the supply of oil to raise its market price29. As such the impact of an oil 
spill is not all bad, since firms can (providing market demand is downward sloping 
2) For example it has been estimated that the Exxon Valdez disaster caused a 10% rise in the 
global price of oil (Lave & Quigley 1989). 
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and sufficiently inelastic) then benefit from a significant increase in revenues. Given 
this possibility it might seem to be in firms' mutual interests to increase their exposure 
to the risk of oil spills, however, self-interest may prevent this. In effect increased 
exposure to the risk of oil spills creates a positive externality 
- 
where the initiating 
firm will bear all of the costs (e. g. clean up and liability costs, reputational effects, 
etc. ) but not all of the benefits associated with this strategy30. Thus, while a firm that 
is guilty of spilling oil may gain some benefit from any resultant price increase (see 
Doherty & Smith 1993), this is unlikely to be sufficient to encourage it to increase its 
exposure to risk to a level that maximises joint industry profits. 
More generally the presence of technological risk could lead to a "Certainty War" 
whenever it is in a duopolist's or indeed oligopolist's individual interests to try to 
maintain a lower level of risk than its rival(s). Indeed a 
-priori, at least, such an 
eventuality would seem to be quite plausible. As was shown in Chapter 5 (see section 
4.3) not only can increased certainty reduce the adverse consequences of a duopolist's 
own exposure to technological risk but it can also provide it with a significant 
competitive advantage over a riskier rival. This could then quite easily mean that 
duopolists will end up spending too much on risk management and expose themselves 
to a jointly inefficient (low) level of risk 
- 
since if one firm was to unilaterally 
increase its exposure it would lose market share3 1. 
Finally it is worth noting that Certainty wars could also arise out of a duopolist's or 
oligopolist's exposure to other sources of risk. Indeed the foundations have already 
30 For example, a firm that experiences an oil spill is unlikely, in the short run at least, to be able 
to supply as much oil at the new higher price as its rivals. In fact in their rather simplified 
model Dekel & Scotchmer assumed that the spilling firm would actually produce nothing at 
all for a time. 
31 For a specific example of this see Appendix 3. 
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been laid for this possibility by Eldor & Zilcha (1990) who consider the use of futures 
to control common, industry wide fluctuations in consumer demand32. 
Although focusing on the case of risk averse oligopolists Eldor & Zilcha come up 
with a similar result to the one described here 
- 
that too much certainty can be a bad 
thing. In their model firms are assumed to be risk averse but can buy futures from an 
unbiased (i. e. actuarially fair) forward market in order to reduce their exposure to 
demand risk. However, purchasing futures may not always be jointly beneficial for 
firms. The exact result relies on two conflicting effects: a beneficial "reduction of 
risk" effect (in terms of increased psychological well-being) and a potentially costly 
"output" effect. The adverse consequences of the output effect stems from the fact that 
in the face of increased certainty about market demand risk averse firms should 
rationally choose to raise their output (as in Sandmo 1971, Leland 1972, etc. ). 
However, if all risk averse firms in a market individually choose to purchase futures 
(which is likely since no firm should allow itself to loose market share to its rivals) 
this could then cause the market price and hence firms' joint profits to fall. In such a 
situation firms would be jointly better off by not buying futures, yet, as Eldor & 
Zilcha point out (Risk, Risk) is not a Nash equilibrium since each firm would then do 
better (through increased market share) by reducing their individual exposure to risk. 
2.5 Co-ordination Equilibria 
A Co-ordination equilibrium will arise if a game yields two (or perhaps even more) 
symmetric Nash equilibria. For example, from table 1 this could arise when C>B and 
32 See also Allaz (1992) who considers the strategic incentives of a risk neutral oligopolist to 
purchase futures. However, in Allaz's model it is not increased certainty that enables the firm 
to increase its future output (since a firm makes its output decisions after market demand has 
been revealed) but simply the fact that it is able to fix the price of its product. 
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R>A, leading to two equally plausible Nash equilibrium solutions (Certainty, 
Certainty) and (Risk, Risk). 
In the context of risk management, co-ordination equilibria are perhaps most likely to 
arise when there is a strong negative (as opposed to positive in the case of risk wars) 
relationship between the extent of one firm's risk related pure penalties or 
technological non-linearities and its rival's exposure to risk. Indeed one possible cause 
- 
the case of strongly negatively correlated output fluctuations 
- 
is discussed in 
Appendix 3. However, more generally any natural hedge that could be created by the 
simultaneous exposure of duopolists or oligopolists to risk might well lead to co- 
ordination equilibria33. 
Another possible cause of risk management co-ordination equilibria is where the cost 
of risk management depends on the number of firms investing in it34. Take, for 
example, insurance. In general premium costs should decline as sales of a particular 
insurance product increases (because of administrative economies, improvements in 
underwriting, competitive pressures etc. ), consequently, it may be that the 
attractiveness of a particular policy will increase as more firms purchase it. In the 
33 For example, where an industry is exposed to demand fluctuations it may be that any resultant 
"stock outs" (i. e. where consumer demand exceeds supply) could lead to consumers 
permanently switching to an alternative product (e. g. from IBM compatible to Apple- 
Mackintosh computers). One solution to this problem might be to invest in risk management, 
however, another might be for firms to exploit negative covariances in their own personal 
demand fluctuations. If each specific firm experiences negatively correlated demand 
fluctuations then whichever firms have surplus production could use this to supply the 
consumers of firms experiencing high demand states. Although the firms experiencing high 
demand states might then lose potential customers all firms would benefit in the long run 
since consumers will have been prevented from switching to a rival product (see Balachander 
,C Farquhar 1994, for a variation on this theme). 
34 For an example of this phenomenon in the technological risk case see Appendix 3. 
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current duopoly model this could then lead to a situation where it is just in a firm's 
interests to purchase insurance if its rival follows suit, since only then will it provide a 
cost effective means of reducing risk. 
Games with multiple Nash equilibria are often characterised by what Crawford & 
Haller (1990) term "strategic uncertainty" 
- 
whereby a firm needs to know exactly 
how its rival is going to act before it is able to determine its own best (i. e. most 
profitable) strategy. Take the case where C>B and R>A but C=R and B=A. In this 
context there are two solutions that are both Pareto superior and Nash equilibria (Risk, 
Risk) and (Certainty, Certainty), however, it is by no means certain that either one or 
the other will actually be achieved. The problem is that there is no dominant pure 
strategy for this game, in fact there isn't even a weakly or iterated dominant pure 
strategy35. Consequently, it is entirely possible that one firm will select Risk and 
another Certainty, causing them to earn lower payoffs than if they had each selected 
the same strategy. 
One possible way in which firms could play co-ordination games is to adopt a mixed 
strategy (see Harsanyi & Selten 1988, Crawford & Haller 1990). When playing a 
mixed strategy a firm randomly alternates between two or more strategies, the 
frequency with which a given strategy is played depending on some prior determined 
probability. For example, in the case where C>B and R>A but C=R and B=A firms 
could, by independently selecting Risk or Certainty with equal probability, achieve a 
35 A weakly dominant equilibrium solution can exist if a particular strategy profile yields 
payoffs that are never lower and possibly better than some alternative strategy. An iterated 
dominance equilibrium is the strategy profile that remains when all weakly dominated 
strategies (i. e. a strategy which is never better but possibly worse than some alternative) have 
been successively deleted. For a more detailed discussion of these concepts see Rasmusen 
(1994, Ch. 1). 
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profitable Nash equilibrium 50% of the time (yielding expected profits of '/2C+'/2B = 
'/2R+'/2A ). However, although authors such as Harsanyi & Selten (1988) have argued 
that a mixed strategy is the only rational36 way to play a static, symmetric co- 
ordination game, there are other ways in which players can improve their expected 
profits. In fact, the interesting thing about co-ordination games is that seemingly 
irrational behaviour can often yield a more profitable outcome. 
One of the first authors to suggest that seemingly irrational behaviour could benefit 
the players of co-ordination games was Schelling (1960). Schelling observed that in 
the real world the players of static co-ordination games would generally try to reach a 
mutually beneficial equilibrium by finding what he termed "focal points". They did 
this, he argued, by choosing strategies which they believed to be the most obvious or 
salient for both themselves and other players37. 
Salient strategies can arise for a number of different reasons. They may be the result 
of: psychological or cultural similarities between players, the context in which a game 
is played (such as the way actions are labelled) or even more tangible considerations 
16 "Rational" behaviour in game theory is defined in virtually the same way as it is in expected 
utility theory (in fact expected utility theory was largely developed with game theory in mind 
- 
see von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944). As such the usual axioms of Ordering, Contextual 
Independence, Equivalence, etc. (see Gravelle & Rees 1992, Ch. 19) must all apply if a 
player's decisions are to be deemed fully "rational". 
37 Note that Schelling's definition of salience is not the only one that has been identified. Indeed 
it is entirely possible that a player may not consider what its rivals' are going to do and instead 
naively select the first strategy that comes to mind at the time (see Mehta et al, 1994). 
However, the advantage of Schelling's approach is that a player's search for a salient strategy 
is based on the (economically) rational pursuit of increased payoffs, as such it would seem to 
most appropriately describe the behaviour of an expected profit maximising firm. 
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such as Pareto optimality or the symmetry (i. e. fairness) of certain equilibria38. Indeed 
salient strategies could well arise in strategic risk management games. For example, if 
C>B and R>A but R>C expected profit maximising firms might well feel that the 
Pareto optimal equilibrium (Risk, Risk) is focal39. Moreover, in smaller or manager 
controlled firms human considerations such as risk aversion might also help them to 
achieve "Certainty" equilibria. However, perhaps the most common source of focal 
points for risk management games (at least in respect of widely held firms) is likely to 
be the influence of stakeholders. 
Different stakeholders could affect the outcomes of co-ordination games in different 
ways. In an oligopolistic industry characterised by high levels of debt, for example, 
agency considerations might well lead to firms' concluding that "Risk" equilibria are 
focal (since they should each realise that it is in their rivals' interests to increase their 
exposure to risk 
- 
see Chapter 2, section 4.4). On the other hand in industries where 
the potential severity of loss is very high (e. g. Nuclear and Chemical industries) 
public and or government pressure might well lead to a feeling that Certainty is the 
more salient strategy. Similarly the influence of employees, suppliers, consumers or 
even shareholders might also help firms to co-ordinate their behaviour and achieve 
mutually beneficial equilibria. 
Unfortunately, an important limitation of the applicability of Schelling's theory to 
oligopolistic games is that not all focal points are Pareto optimal. Moreover the 
existence of a clear focal point is not always guaranteed. Consequently, expected 
profit maximising firms are likely to want to find some rather more reliable means to 
38 In addition to Schelling (1960) see Sugden (1986) for a good discussion of the factors that 
may influence a strategy's salience. 
; ` ) Note that this could arise in the case of negatively correlated output fluctuations - Appendix 3 
for an example of this possibility. 
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achieve co-ordination. However, given that this will generally require some kind of 
pre-game behaviour or interaction the possibility is effectively excluded in purely 
static games. As such a detailed analysis of co-ordination strategies and the possible 
role of risk management in helping strategically motivated firms to achieve them is 
left to the next section on more dynamic games. 
3. Risk Management as a Dynamic Closed-Loop Game. 
The above analysis was couched in an effectively static, one period framework in 
which the only strategic decision a duopolist needed to make was to choose between 
Risk and Certainty. Unfortunately, while providing simple, clear results static models 
limit the range of strategic options that may be open to duopolistic (or indeed 
oligopolistic) firms. In order to have a more complete picture of the behaviour of such 
firms under risk this section, therefore, considers the rather more dynamic case of 
multi-stage, closed-loop risk management games. 
The essential feature of a multi-stage, closed-loop game is that its participants do not 
take the actions of their rivals as given, instead a player is allowed to both observe 
and predict the strategic decisions of his or her opponents and pro-actively respond to 
them (see Fudenberg & Tirole 1986, Shapiro 1989a, Slade 1995). This then opens up 
a huge gamut of interesting new strategic possibilities and equilibria. In the current 
model self interested firms could, for example, devise strategies that commit 
themselves to even more severe "Risk Wars" and "Certainty Wars". However, what is 
rather more likely is that firms will try to improve on the Pareto efficiency of static 
equilibria by finding ways to help co-ordinate their actions. 
As was shown in section 2 one feature of many static, symmetric games is that 
strategically interdependent firms can end up experiencing Pareto inefficient 
equilibria (in the current framework this applies to "Risk Wars", "Certainti JVars" and 
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co-ordination equilibria). Of course firms might well be expected to want to try and 
do something about this rather unfortunate situation, however, in a static game this 
will usually prove impossible. The basic problem is the absence of any means to 
generate a credible commitment to take mutually beneficial actions40. Duopolists 
may, for example, realise that it is in their joint interests to co-ordinate their risk 
management actions, yet when it comes to the crunch (i. e. the strategic decision 
making phase) they will not be able to reliably motivate themselves to behave in such 
a way. Due to the static, unsophisticated nature of the analysis what each duopolist 
lacks is a means to irrevocably modify either its own or its rival's behaviour. Without 
such a commitment there is, therefore, very little that the two duopolists can do in 
order to ensure that they do not (either deliberately or mistakenly) select a mutually 
undesirable level of risk41. 
Of course in the real world strategically interdependent firms can and do find ways to 
co-ordinate their actions42 
- 
multi-stage closed-loop games provide a way to examine 
this interaction. The idea is that by incorporating a greater degree of strategic 
40 Credible commitments are strategies that rival firms strongly believe will be carried out (see 
Schelling 1960, Dixit 1980, Shapiro 1989a). 
41 Take for example the case of a "Risk War". Although each duopolist might agree that (Risk, 
Risk) is an undesirable equilibrium they will not be able to credibly commit themselves to 
doing anything about this. The trouble is that while each firm may be able to raise their joint 
profits if they agree to invest in Certainty, individually they can do better by cheating on such 
an agreement (since one requirement of a "Risk War" is that B>C) and increasing their 
exposure to risk. Therefore, in order to deter cheating firms will need to find some way to 
punish violators. However, since there is no way in which a firm can react to deviant 
behaviour in an effectively static model (either because competition lasts for only one period 
or firms are strategically naive) cheating cannot be punished. 
42 For example, Porter (1983), Rotemberg & Saloner (1986) and Salop (1986) all report real 
world examples of co-operative arrangements between strategically motivated firms. 
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sophistication into game theoretic oligopoly models firms may be able to credibly 
commit themselves to mutually beneficial equilibria. In fact the literature on 
oligopoly theory is full of research into the possible ways in which strategically aware 
firms might attempt to jointly improve their payoffs43. The purpose of this section, 
however, is to explore one particular and potentially highly effective sub-set of these 
mechanisms commonly known as "Facilitating Devices" (Salop 1986)44. 
The function of a facilitating device is to directly alter the payoffs that each player 
receives in a game before it is played. As such they can transform situations like "Risk 
Wars" or "Certainty Wars" and co-ordination equilibria into games of mutual interest 
where firms automatically select the Pareto-superior outcome. Many things can be 
used as facilitating devices45, however, in the current context the role of certain risk 
management tools (such as insurance, captive insurance and physical risk control 
devices like sprinklers) is explored. In particular four main possibilities are proposed: 
(i) the use of specific risk management tools as devices for reducing risk, 
(ii) the use of specific risk management tools as devices for increasing risk, 
43 See, for example, Shapiro (1989a) and Martin (1993) for two excellent reviews of this 
literature. 
44 In the words of Salop (1986): 
"The likelihood of successful co-ordination may be increased by the adoption of industry 
practices that increase oligopolists' incentives to co-operate and reduce their incentives to 
compete, despite their divergent interests. " 
45 See, for example, the work by Salop (1986) on "most favoured nation" and "meeting 
competition" clauses or Poitevin (1989) on the role of the banking structure of a duopoly. 
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(iii) the use of specific risk management tools as devices to facilitate 
communication between firms, 
(iv) the use of risk management in general as a device to foster and signal a 
seemingly subjective dislike for risk amongst the stakeholders of strategically 
interdependent firms. 
Two of these roles 
- 
those of reducing risk and facilitating communication 
- 
are 
largely uncontentious, at least in that they accord with the "accepted wisdom" of 
much current risk management research (e. g. see Chapter 2). However, in what 
follows it will be argued that these roles only represent a sub-set (although admittedly 
quite a large one) of possible real world motivations for investment in many risk 
management tools. The use of certain risk management tools as devices for increasing 
risk is perhaps the newest and most surprising assertion, yet in the context of 
"Certainty Wars" it will be demonstrated that such behaviour is not only possible but 
could also prove to be highly profitable for some fines. On the other hand the view 
that risk management can be used to both foster and signal a subjective dislike for risk 
could be seen as a highly traditional and out of date one (see Chapter 2, section 2.2). 
Indeed most of the recent literature on risk management (including in part this thesis) 
has been dedicated at discrediting it. Yet, when faced with certain co-ordination 
equilibria it will be shown that seemingly irrational and apparently risk averse 
behaviour can sometimes help a firm to directly increase its profits. 
What follows is a discussion of the role of a number of specific risk management 
tools in helping to facilitate the prevention of "Risk Wars", "Certainty Wars" and 
certain Pareto inefficient co-ordination equilibria. Note that this section marks a 
further important departure from Chapter 5 by relaxing the assumption that all risk 
control and risk financing tools perform effectively the same function - to directly 
reduce a firm's exposure to the physical consequences of risk (whether this be 
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demand, cost or output related). Instead it will be argued that in a strategic framework 
risk management tools may well be used for quite different reasons and applications. 
Some of the tools discussed below and their associated terms may be unfamiliar to the 
reader, therefore, a brief description of these concepts is provided in Appendix 4. 
3.1 Using Risk Management to Control "Risk Wars" 
In section 2.3 it was explained how a pair of duopolists competing in a static, open 
loop risk management game might achieve a Nash equilibrium (Risk, Risk) that is 
Pareto inferior to that which would arise if they had jointly opted for Certainty. The 
reasoning behind this outcome was based on the standard game theoretic problem of 
the prisoner's dilemma, in which self and mutual interest are in conflict. What firms 
need, therefore, is a way to reconcile this predicament, the purpose of this section is to 
explore how investment in certain risk management tools might help to facilitate this. 
If a risk management tool is going to be of any use in preventing "Risk Wars" it will 
need to fulfil two requirements, firstly any expenditure on the tool must be 
irrevocable (i. e. once purchased it cannot be re-sold) and secondly it must eliminate a 
duopolist's personal incentive to choose Risk over Certainty. Remembering that from 
table 1a "Risk War" occurs where B>C>R>A this can be achieved by reducing both 
B and R, the possible payoffs that a duopolist receives when it chooses Risk. A "Risk 
1 Var" will, therefore, be prevented where pre-game expenditure on a particular risk 
management tool reduces B and R sufficiently to create a game of "Certainty" (where 
C>B and A>R)46. 
46 Note that a "Risk War" could be prevented by simply reducing the off-diagonal Risk payoff B 
(Salop 1986). However, while reducing B should prevent firms from choosing Risk there is no 
guarantee that this will actually occur. The problem is that simply reducing B (so that 
C1 B>R>A) will effectnvely create a co-ordination game with two Nash equilibria (Risk. Risk) 
and (Certainty, Certainty). Then although (Certainty, Certainty) is the Pareto dominant 
equilibrium it is by no means certain that firms will actually select it (see section 2.5). 
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Not all risk management tools will meet the two criteria that are necessary for them to 
be able to help prevent a "Risk War". Moreover, depending on the parameters of the 
model even apparently good tools may become less effective. However, due to the 
rather large number of risk management tools that are currently available the 
subsequent discussion is necessarily restricted to a number of specific examples 
- 
although it is hoped that these examples will provide a good illustration as to how 
other tools might be used in practice. 
3.1.1 Physical Risk Control. 
One way to help prevent a "Risk War" might be for firms to jointly agree to invest in 
risk control devices (whether they be loss reduction or loss prevention tools 
- 
see 
Appendix 4) before they make their risk and input decisions in the competitive phase 
of the game. The rationale behind this strategy is that a firm which has already 
invested in risk control tools is going to be more likely to use them. One of the 
advantages of increased exposure to risk is that a firm can save on its risk 
management expenses, however, if the firm has already purchased risk control tools 
any decision to increase risk will necessitate the waste of already purchased resources 
(unless of course it can find a ready second hand market). Hence the benefits 
associated with increased exposure to risk are reduced, thereby, lowering the firm's 
incentive to deviate from the jointly profitable (Certainty, Certainty) equilibrium. 
Unfortunately, however, a major problem with using risk control tools as a facilitating 
device is likely to be monitoring. Firms may agree in stage one of the game to 
purchase a set amount of risk control devices, but, given the advantages associated 
with unilateral increases in risk, an individual firm can never be sure that its rival(s) 
will do so. What a firm will need to do, therefore, is inspect its rivals' risk control 
purchases, investigating both the quantity and quality of their expenditure. However, 
such an inspection is unlikely to be easy. Accurate assessments of risk are expensive, 
''1 
moreover, the effectiveness of many risk control tools can often only be assessed ex- 
post (see Chapter 2, section 3.1). Thus it may not be until after the risk management 
game in table 1 is played that firms will realise that one (or more) of them has cheated 
- 
but by then it will be too late47. 
3.1.2 External Insurance 
One potentially more effective risk management based facilitating practice is 
insurance. Insurance companies tend to have a comparative advantage in both 
monitoring and preventing risk seeking behaviour within firms (see Chapter 2, section 
3.3). Thus any firm that purchases insurance and then decides to increase its exposure 
to risk should be quickly detected. Moreover, insurers have the ability to penalise 
firms which increase their exposure to risk by charging higher premiums48 or 
cancelling cover without refunding the original premium. 
The risk monitoring and prevention abilities of insurance companies are also often 
enhanced by the fact that they tend to have the law on their side. When purchasing 
insurance a firm is governed by all the same legal principles as individuals including 
those of "Utmost Good Faith" and "Warranty". Consequently, if a firne fails to 
provide accurate information about its planned exposure to risk or comply with 
contractual requirements (such as the installation of risk control devices/procedures) it 
may well have its claims refused or even face criminal proceedings-19. 
47 It is also worth noting that anti-trust authorities may become highly suspicious if oligopolistic 
firms are regularly visiting each other's factories. 
48 Although in the case of experience rated policies ( i. e. where the premium is determined by 
the past loss experience of the purchasing firm) such increases may arise too late. 
41) See Birds (1993) for a good discussion of UK insurance law. 
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Despite the potential effectiveness of insurance as a means to prevent "Risk Wars" 
there are still some problems associated with its use. Perhaps the most obvious one is 
moral hazard (see Shavell 1979, Rees 1989). If an insurance company is unable to 
properly monitor the actions of a firm then insurance will not provide an effective 
deterrent against risk increasing activities50. In fact, in such circumstances the 
purchase of insurance could even increase the likelihood or severity of a "Risk War" 
- 
providing it serves to reduce the costs associated with increased exposure to 
technological risk. 
Secondly, although it should be easier to determine the extent and quality of a firm's 
insurance cover than for the case of risk control devices, perfect monitoring is still not 
guaranteed. Seeking to gain the upper hand firms might then start purchasing 
substandard or insufficient insurance cover or even try to cancel it just prior to 
deciding on its exposure to risk. Whichever way firms' behave the strategic benefits of 
insurance are then likely to become seriously attenuated, a fact which could possibly 
lead to the re-commencement of a costly "Risk War". 
Fortunately there are ways round these problems. One potential solution is for firms 
to use the same insurance company or broker. Since a common insurance company or 
broker would be responsible for all the firms in an industry it is likely to have both an 
increased incentive and ability (via its specialist knowledge of the industry) to control 
fines' moral hazard incentives51. Moreover, common insurers or brokers could even 
be used as an information transmission device, monitoring insurance purchases and 
50 This is especially likely for new or low frequency hazards that insurance companies do not 
have much information about (see Doherty & Smith 1993). 
See Pointevin (1989) for a similar discussion on the use of common lenders to prevent a 
Brander & Lewis (1986) type risk \var. 
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notifying a firm of reductions in its rival(s) chosen level of cover or of outright 
cancellations. 
Finally it is interesting to note that duopolistic and oligopolistic firms could also 
exploit the fact that many insurance contracts are compulsory. Governments, creditors 
and suppliers all typically stipulate minimum insurance requirements for certain risks 
and could punish firms that refuse or are unable to purchase sufficient cover (because 
of their exposure to high levels of risk, for example) through the imposition of fines, 
refusal of firm specific inputs and greater interest charges or input prices (see Mayers 
& Smith 1982). However, compulsory insurance requirements do not cover all risks, 
and even when they are in place the penalties associated with non-compliance can 
often be small or imperfectly enforced52. 
3.1.3 Risk Sharing Arrangements/Joint Captives 
One final interesting alternative worth noting is the use of a joint captive. The 
mechanisms by which a joint captive should help to prevent a "Risk War" are very 
similar to that of traditional insurance. However, joint captives are likely to have a 
number of further advantages. For example, where each firm in an industry is an 
owner of the joint captive they should be better able to monitor the quantity and 
quality of their rivals' insurance cover (since they will be directly involved in the 
procedure). Moreover, in industries characterised by unique or uncommon risks the 
specialist risk assessment expertise of firms may well exceed that of insurance 
companies, thereby, providing them with a superior ability to prevent moral hazard 
(e. g. see Doherty & Smith 1993). 
S-' For example, few regulators, creditors and suppliers are likely to check the true extent of a 
firm's insurance cover until after a loss has occurred. 
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3.2 Using Risk Management to Control "Certainty Wars" 
That risk financing tools such as insurance or joint captives could be used to help 
prevent a "Risk War" may seem unsurprising. As stated in Chapter 2 one important 
function assigned to numerous risk financing tools is the monitoring and control of a 
firm's exposure to risk, consequently the argument that they should help to prevent 
Pareto inefficient increases in risk is neither a particularly new or contentious one. 
Yet, in what follows it is argued that in the strategic context certain risk financing 
tools may also paradoxically be used to help prevent "Certainty Wars". The rationale 
behind this is actually very similar to the "Risk War" case 
- 
with firms making 
irrevocable investments in specific risk financing tools in order to influence their 
payoffs in the ensuing two-by-two risk management game. However, instead of using 
these tools to commit themselves to Certainty firms actually design them to do the 
opposite. 
The main mechanism that firms could exploit to prevent "Certainty Wars" is moral 
hazard. Moral hazard is traditionally seen as a potential cost of both traditional 
insurance and joint risk sharing contracts (e. g. Shavell 1979, Rees 1989), however, 
when dealing with strategically motivated firms this need not be so. Moral hazard in 
insurance or risk sharing contracts is caused by the fact that the individual or firm that 
is purchasing such a contract (the insured) no longer has to bear the full financial 
consequences of their exposure to risk. As such the insured will tend to become much 
less concerned about reducing the adverse consequences of risk since this cost is now 
shared. In a "Certainty War" this should then have the beneficial effect of reducing a 
firm's incentive to select Certainty by restructuring its payoffs to create a more 
profitable "Risk" equilibrium (where R>A and B>C). 
Any risk management tool that can be used to generate a moral hazard incentive might 
be able to prevent Pareto inefficient reductions in risk, however, as in the case of 
"Risk bars" certain tools are likely to be more effective that others. To illustrate this 
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idea the impact of two quite different tools are investigated: risk sharing arrangements 
and traditional insurance contracts. 
3.2.1 Risk Sharing Arrangements 
Interestingly some consideration of the strategic use of risk sharing agreements to 
profitably increase firms' joint profits already exists in the literature. In a rare 
synthesis of risk management and economics Dekel & Scotchmer (1990)53 examine 
the incentives of oil companies to use joint risk sharing arrangements in order to 
increase their exposure to the risk of potentially profitable oil spills. In ensuring that 
firms no longer bear the full impact of their losses, risk sharing creates an incentive 
for firms to engage in moral hazard and reduce their expenditure on spill prevention. 
Spills disrupt the supply of oil and raise its price, so while each firm must bear a 
proportion of any clean up costs Dekel & Scotchmer argue that this should be more 
than offset by the associated increase in revenues 
- 
providing demand is sufficiently 
inelastic. 
Although not explicitly framing their discussion in the context of "Certainty Wars" 
Dekel & Scotchmers' reasoning is consistent with that adopted here. They recognise, 
for example, that without a risk sharing agreement there would be too few spills, 
leading to a low oil price and Pareto inferior profits. Moreover they argue that when a 
firm joins a risk sharing agreement it will rationally increase its exposure to risk, since 
failure to do so (despite their individual incentive to cheat and maintain a low level of 
risk) would penalise the firn 
- 
in terms of its failure to exploit the moral hazard 
incentive. Indeed, Dekel & Scotchmer actually suggest that given equal risk sharing a 
firm's incentive to cheat should be eliminated. 
53 See also Balachander & Farquhar (1994) for a similar analysis in the case of price setting 
firms. 
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However, involvement in a risk sharing arrangement is no guarantee that a firm will 
not find some way to personally exploit the situation to the detriment of others. One 
major problem is likely to be contractual enforcement. As Coats & Ravallion (1993) 
point out the members of a risk sharing pool who have not experienced a loss should 
rationally seek to renege on their agreement in order to avoid sharing their good 
fortune with others. In the current context this could seriously attenuate the 
effectiveness of risk sharing agreements at preventing "Certainty Wars" 
- 
with 
member firms attempting to secretly reduce their own exposure to risk and then 
reaping the benefits but refusing to share in the losses of others. Of course the use of 
formal, legally binding, contracts might reduce the likelihood of such opportunism, 
however, even this is unlikely to be completely effective. It is frequently impossible 
or at best prohibitively expensive, for example, to either completely specify or legally 
enforce every desired future action in a contract. This can then allow its participants to 
exploit loop holes and still renege on the agreement (see Williamson 1985, Hart & 
Holmstrom 1987). 
One way round the problem of contractual enforcement might be to create a risk 
sharing arrangement in which firms pre-commit a set level of funds to a neutral party. 
Indeed risk sharing arrangements such as the P&I clubs or joint captives (for example 
Oil Insurance Ltd in the oil industry or Energy Insurance Mutual for electric power 
stations) could be used for this reason. In effect this is akin to posting a hostage (e. g. 
see Schelling 1960, Williamson 1985, Raub & Keren 1993), whereby, a firm which 
reneges on its commitment to increase risk will then have to write off any premium 
payments that have already been made to the risk sharing pool. Thus rather than 
having to use rather more uncertain and expensive legal routes (such as litigation) to 
ensure compliance, opportunism can be instantly and costlessly punished. As such a 
firm should now (providing the level of pre-committed funds is large enough) have 
much less of an incentive to renege on the risk sharing contract. 
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However, the are problems with the pre-commitment of funds. Pre-commitment will 
require losses to be estimated ex-ante, something that may prove difficult especially 
given that a firm's exposure to risk should change after it has joined the agreement. 
Furthermore, even if the expected level of losses could be correctly predicted it is still 
possible that in bad years claims will exceed the financial capacity of a fund. 
Consequently in the face of very large or frequent losses the risk sharing pool may run 
dry, preventing full insurance for all losses and thus reducing a firm's incentive to 
engage in moral hazard. Extra cash could be demanded either ex-ante or ex-post, 
however, the former may lead to costly over payments (in terms of the opportunity 
cost of forgone alternative investments), while with the latter the original problem of 
reneging could be repeated. 
3.2.1 External insurance. 
The use of an external insurer could confer a number of advantages over joint risk 
sharing agreements. As already stated in the case of "Risk Wars" external insurers 
generally possess a comparative advantage (in terms of superior actuarial skills, lower 
information gathering and processing costs etc. ) in assessing risks ex-ante. Moreover, 
their reserve capacity should be such that except in the most extreme cases they will 
have the necessary funds to compensate a firm for its losses. However, despite these 
advantages there are a number of problems which do rather question the strategic 
usefulness of external insurers in this context. 
The big issue is whether an external insurer will be prepared to tolerate the presence 
of a high degree of moral hazard. An external insurer will simply face the costs 
associated with firms' moral hazard, consequently unless they can find some way to 
compensate it 
- 
say by offering retroactive premium payments, or by even making it a 
residual claimant 
- 
an insurer may actually require them to reduce their exposure to 
risk rather than increase it. Similarly other insurability issues could represent a 
problem. Factors such as adverse selection, whether a loss is measurable in monetary 
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terms, the availability of reliable historical information or the uniqueness of an 
insured event may all influence whether an insurer is prepared to offer cover or not 
(see Schmit 1986). Admittedly these insurability issues could also hinder to operation 
of risk sharing pools, however, given that they are generally owned by their policy 
holders these issues should be less significant (see Bawcutt 1991, Ch. 1)54. 
3.3 Using Risk Management to Help Co-ordinate Firms' Actions 
As stated in section 2.5 the basic problem with static risk management co-ordination 
games is that they are often characterised by a considerable degree of "strategic 
uncertainty" (Crawford & Haller 1990). Consequently, what firms are likely to want 
to try to do is find some way to resolve this uncertainty. In what follows two different 
possibilities are investigated. The first deals with the role of specific risk management 
tools as a means for facilitating communication between firms, while the second 
suggests that in some cases risk management could be used to help a firm establish a 
number of risk related strategic conventions. 
3.3.1 Using Risk Management to Aid Communication in Co-ordination Games. 
Engaging in pre-play communication is likely to be one of the best ways to ensure a 
Pareto optimal solution to a risk management co-ordination game. Effective 
communication will ensure that each firm can decide on its exposure to risk with full 
knowledge of how its rival is going to act. However, what firms will need to do is 
devise a mechanism to facilitate the exchange of information between them and it is 
here that certain risk management tools could be of use. Indeed a natural candidate for 
the role of communicator might well be a joint captive or insurer, or an insurance 
broker or risk management consultant that deals with several clients in the same 
54 For example. Protection & Indemnity clubs have even been known to provide cover against 
fines incurred for intentionally criminal acts (Faure & Heine 1991). 
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industry55. What these devices could then do is collect data from all firms and help to 
co-ordinate their actions by establishing an industry norm for risk management 
practice and expenditure56 
In addition to providing a medium for information exchange joint captives, brokers 
and consultants might also be able to improve the effectiveness of pre-play 
communication by acting as a form of translator. One particular problem with 
communication is that firms will need to establish a common language (Crawford & 
Haller 1990, Farrell 1993,1995). For example, it may be that each firm has a different 
way of describing its exposure to risk57. Consequently if one firm was to say that it is 
going to reduce its exposure to risk by x units, its rival 
- 
who could define risk units 
somewhat differently 
- 
might take this to mean something completely different. By 
using a common insurer/captive, broker or consultant, however, the probability of this 
kind of misunderstanding could be reduced. Then when the actual co-ordination game 
is played there should be little danger that a rival firm will invest in either too little to 
too much risk management, resulting in an increase in expected payoffs for all firms. 
Communication is also likely to very difficult where firms have an incentive to lie 
about their future behaviour (e. g. see Ziv 1993). Take, for example, the case where 
A>B>C_R (or indeed B>A>C>R). In this case the best possible outcome is to be the 
only player to choose Certainty. However if both firms choose Certainty they will 
Given that communication will improve the payoffs of a co-ordination game firms should 
even be prepared to pay a premium for these services. 
56 For a good general discussion of the role of joint communication devices in co-ordination 
games see Farrell & Saloner (1988). 
57 Admittedly this is not a problem in the current model where firms can only choose between 
either full exposure to Risk or Certainty, however, it could occur in a model where the level of 
risk is continuous. 
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each be worse off than if one of them had instead chosen Risk. The problem now is to 
find some way for firms' to credibly communicate their behaviour since each of them 
will attempt to intimidate their rival by falsely claiming that what ever happens they 
are going to be the one to select Certainty58. When faced with such a communications 
deadlock59 common insurers/captives, insurance brokers or risk management 
consultants could act as a mediator (Schelling 1960). The role of this mediator would 
be to assign an action to each firm. Then once assigned with an action no firm should 
have an incentive to deviate from it since doing so would make it worse off (see 
Schelling 1960, Sugden 1986,1989)60 
3.3.2 Using Risk Management to Help Establish Conventions. 
Although often arising out of a particular focal point conventions provide a much 
stronger basis for co-ordination. A convention is a universally known and accepted 
way of playing a game (see Sugden 1986,1989). Therefore, where it is convention 
that a duopolist or oligopolist should play a particular strategy its rival(s) will assume 
that this is the only strategy that will be played and act accordingly61. This should 
then have quite a stabilising effect on the outcome of a risk management co- 
ordination game since each duopolist will have a very definite idea as to how its rival 
is going to act. 
58 In game theoretic parlance this is known as the game of "Chicken". For more on this game see 
Sugden (1989) and Rasmusen (1994, Ch 3). 
ýt) In many respects the repeated breakdown of the Northern Ireland peace talks are a result of 
the fact that the battle between Republicans and Unionists is a game of "Chicken". 
60 For example, if a firm was told that its rival was going to select Certainty and that it should 
select Risk it would not rationally then decide to select Certainty since B>C. 
61 For example, the convention in the UK that cars should pass each other on the left helps to co- 
ordinate the actions of motorists and avoid accidents. 
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It is usually assumed that conventions arise haphazardly rather than being deliberately 
chosen by the players of a game (e. g. Sugden 1986,1989, Weibull 1995)62. In fact 
conventions are typically modelled as being the result of evolution, arising through an 
often lengthy process of quasi-biological natural selection in which less "successful" 
strategies are eliminated until only one remainS63. This supposition does not, 
however, sit well with the current focus on closed-loop games in which firms are 
gifted with very superior powers of deductive reasoning. One problem is the time it 
can take for the players in an evolutionary model to establish a convention that 
ensures a stable equilibrium. Moreover even when a convention is established there is 
no guarantee that the ensuing equilibrium will be Pareto optimal. Instead as Sugden 
(1989) points out evolutionary success is more likely to be determined by analogy64 
and the ability of one particular strategy to do well against other competing strategies 
rather than concepts like Pareto efficiency. 
Given the vagaries of natural selection it is, therefore, hard to believe that intelligent, 
expected profit maximising firms will allow themselves to succumb to the whims of 
evolution65. Instead it is argued that in the current context of closed-loop risk 
management games firms are far more likely to try to modify the process (just as a 
62 Consider, for example, the fact that cars in the UK drive on the left while those in France 
drive on the right. Random chance seems to have determined which side of the road cars are 
expected to pass each other. 
63 See Sugden (1989) for an excellent discussion of this process. 
0 The concept of analogy is very similar to Schelling's notion of salience. It refers to popular 
and widely agreed upon notions such as "first come first served" or "last in first out". 
05 In defence of Sugden (1986,1989) it should be noted that he focused on the behaviour of 
individuals who typically will possess (due to bounded rationality and lack of information) 
inferior reasoning abilities to large firms. 
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scientist might do working in the field of Genetics) in order to ensure that a universal 
convention is not only established quickly but that it is also Pareto efficient. 
Admittedly this assumption is at odds with the likes of Sugden (1989) who argues 
quite forcefully that "... conventions are not chosen; they arise by chance", however it 
does have a precedent in the game theoretic literature in the form of some recent work 
by Mark Casson (1991). 
In his book, The Economics of Business Culture, Casson (1991) argues that the 
payoffs of many different types of game, including those of co-ordination, can often 
be manipulated by some form of leader. Leaders can either be distinct 
- 
such as a 
dominant firm, politician, or regulator 
- 
or a personification of the combined influence 
of a dispersed peer or stakeholder group. The purpose of this leader is then to 
consciously influence the payoffs received by players in order to create games of 
"Harmony" where they each automatically select the best (i. e. Pareto optimal) course 
of action. 
Although Casson largely focused on the manipulation of human attitudes and 
emotions (and in particular our moral sensibilities) his work can be used to help 
explain the strategic risk management behaviour of even an expected profit 
maximising firm. In fact one of the key insights of Casson's and indeed much of the 
convention literature is that seemingly irrational or emotional behaviour can 
sometimes help to facilitate mutually beneficial equilibria in co-ordination games66. 
Admittedly the idea that "emotional" behaviour can be used to generate profitable 
equilibria is at odds with many of the traditional axioms of both game theory and 
economics (see Sugden 1986,1989). However, the paradox is that where players face 
00 The basis for this insight is the same as in the original focal point literature - see section 2.5 
above. 
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multiple Nash equilibria human emotions can enable them to achieve more profitable 
outcomes than if they were operating under the traditional axioms of game theory. As 
such it is hard to believe that intelligent, expected profit maximising firms will not 
choose to exploit potentially profitable conventions, even when they are based on 
subjective human concerns. 
What follows is a discussion of how the risk management functions of duopolists or 
oligopolists might be used to establish profitable conventions for risk management 
games. Note that in this case it is not always specific risk management tools that are 
used to ensure a profitable equilibrium. Instead the suggestion is that firms may also 
use their entire risk management functions as a means to alter the behaviour of key 
decision making personnel (i. e. company directors and other senior employees). 
3.3.2.1 Using risk management to help establish a convention of risk aversion. 
As demonstrated in Chapter 2 (section 2) much of the early research into risk 
management was built around the premise of corporate risk aversion. In fact some 
authors (e. g. Mehr & Hedges 1974, Greene & Serbein 1983) even went as far as to 
suggest that risk management should help to promote risk aversion. This was on the 
grounds that unprofitable reductions in risk might be required in order to ensure that 
firms engaged in socially responsible behaviour67. More recently this view has been 
extensively criticised (see Chapters 2 and 4), with many academics voicing strong 
objections to both the theoretical and practical implications of using risk aversion to 
justify corporate risk management. Yet, in the strategic context the case against risk 
aversion becomes less clear cut, instead it can actually be argued that fostering a 
67 Greene & Serbein (1983, p. 4) sum this idea up quite well: 
"In the top level management of the firm, there is often a conflict between optimisation of 
return on capital and the increasing demand that waste of human, natural, and financial 
resources cause. Risk managers can help in the resolution of the conflict through their 
activities in risk and cost control. ". 
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subjective dislike for risk amongst stakeholders and in particular a firm's senior 
executives or managers may actually prove to be desirable. 
In order to see the value of risk aversion imagine a two-by-two risk management co- 
ordination game in which C>R>B>A68. In such a game the strategy (Certainty, 
Certainty) is clearly Pareto superior, however, it is by no means assured that the two 
firms will be able to achieve such a desirable equilibrium. The basic problem is trust. 
Although the potential payoff from Certainty is highest if both firms choose it (C), 
this will need to be traded off against the risk of receiving the lowest possible payoff 
(A) if a firm's rival does not. Thus a firm may well prefer to select Risk unless it can 
be sure (or at least almost sure) that its rival will definitely choose Certainty. 
By establishing a convention which guarantees that firms will choose Certainty the 
problem of trust in a co-ordination game such as C>R>B>A should be eliminated. 
One such convention is that of risk aversion. In effect what strategically 
interdependent firms could do is establish a Casson type leader to ensure a (Certainty, 
Certainty) equilibrium. This leader could be simply made up of key individuals 
responsible for each firm's individual risk management function69, however, in order 
to establish a strong and unambiguous convention (see section 3.3.1 above) it is likely 
that firms would use in conjunction with this a common trade association, mutual 
broker or consultant, or even a professional risk management association such as the 
Institute or Risk Management in the UK. The purpose of this leader would be to 
ensure that the key stakeholders of each firm (such as senior managers) maintain the 
industry norm level of risk management. Individuals/groups that deviated from this 
68 This is commonly known as the "stag hunt" game 
- 
for more information on this game and its 
applications see O'Neill (1994) and Crawford (1995). 
69 For example these key individuals might include a formal risk manager, company secretary or 
finance officer (see Chapter 3, section 3.2). 
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norm might then be punished either tangibly (via pay awards, or pecuniary benefits 
etc. ) or even intangibly through the instigation of group feelings of guilt or remorse. 
Thus, although in many contexts risk aversion is not likely to influence corporate risk 
management decisions, its significance to some strategically motivated firms should 
not be underestimated. Indeed in co-ordination games where (Certainty, Certainty) is 
the Pareto dominant equilibrium stakeholder risk aversion may be both a cause and 
effect of investment in corporate risk management. However, it is important to 
remember that in no way are such feelings of risk aversion either irrational or 
unprofitable, instead they are part of a fully considered attempt to maximise joint 
profits. 
3.3.2.2 The relationship between risk perception heuristics and risk management co- 
ordination games. 
An increasing amount of contemporary research into risk management is exploring 
the idea that individuals and firms may sometimes behave as seemingly irrational 
entities that use heuristics, or less technically "rules of thumb", to make their 
decisions (see Chapter 4, section 3.1). In the course of this research the influence of 
many different heuristics have been explored, however, what remains to be explained 
is their root cause (Pidgeon et al 1992). Admittedly some attempts are now being 
made to try to explain heuristics using what is commonly termed "cultural theory" 
(e. g. Douglas & Wildavsky 1982, Dake & Wildavsky 1990, Yardley et al 1997), yet, 
despite some work in the corporate context (such as Perrow 1984, Pidgeon 1991, 
Turner 1978,1994, Clarke 1992) little has been done to relate the development of 
heuristics to the strategic behaviour of firms. The purpose of this section is, therefore, 
to provide some possible explanations for the exploitation of heuristics by a 
strategically motivated profit maximising firm. 
236 
To many the idea that a "rational" profit maximising firm could attempt to exploit 
certain heuristics might seem rather paradoxical. Cultural theory, the currently 
predominant explanation for the presence of heuristics, is based on the tenets of 
sociology and anthropology (Pidgeon et al 1992). As such its proponents argue that it 
is the subjective and often irrational beliefs of social groups that will most influence 
the heuristics used in both individual and corporate decisions. However, as has 
already been demonstrated in this Chapter, apparently subjective attitudes and beliefs 
and the rational desire for profit can exist in tandem. In this thesis, therefore, it is 
argued that in the case of closed loop co-ordination games rational, profit maximising 
firms might, through their risk management functions or some joint leader (such as a 
joint captive or trade association etc., see section 3.3.2.1 above), deliberately 
encourage the use of decision heuristics by their employees 
- 
providing these 
heuristics help to ensure Pareto efficient equilibria70. 
Imagine, for example, a simple two-by two co-ordination game in which C>B and 
R>A but C=R and B=A (see section 2.5). In this game there are two equally profitable 
strategies (Certainty, Certainty) and (Risk, Risk), however, the problem is that each 
time the game is played a firm will be unable to predict whether its rival will choose 
either Risk or Certainty. What each firm needs, therefore, is to establish some 
mechanism that can help it to predict its rival's actions and achieve co-ordination. The 
exploitation of a commonly known and accepted heuristic such as the phenomenon of 
"Anchoring" (Tversky & Kahneman 1974, Shiller 1997) could provide just such a 
solution71. Anchoring denotes the tendency for decision makers to use past actions or 
70 It is also interesting to note that in a recent empirical study of the relevance of cultural theory 
in explaining the use of heuristics an explicit causal link could not be found (Sjonberg 1997). 
71 For example, the "sticky prices" phenomena talked about in the industrial- and macro- 
economics literature's (e. g. Means 1935, Weiss 1977, Schramm & Sherman 1977, Rotemberg 
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information as a suggestion for future outcomes. Consequently what firms (or rather 
their risk management leader) could do is use the Anchoring Heuristic to establish a 
convention amongst their key stakeholders that once a given action yields either of 
the two Pareto efficient equilibria 
- 
(Certainty, Certainty) or (Risk, Risk) 
- 
it should 
be consistently repeated72. Obviously such a convention does not guarantee co- 
ordination the very first time a game is played, however, if the game is repeated co- 
ordination should (since firms have a 50% chance of achieving co-ordination in each 
game) in all probability be ensured for each subsequent repetition (Crawford & Haller 
1990)73. 
Other heuristics could also be used to help provide Pareto efficient solutions to certain 
co-ordination games. Take the phenomena observed in some markets known as the 
"Disjunction Effect" (see Tversky & Shafir 1992, Shiller 1997). This effect denotes 
the tendency of decision makers to wait to make decisions until further information is 
revealed, even though this information may not be technically relevant to the decision 
in question and even if they might have made the same decision without it. Although 
it may seem quite irrational to wait for seemingly unnecessary information, in the 
strategic context the benefits of doing so have already been explored (e. g. Cass & 
Shell 1983, Maskin & Tirole 1987). In the current context, for example, irrelevant 
information might be of value where it is assigned a common meaning since it could 
then be used as kind of random signalling device to indicate the exact risk control 
& Saloner 1986 see also Martin 1993, Ch. 15 for a good review) might well be the result of a 
rational co-ordination strategy adopted by strategically interdependent firms. 
72 See Crawford & Haller (1990) for a variant of this game. 
73 A similar concept is the phenomenon of "magical thinking" (Skinner 1948). This concept 
denotes the tendency of decision makers to repeat past actions where they are believed 
(rightly or wrongly) to lead to beneficial outcomes. 
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action that a firm should take (Sugden 1986,1989). Imagine a game of "chicken" 
(where A>B>C? R). Here the emergence of say a sun spot on one particular day (i. e. a 
Tuesday) might be taken the mean that firm 1 should defer and choose Risk, while 
firm 2 chooses Certainty. Moreover, note that although firm 2 has no way to punish 
deviant behaviour this arrangement should be self enforcing. The argument goes that 
since firm 1 will realise that when sun spots appear on a Tuesday its rival will 
automatically choose Certainty it knows that its best possible response will be to 
always choose Risk (Schelling 1960, Sugden 1986,1989). 
Finally the need to achieve co-ordination could explain the presence of fads and trends 
in corporate risk management decisions. Fads and trends are typically assumed to 
arise because decision makers lack the time and or ability to make fully informed 
decisions (see, for example, Shiller 1997). The idea is where decision makers cannot 
make fully informed decisions they will typically try to find meaningful ways in 
which they can restrict the data set that they actually use74. Fads and Trends provide 
just such a mechanism, since by being both familiar and popular they help to bring 
certain issues or outcomes to the fore-front of a decision maker's mind75. 
Usually fads and trends are seen as being quite irrational (e. g. Shiller 1987), however, 
it may be that where decision makers face co-ordination equilibria they could be used 
as the basis for profitable conventions. Take, for example, the current wave of interest 
in captive insurance companies. In recent years the number of captive insurance 
74 Note that in the psychological literature this phenomenon is typically known as "selective 
attention" (James 1950), however, in the economics literature it is more commonly called 
"bounded rationality" (Simon 1957, Williamson 1975). 
75 For empirical evidence of this phenomenon see Shiller (1984.1987), see also the seminal 
work of Tversky & Kahneman (1973) into their so called "Availability Heuristic". 
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companies has been on the increase76, despite the fact that many of the traditional 
benefits associated with captive use (tax breaks, reduced risk financing costs, etc. ) are 
in decline. Indeed one well renowned captive insurance consultant Paul Bawcutt has 
recently indicated that in his opinion many of these newly formed captives should 
actually be shut down (Unsworth 1996, Howard 1996). However, it may be that this 
seemingly irrational fad for captives is in part a reflection of certain firms' attempts to 
solve risk management co-ordination games. A firm which sets up a captive is 
effectively deciding to increase its exposure to risk (unless it then decides to reinsure 
this risk)". Thus, where a firm expects its rival to set up a captive and (Risk, Risk) is 
a Nash equilibrium rationally it should do the same. 
4. Conclusions 
Current research into risk and risk management is incomplete in that it does not 
effectively consider the strategic implications of a firm's decisions. This is unfortunate 
since the behaviour of duopolists and oligopolists under risk is likely to be 
considerably different to that of perfectly competitive firms (which seem to be the 
focus of much current risk management research) or even monopolists. Hopefully this 
chapter has to begun to redress this imbalance. 
One important difference about duopolists and oligopolists is that their risk 
management decisions are not made in a vacuum but are instead often influenced by 
the actions of their rivals. This strategic interdependence can then yield some rather 
surprising results. It is possible, for example, that self interested firms will engage in 
76 In a recent siýrwev Alexander & Alexander (1995) report that over 40%,, of the firms in their 
sample had formed a captive since 1990. 
77 For more on the function of a captive see Appendix 4. 
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"Risk Wars" where they each choose to adopt a high risk strategy even though a low 
risk one would yield a Pareto improvement in terms of higher joint payoffs. On the 
other hand "Certainty Wars" are also a possibility, in which expected profit 
maximising firms spend too much on risk management in a vain attempt to gain a 
competitive advantage over their rival(s). 
Secondly it would appear that in more dynamic closed-loop games firms may not only 
use risk management to reduce their joint exposure to risk but also to increase it. In 
particular it was argued that by exploiting the moral hazard incentives created by tools 
such as insurance or risk sharing arrangements risk management may have a role to 
play in helping to facilitate the prevention of "Certainty Wars". Similarly in co- 
ordination games it is even possible that firms will use insurance brokers or risk 
management consultants to help them mutually increase (rather than just reduce) their 
exposure to risk. 
Yet, despite the fact that some of these propositions are rather unorthodox it is worth 
noting that a firm's use of risk management has not really changed in any great way. 
The modem finance approach is largely based on the assumption that the role of risk 
management is to help overcome market imperfections and align the often conflicting 
objectives of a firm's stakeholders. In this respect the role of risk management in the 
strategic context is not much different, however, rather than focus on all the 
conventional issues this chapter has introduced a new stakeholder group 
- 
the firm's 
competitors. 
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Chapter 7: 
Conclusion 
1. A New Paradigm for Risk Management? 
Perhaps the most interesting thing about academic research into risk management is 
the comparative immaturity of the discipline. Unlike areas such as economics or 
modem finance theory risk management has few seminal and widely accepted ideas to 
draw upon', in fact risk management research could almost be said to be in a state of 
flux with more ideas than authors2. In part, this multitude of theories mirrors the 
complexity and diversity of real world decisions under risk, however, this rather ad 
hoc approach to research has done little to constructively further our understanding of 
the area. What risk management academics need to do now is find order in the chaos 
and provide a strong foundation on which future research can grow. 
Admittedly some degree of cohesion has already been achieved by using the ideas of 
more established disciplines to provide a framework from which to understand the 
risk management decisions of firms (for example, modem finance theory, psychology, 
sociology and organisational behaviour). Indeed concepts such as the currently 
predominant modem finance approach reviewed in Chapter 2 have provided a useful 
guide, helping to direct risk management research into a number of interesting areas. 
However, these frameworks can prove to be rather restrictive, diverting attention from 
other valuable and equally plausible lines of thought. Moreover, at least in the case of 
the modem finance approach, the current lack of conclusive empirical proof for its 
associated hypotheses would also seem to suggest that it does not represent a panacea 
For example, much modem economic research is still based on the ideas of pioneers such as 
Adam Smith (1937) and Cournot (1838). 
2 Hood et al (1992) call this the "Risk Archipelago" (see also Hood & Jones 1996, p3-6). 
(see Chapter 3)3. The primary purpose of this thesis has, therefore, been to try and 
develop a new broader framework for risk management that cannot only embrace the 
widest possible assortment of views but also provide some definite predictions. The 
basis for this framework: neo-classical economics. 
The role of economic theory in risk management research has had a rather chequered 
past. Many of the past and indeed current economic models of risk management 
decision making that have been proposed rely extensively on the predictions of 
expected utility theory. However, as shown in Chapter 4 (sections 2 and 3.1) the 
relevance of expected utility theory to corporate decision making has been widely 
criticised on both theoretical and empirical grounds. As such any attempt to explain 
corporate risk management that depends on the predictions of expected utility theory 
must at best be considered rather suspect and at worst futile. 
Yet, despite the problems with expected utility theory there are other rather more 
plausible economic based explanations for corporate risk management. In particular 
this thesis has focused on two groups of economic consequences that can arise in a 
world of risk, those of "pure penalties" and "technological non-linearities". As has 
been demonstrated risk management research based around these twin concepts 
should benefit from a number of advantages. For example, not only are the definitions 
of a "pure penalty" or "technological non-linearity" sufficiently broad to encompass 
many of the ideas generated by the modem finance approach (such as bankruptcy 
costs and convex tax functions 
- 
see Chapter 4 sections 3.2 and 3.3), they can also be 
used to produce numerous additional scenarios in which a firm may wish to control its 
exposure to risk (such as in monopolistic and oligopolistic markets - see Chapter 5, 
Note that recent research into "cultural theory" has also been criticised on the grounds that it 
may be unrealistic (Johnson 1991, Sjonberg 1997). 
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sections 4.2 and 4.3). In addition, by using these concepts it was shown in Chapter 5 
that risk management can bring tangible and immediate benefits to the firm 
- 
in terms 
of increases in both its optimum output level and short run profits. 
Another important advantage with using economics as a basis for risk management 
research is that it enables a strategic dimension to be added to a firm's risk 
management decisions. Indeed as demonstrated in Chapter 6 risk management is 
likely to be of considerable importance to strategically motivated firms. This 
importance does not, however, always stem from the simple desire of a firm to reduce 
its exposure to risk. It is possible, for example, that duopolists or oligoplists will use 
certain risk management tools to help prevent "Risk Wars" and "Certainty Wars" - 
where self interested firms jointly expose themselves to too much or too little risk 
respectively. Similarly when faced with multiple Nash equilibria it is possible that 
firms will use their risk management functions to help profitably co-ordinate their risk 
control decisions. 
How then can the contribution of economic theory to risk management research be 
summed up? Perhaps the most important insight is the idea that a firm's risk 
management decisions can make a direct contribution to its short run profits. The 
returns from risk management have typically been seen as being both hard to 
measure4 and taking a long time to materialise (see Chapter 2). In an economic 
context, however, the benefits of risk management are often not only immediate but 
highly tangible as well. In view of this one of the central ideas of the modem finance 
approach to risk management (see Chapter 2, section 3.1) - that there will be a conflict 
of interests regarding risk exposure between shareholders and the firm's other 
stakeholders 
- 
may need to be rethought. If risk can have an immediate and tangible 
It would be difficult for a firm to estimate how many third party 
liability suits might be 
avoided through investment in environmental risk management, for example. 
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effect on the profits of a firm then it stands to reason that its shareholders will want 
managers to invest in cost effective risk management. In short it may well be that 
shareholders are not as "averse" to expenditure on risk management as has previously 
been thought. 
A second related contribution of economic theory is that it places much more 
emphasis on the mean returns (i. e. profits) of a risky decision than its variance. 
Perhaps as a consequence of expected utility theory5 much of the research into the 
modern finance approach to risk management still focuses on how seemingly risk 
averse stakeholders will react to increases in the variance of their returns (see Chapter 
2)6. The trouble with this, however, is that a decision maker's attitude towards the 
variance of his or her returns is an inherently personal one, as such it is very difficult 
to achieve a reliable prediction on how different decision makers will respond to the 
same level or type of risk. The advantage of focusing on the mean returns of a risky 
decision is that this problem can be largely eliminated. In general it is reasonable to 
assume that all decision makers will prefer more returns to less 
- 
thus where risk can 
be shown to have a direct impact on the mean returns of a decision maker it becomes 
much easier to make general predictions. 
Finally economic theory can be used to provide a definite link between a firm's core 
business and risk management decisions. Certain authors in the modern finance 
approach to risk management (e. g. Froot et al 1993, Stulz 1996) have already 
recognised that a firm's risk management function can be used to support both its long 
It is hard to deny that expected utility theory has not had a major influence on much of the 
recent modern finance and organisation behaviour based research into firm (or indeed 
individual) behaviour in a world of risk. 
ý' However, it should be noted that the modem finance based research into convex tax functions 
and bankruptcy costs does not share this problem - see Chapters 2 and 4. 
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term investment and short term operational decisions, however, what this research has 
failed to do is provide explicit proof of this link. By using economic theory this thesis 
has been able to provide some supportive evidence. In particular it has demonstrated 
that investment in risk management can enable a firm to profitably increase or (in the 
case of strategically motivated firms) even decrease its output. Moreover, it should not 
be too difficult to show in subsequent research that risk management can be used to 
enhance a variety of other decisions, such as pricing, long term investments, 
advertising or research and development. 
Thus it would appear that the ideas which underpin economic theory have much to 
contribute to our understanding of corporate risk management. Hopefully future 
research in the field of risk management will begin to adopt a more formal economic 
view, investigating perhaps some of the extensions to the current work suggested in 
section 3 below. This is not to say, however, that other perspectives are invalid. 
Economic based risk management research undoubtedly has its limitations (see 
section 2 below), moreover, our finite understanding of the behaviour of real world 
firms would appear to suggest that they may have more complex concerns than simple 
profit maximisation (Schoemaker 1993). Yet, in order to maintain a balanced view of 
corporate risk management decisions, the predictions of economics based risk 
management models should not be ignored. 
246 
2. Limitations of Current Research 
Many of the limitations of the analysis in this thesis have been identified in the 
relevant Chapters and sections above. What follows, therefore, is a brief summary of 
some of the more important issues. 
2.1 Use of ordered attitudinal data to test the modern finance approach in 
Chapter 3 
The purpose of Chapter 3 was to attempt to identify whether the various predictions of 
the modem finance approach actually explained why large UK companies spend 
money on risk management. In general the results of this analysis were quite negative 
with there being little evidence that anything, other than the personal attitudes of 
managers, actually influenced a firm's risk management programme. 
It is quite likely that the lack of support found for the modern finance approach in 
Chapter 3 reflects the real world insignificance of its hypotheses7. However, it is also 
possible that the use of ordered attitudinal data to measure the various dependent 
variables lead to a degree of bias in the analysis. Although respondents were asked to 
answer all questions on the basis of what was important to their company, rather than 
themselves, it is impossible to be sure that their personal opinions did not influence 
their responses. Thus it may be that the questionnaire data collected reflected what 
respondents felt should be the motivations for their company's risk management 
programme rather than what their company's motivations actually were. 
Yet, despite the limitations of attitudinal based data it is unclear as to how general 
surveys on the modern finance approach to corporate risk management can proceed 
without making extensive use of such information. Reliable, objective information 
about risk management is scarce at best 
-a situation that does not appear likely to 
Indeed other empirical studies of the modern finance approach have not found overly strong 
support for it either - see Chapter 3. section 2. 
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change (see section 2.2 for more information on this). Thus it may be some time (if 
ever) before a conclusive test of the modem finance approach can be undertaken. 
2.2 The need for further empirical research on the significance of 'pure penalties" 
and "technological non-linearities" in motivating corporate risk management 
An important limitation of this thesis is the lack of any empirical research regarding 
the economic impact that "pure penalties" and "technological non-linearities" may 
have on the risk management decisions of firms. Future research will definitely have 
to address this issue, however, at the current time it is unclear as to how many of the 
hypotheses contained in Chapters 4,5 and 6 could be tested. One problem is that the 
behaviour of real world firms is likely to be very sensitive to the internal and external 
environments that they face (in terms of the type of risk, number of inputs used, the 
nature of competition, etc. 
- 
see Chapter 5, section 3) 
- 
as such it may be quite difficult 
to find industries which meet the various assumptions that have been made. To make 
matters worse, there is also a lack of publicly available information about the nature 
of a firm's exposures to risk and its reactions to it (see Chapter 3). Most firms are not 
prepared to reveal information about their risk management programmes. Moreover, 
although government reports such as the Cadbury Committee on corporate 
governance (Cadbury 1992) have recommended that this situation should change, it 
does not seem that anything will be done about this in the near future. 
2.3 Simplicity of the models used in Chapters 5 and 6 
Many of the assumptions made about the economic models examined in Chapters 5 
and 6 are quite simplistic. Simplified models have the advantage of keeping the 
analysis fairly tractable, allowing this thesis to focus on some of the key features of 
economic risk management models. However, it would be fair to say that some of the 
assumptions made in especially Chapter 5 (such as the use of a linear demand function 
or the fact that a firm is restricted to using only one productive input) are not wholly, 
realistic. It would, therefore, be advisable for future research to address this issue (see 
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sections 3.1 and 3.2 below) and attempt to relax some of the more restrictive 
assumptions made here. 
2.4 Focus on profit maximisation 
To proponents of the modern finance approach to risk management and "cultural 
theory" the focus on profit maximisation in Chapters 4,5 and 6 might seem to 
represent something of a limitation. Modern finance theorists have effectively adopted 
a political view of the firm, arguing that the concerns of non-shareholder stakeholders 
will often conflict with objectives such as short run profit maximisation. Moreover, 
cultural theorists have even gone a step further embracing the contextual view of the 
firm in which organisations are assumed to be so complex that the formation of 
definite, objective goals such as profit maximisation are said to be virtually 
impossible8. 
However, despite the current unfashionability of profit maximisation in risk 
management research it is hoped that this thesis has demonstrated that the concept is 
far from redundant. As Schoemaker (1993) points out rational economic models have 
an important role to play in our understanding of a wide range of corporate behaviour. 
In particular, rational models keep the analysis tractable, enabling the consideration of 
complex issues such as the strategic interdependence of firms (see Chapter 6). 
Moreover, although it is undoubtedly true that real world firms are concerned about 
goals other than profit maximisation, it is also fair to say that most are still in the 
business of making a profit (see, for example, Hay & Morris 1991, p292-296). 
8 For more on the political and contextual views of the firm see Schoemaker (1993). 
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3. Possibilities for Future Research 
3.1 Changing the assumptions 
As illustrated in Chapters 5 and 6 one of the biggest problems with economic based 
risk management models is that their resultant predictions are highly sensitive to the 
assumptions made about firms and the types of risk that they face. For example in 
Chapter 5 the behaviour of a perfectly competitive firm was significantly affected by 
whether it faced firm specific or industry wide technological risk. Moreover, it would 
not be too difficult to show that other changes to the model (such as exposing the firm 
to multiple unreliable inputs, price fluctuations or a non-linear industry demand 
function) might also affect a firm's behaviour. Chapter 6 was kept deliberately general 
to incorporate the widest possible variety of effects on a strategically motivated firm, 
however, even here the associated technical analysis (such as in Appendix 3 or the 
discussion of risk wars in section 2.3) was largely limited to quantity setting 
duopolistic firms facing technological risk. 
Future economics based research could, however, address this issue. In fact, albeit 
without much explicit attention to risk management many different sets of 
assumptions about the economic behaviour of firms in a world of risk have already 
been investigated. What is needed, therefore, is to adapt these ideas into formal 
models of corporate risk management. Then when this is done academic research 
should benefit from a much more comprehensive and clearer idea about the risk 
management motivations of firms. 
9 For more on this area see Chapter 5. especially section 2. 
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3.2 Increasing the diversity of strategic equilibria in risk management games 
Perhaps the most novel feature of economics based risk management research is that it 
allows a strategic dimension to be incorporated into the decisions of firms. Chapter 6 
dealt with this area, demonstrating that a wide range of different and sometimes 
surprising outcomes may arise when strategically motivated firms are able to 
manipulate their exposure to risk. In particular five specific groups of symmetric Nash 
equilibria were focused upon: "Certainty" equilibria, "Risk" equilibria, "Risk Wars", 
"Certainty Wars" and finally co-ordination equilibria. 
These five groups of equilibria illustrate many of the interesting features that are 
likely to characterise strategic risk management games, however, it is hard to deny 
that in other situations the behaviour of strategically motivated firms might well 
change. One obvious extension is to investigate the behaviour of firms in asymmetric 
games. Indeed, as already stated in Chapter 5 (section 4.2) the cost and efficiency of 
risk management is likely to be highly important to an imperfectly competitive firm. 
This importance could then be reflected in the types of equilibria faced by firms. For 
example, a firm with a relatively low unit cost of risk management or more efficient 
risk management programme might well be able to dominate its industry 
- 
because it 
will possess a comparative advantage in terms of reduced production costs in a world 
of risk. This should then provide all firms in the industry with a strong incentive to 
improve the cost effectiveness of their risk management programmes, leading perhaps 
to "Efficienci' Wars". Moreover, following on from the work of Salop & Scheff nan 
(1983) a firm might even attempt to worsen the cost effectiveness of its rivals' risk 
management programmes in order to improve or achieve a dominant position in the 
market 10. 
10 For example, by encouraging safety legislation that has a disproportionate effect on the cost 
and or efficiency of rival risk management progranunes. 
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3.3 The role of communication 
Within the organisational behaviour based "cultural theory" literature the advantages 
of risk management communication have been well-researched (e. g. Shrivastava et al 
1988, Quarantelli 1988, Pidgeon et al 1992, Turner 1994, Weir 1996). The basic thrust 
of this work is that both intra- and inter-firm communication can have an invaluable 
role to play in helping to prevent and mitigate disasters. However, in the strategic 
context the benefits of communication are less clear cut (see Fudenberg & Tirole, 
1984,1986, Vives 1984, Gal-Or, 1985,1986, Shapiro, 1986, Roberts 1987, Cason 
1994, Farmer 1994). Consider, for example, the case of a "Risk War" or "Certainty 
War". In these situations a firm might well try to keep its rivals in the dark about the 
extent of its expenditure on risk management, preferring them to believe that it is 
exposed to more or less risk than it actually is. The idea behind this strategy would be 
to achieve an inexpensive competitive advantage 
- 
since a firm will generally find it 
cheaper to pretend to be exposed to more or less risk than actually modify its 
exposure. Yet, ultimately this pretence would probably just increase the chance of a 
"Risk War" or "Certainty War" (since the costs associated with self interested 
behaviour should be reduced). Moreover, the presence of asymmetric information 
may even make "Risk Wars" or "Certainty Wars" more difficult to prevent, since a 
firm will find it very difficult to properly monitor rival behaviour. 
3.4 The role of 'pure penalties" and "technological non-liriearities" in describing 
the behaviour of individuals 
This thesis has focused primarily on the risk management decisions of widely held 
(i. e. quoted) firms, as such it is not immediately obvious whether its predictions could 
be used to explain the behaviour of individuals, especially in a non business 
environment. However, despite this focus on corporations it may well be possible that 
individual behaviour is also affected by certain "pure penalties" and "technological 
non-linearities". 
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In recent years the ability of expected utility theory to explain the decisions of 
individuals has been under perhaps even more attack than its use in the corporate 
context. In particular, numerous authors have argued that rather than following the 
rather precise axioms of utility theory most individuals instead use heuristics (such as 
Kahneman & Tversky 1973, Slovic et al 1980, Fischhoff et al 1981, see also Chapter 
4, section 3.1). This has lead to extensive criticism of expected utility theory and 
although some have attempted to revise its assumptions (e. g. Machina 1987) for many 
it has largely been discredited (see Pidgeon et al 1992). 
Given the quite large number of empirical studies into the role of heuristics it is hard 
to deny that they will not colour the real world decision making processes of 
individuals However, what is still rather unclear is the source of these heuristics. As 
stated in Chapter 6 (section 3.3.2.2) the current view is that heuristics are 
predominantly socially/culturally determined. Yet as Sjonberg (1997) points out 
empirical studies in this area have not provided conclusive proof of this claim. 
Admittedly the lack of statistical significance in these empirical studies could be due 
to the difficulties that can be associated with measuring subjective concepts such as 
culture, however, it is perhaps more likely to be caused by the fact that individual 
heuristic biases are the result of other factors (Johnson 1991). 
If individual heuristic biases are not always the result of culture it would seem 
worthwhile to explore other avenues of research. As such the concepts of "pure 
penalties" and "technological non-linearities" may provide useful explanations for 
observed individual behaviour. Take, for example, Tversky & Kahnemans' (1981) 
observation that individuals are often more averse to risks that are framed as losses 
rather than gains. Although seemingly irrational when looked at through the lens of 
expected utility theory (through violation of the context independence axiom - see 
Gravclle & Rees 1992, p554-556), this behaviour can easily be explained within a 
"pure penalty" fi-amework. Risks that only offer negative returns are effectively pure 
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risks that can only reduce the wealth of an individual. As such it is perhaps 
unsurprising that individual decision makers will prefer to avoid such risks since 
doing so will help to protect them from suffering their inevitable associated losses' 
. 
Similarly, heuristics such as "loss aversion", one of the core ideas of "Prospect 
Theory" (Kahneman & Tversky 1979) could be explained by the presence of 
technological non-linearities. Loss aversion refers to the tendency for individuals to be 
more sensitive to reductions in their wealth than to increases. Although usually seen 
as irrationa112 this phenomenon may arise because the monetary payoff function of a 
particular risk is kinked so that the adverse financial impact of "bad" states of nature 
considerably outweigh the benefits of "good" ones. Risks which offer the prospect of 
bankruptcy provide a good example of this. Just as in the case of a firm, bankruptcy 
can represent a considerable cost to an individual 
- 
due to the future denial of credit, 
unavailability of bank accounts or the forced liquidation of capital at below market 
value. Thus where an individual is faced with a decision that could result in 
bankruptcy it would seem quite logical for them to be unwilling to take it. 
It is also interesting to note that many of the risks that were "over estimated" or strongly 
disliked in other empirical studies of heuristics use by individuals have also been framed as 
pure risks (e. g. see Slovic et al 1980, Fischhoff et al 1981). 
12 See, for example, Samuelson (1963). 
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Appendix 1: 
Risk Management Questionnaire. 
This questionnaire is targeted at risk/insurance managers and finance managers who 
are employed by companies operating within the UK. 
The following questions seek to investigate the reasons why these managers believe 
risk management to be an important investment for their companies. 
Companies spend money on risk management in an attempt to deal with the adverse 
impact that fortuitous risk may have upon their operating cash flows, arising from: 
asset damage (machine breakdown, property loss through fires etc. ), business 
interruption, employee injury and damage liability costs (pollution, product 
malfunction, etc. ). 
Please answer these questions as truthfully as possible, there are no trick questions!. 
If you would like to receive a synopsis of the survey results, please tick the box at the 
end of the questionnaire. 
When completed please return questionnaire to 
contact: 
Mr Simon Ashby 
University of Nottingham Insurance Centre 
School of Management & Finance 
Social Sciences Building 
University of Nottingham 
NOTTINGHAM NG7 2RD 
In case of any queries please 
Mr Simon Ashby 
Phone(0602)515495 
Fax: (0602) 515262 
Section A. The Scope of Risk Management. 
Several companies may be exposed simultaneously to the risk of large scale 
disasters whose impacts are difficult to diversify away (e. g. storms, floods, 
earthquakes, economic recession). How important is your company's risk 
management programme in reducing the adverse impact such events may have 
on your share price? 
Unimportant Important 
Don't know 
Q12345 
(Please either tick the box or circle a number) 
2. Considering the impact of the risk of physical injury on employees, how 
important is your company's risk management programme in contributing to 
the following corporate objectives? 
(a) A more productive work force. 
Unimportant 
Don't know 
Q1 
(b) Reducing labour turnover. 
Don't know 
Q 
2 
Unimportant 
12 
(c) Reducing your company's wage costs. 
Unimportant 
Don't know 
Q1 2 
3 
3 
3 
Important 
45 
Important 
45 
Important 
45 
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(d) Reducing the legal liability costs of your company. 
Unimportant 
Don't know Q123 
(C) Conforming to government safety regulations. 
Unimportant 
Don't knowF-I 123 
(In each question please either tick the box or circle a number) 
Important 
45 
Important 
45 
3. The risk of corporate insolvency exposes employees to the possibility of 
redundancy. In this respect: how important is your company's risk 
management programme in contributing to the following corporate objectives? 
(a) A more productive work force. 
Unimportant 
Don't know 
Fl 12 
(b) Reducing labour turnover. 
Don't know 
Fl 
Unimportant 
12 
3 
3 
Important 
45 
Important 
45 
(c) Reducing your company's wage costs. 
Unimportant 
Don't knowF-1 I '? 3 
(Iii cach questioti please either tick the box or circle a nwiiber) 
Important 
45 
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4. Considering your consumers safety, how important is your company's risk 
management programme in contributing to the following corporate objectives? 
(a) Providing basic product safety, by complying to the relevant statutory 
safety regulations. 
Don't know 
Fl 
Unimportant 
12 3 
Important 
45 
(b) Reducing the legal liability costs of your company. 
Unimportant 
Don't know 
171 
123 
Important 
45 
(c) Reducing the losses associated with the decline of sales and consumer 
confidence. 
Unimportant Important 
Don't know 12345 
(In each question please either tick the box or circle a number) 
5. Considering the effect of the production process on the external environment 
(e. g. pollution), how important is your company's risk management 
programme in contributing to the following corporate objectives? 
(a) Ensuring that regulatory and legal costs are reduced. (e. g. in helping to 
avoid fines and liability suits) 
Don't know 
Q 
Unimportant 
12 
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Important 
345 
(b) Ensuring a good public image. 
Unimportant 
Don't know Q12 
Ensuring an ethical approach to your business. 
Unimportant 
3 
Don't knowF-I 123 
(In each question please either tick the box or circle a number) 
Important 
45 
Important 
45 
6. How important is your company's risk management programme in reducing 
the rate of interest charged by the following types of creditors, thus reducing 
your cost of capital? 
(a) Trade creditors. 
Don't Know 
Q 
Unimportant 
12 
(b) Short term bank creditors. (overdrafts) 
Unimportant 
Don't Know 
F-I I 
(c) Bondholders. (Long term loans) 
Unimportant 
2 
3 
3 
Don't Know 
1-1 123 
(In each question please either tick the box or circle a mimber) 
Important 
45 
Important 
45 
Important 
45 
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7. Considering your shareholders, how important is your company's risk 
management programme in contributing towards the following corporate 
objectives? 
(a) Maintaining existing dividends, thus protecting the value of your 
company's shares. 
Don't know 
Q 
Unimportant 
12 3 
Important 
45 
(b) Increasing dividends, thus raising the value of your company's shares. 
Unimportant Important 
Don't know 12345 
(c) V1 Reducing your company's tax liabilities. 
Unimportant Important 
Don't knowF-1 12345 
(d) ý/ Avoiding the costly effects of 
financial distress and/or bankruptcy. 
Unimportant Important 
nnn, t i-nnix, F-1 12345 ý ý.. ý . -. - II 
(In each question please either tick the box or circle a number) 
r 
ýýý, 
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^, ( tJ ý 
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8. When your company has expanded its range of activities. (e. g. new 
acquisitions, product range expansion) was any risk management advice 
sought? 
Never Always 
We have never sought to expand El 12345 
Don't Know F1 
(Please either tick a box or circle a number) 
9. For many industries, expansion into new risky areas is seen to be an 
unprofitable and thus undesirable move. Is risk an important barrier to 
expansion for your company? 
Unimportant Important 
Don't know. 12345 
(Please either tick the box or circle a number) 
10. When your company has considered divesting itself of any of its activities, 
does the level of long term risk (e. g. pollution, latent injuries) encourage or 
discourage divestment? 
We have never sought to divest F-I 
Don't know 
Fý 
(Plcase either tick a box or circle a number) 
Discourage Encourage 
12345 
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2 3 
11. Do you contract out risky activities to small, independent. specialist 
companies? 
Never Always 
Don't know F] 12345 
(Please either tick the box or circle a number) 
Section B. BASIC INFORMATION QUESTIONS. 
ABOUT YOU IN 1991/2. 
12. What in your opinion, is the most suitable level of insurance cover for your 
own personal possessions? 
Wholly insured Wholly uninsured 
Don't KnowF-1 12345 
(Please either tick the box or circle a number) 
13. What, in your opinion, is the most suitable level of property insurance cover 
for the assets of your company? 
Wholly insured Wholly uninsured 
Don't Know 
F1 12345 
(Please either tick the box or circle a number) 
14., 
. 
In comparison with your company's senior management, are you more or less 
of a risk taker? 
Less Same More 
1245 
(Please circle a number) 
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15., In comparison with your company's senior management, are you more or less 
likely to consider the longer terni impact of your company's investment 
decisions? 
Less Same More 
12345 
(Please circle a number) 
16. Who is your direct superior? 
Chief Executive F1 
Board level Executive 
1-1 
Non board Manager F-I 
(please tick a box) 
17. What is your specific job title/description? 
18. Do you, or anyone else within your department, sit on your company's Health 
and Safety Committee? 
Yes F1 
No 
F-I 
(please tick a box) 
19. How many years have you worked in the field of Risk Management/Finance" 1. 
(Deletc as Appropriatc) 
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20. In what area/s are your professional qualifications? 
Risk Management related 
(e. g. IRM) F1 
Insurance F-1 
Legal Fý 
Accounting Fý 
Engineering F1 
Company secretary 
1-1 
Other Q 
(please specify below) 
(please tick one or more boxes) 
21. Do you receive any of the following incentive schemes? 
Profit related pay 
Share option schemes 
Personal performance based schemes F-I 
None of the above 
1-1 
(please tick one or more boxes) 
If you would like a synopsis of the results, please tick this box: 
Name 
Address 
3 04 
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Correlation Coefficients of Independent Variables 
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Appendix 3: 
An Example of a Cournot-Nash Risk Management Game 
From Chapter 5, section 4.3 consider a pair of expected profit maximising duopolists 
labelled i=1,2 with perfectly substitutable outputs q, and q2 and a linear inverse 
demand function p=a-b(ql+q), where a, b>0. Both firms have production functions 
which display constant returns to a single input zi, but are faced with multiplicative 
technological risk so that qi=ziFi, where E; i >0 is a random variable with mean 
standardised to 1, variance ai >0 and covariance CY, 2. The unit cost of z is c for both 
firms. Thus each duopolist's expected profits are therefore: 
E[7c, (ZIZ2 )]=(a 
-c)zi -b((y2 
(mi )+ I)Zi2 
- 
býpa, (m, )CY 2 (M2 )+ 11 ZiZ. j - 1-11ý I for i, j = 1,2; i #j 
where p is the correlation coefficient that denotes the sign and strength of the 
covariance between a, and c72. Following on from the analysis in Chapter 5 (section 
4.3) the first order Cournot-Nash equilibrium condition for the optimal value of zi* is 
then': 
(a 
- 
c). [2(,,, 
+ 1) 
-+ bi Zi 
-22 
for 
4al 
+ 1)((72 (pal(T + 1)2 
Now assume that each firm can eliminate its exposure to technological risk by 
investing in costly risk management. A firm is, therefore, able to control the variance 
of cyi, choosing to expose itself to either the prevailing level of risk (which in this case 
is assumed to be ai = 1) or certainty (cyj = 0) so that qi==zi. The terms R-Cc, and RCR 
represent the cost of risk management denoting the lump sums payable in the 
For the derivation of this equation and its associated second order conditions see Chapter 
section 4.3. 
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(Certainty, Certainty) and (Certainty, Risk) or (Risk, Certainty) cases respectively. 
The payoffs in this game are then obtained by substituting the optimal values for ,, 
-* 
(for ai -I and ai =0 respectively) into the expected profit maximising condition. 
Given that the variables a, b and c are constant all payoffs are expressed in units of (a- 
C)2/b. 
Firm 2 
Certainty, c7i =0 
Firm I Certainty, c7i = 
Risk, ßi =1 
Payoffs to: (Finn 1, Firm 2) 
(1/9-Rcc,, 1/9-R-cc) 
(2/49,9/49-RCR) 
Risk, ai=1 
(9/49-RCR, 2, "49) 
(2/(p+5)2,2/(p+5)2) 
Table I: AW Risk Management Game with Technological Risk and Linear 
Demand 
From table I it should become clear that in the current simplified model the Nash 
equilibriUM2 that will eventually arise will depend on the prevailing values of p (the 
correlation coefficient) as well as Rcc and RCR (the potential costs associated with 
investment in risk management). Note, therefore, that since the value of p can never 
be greater than one3 a "Risk War" is not a possibility as 2/49 cannot exceed 2/(p+5)2. 
This is a consequence of the rather restrictive assumptions of the current model. If, for 
example, firms were exposed to a non-linear demand curve or a different type of risk 
(demand or cost say) a risk war might become possible4. There are, however, (from 
Chapter 6, section 2) four other main possibilities. 
A Nash equilibrium can be defined as an equilibrium from which no firm would unilaterally 
wish to deviate (for example see Rasmusen 1994, Ch. 1). 
For a good discussion of this issue see Greene (1997). 
4 See Chapter 6, section 2.3 for more inforn-iation on the possible causes of risk wars. 
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A "Certainty" equilibrium will arise if 1/9-P,. (, c > 2/49 and 9/49 -RCR > 'ýI(P 
+5)2. 
As might be expected a "Certainty" equilibrium is most likely when the costs 
associated with investing in risk management (Rcc and RCR) are not too high. For 
example, in the case where p=O investment in risk management will be Pareto 
optimal when Rcc < 0.03111 and RCR < 0.103675. Note also that for negative values 
of p the maximum values of RCC and RCRnecessary for a "Certainty" equilibrium will 
decrease, while for positive values of p they will increase. When p<0 the natural 
hedge that is caused by firms' negatively correlated output fluctuations reduces their 
exposure to costly price fluctuations and thus the need for risk management. On the 
other hand when p>0 each firm's exposure to output induced price fluctuations will 
rise causing the cost of risk and thus the value of risk management to increase6. 
(2) A "Risk" equilibrium, where neither firm invests in risk management, will 
occur if 1/9-Rcc < 2/49 and 9/49-RCR< 2/(p+5)2. 
A "Risk" equilibrium is in effect the corollary of a "Certainty" equilibrium. Thus the 
chance of a "Risk" equilibrium will generally increase as the lump sum costs of risk 
management rise and or the value of the correlation coefficient (p) decreasCS7. 
(3) A "Certainty War", where 9/49-RCR> 2/(p+5)2> 1/9-Rcc > 2/49. 
Thus the values of Rcc and RCRthat will yield a "Certainty War" will be heavily 
influenced by the value of p. For example when p=O a "Certainty War" will anse if 
For p=0 the maximum value for RCR Is simply calculated by subtracting 2/(5)2 from 9/49. 
Similarly, the maximum value for RCC is calculated by subtracting 2/(ý)2 from 119. Note that 
although (Certainty, Certainty) will also be a Nash equilibrium Nvhen R(, (ý is sufficiently small 
to ensure that 119-RCC < 2/49 (i. e. if Rcc, < 0.07029), where 0.03111 < R(, (ý < 0.07029 this 
will actually generate a "Certainty War" (since 2/(5)2 > 1/9-RCC, ). 
0 For example when p= 1, a "Certainty" equilibrium Nvill occur when Rý-,, < 0.05555, R(, R < 
0.12812. Whileforp=4 lt,, vill occur when RCC, < 0.01388, Pý-('R< 0-05867. 
7 For example assuming that p= 0a "R, sk" equIl, br, um wIll arlse f R(ý(, > 0.07029 and RCR 
0.10367. 
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0.03111 < Rcc < 0.07029 and RCR <0.10367. However, when p=-] a "Certainty 
War" will arise if 0.01388 < Rcc < 0.07029 andp*-CR <0.058678. 
(4) Finally a pair of co-ordination equilibria (Certainty, Certainty) and (Risk, 
Risk) can occur if 1/9-Rcc > 2/49 and 9/49-RCR < 2/(p+5)2. 
Thus the likelihood of a pair of co-ordination equilibria arising will increase as: (1) the 
more the cost of unilateral investment in risk management (ý 
"C R R) exceeds the cost of 
joint investment (Rcc); (ii) when p<0. For example, when p==O both (Certainty, 
Certainty) and (Risk, Risk) will be Nash equilibria if Rcc < 0.07029 and RcR > 
0.10367. However when p=-I the chances of a pair of co-ordination equilibria will 
increase substantially requiring only Rcc < 0.07029 and RCR > 0.05867 9. 
8 To obtain the critical value for RCR subtract 2. '(p+5)2 from 9/49. To obtain the critical range 
of RCC, subtract 2/(p+ý)2 from 1,9 to get the minimum value and then 2 49 from 19 to get 
the maximum. Ignore any minus signs. 
To oct the critical values of RCC, and R('R necessary for this pair of co-ordination equilibria Again ignore any minus signs. simply subtract I () from 2 41) and 9 41) from (p 
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Appendix 4: 
A Glossary of Risk Management Terms 
Hedging (see also Natural Hedge) 
As a generic term hedging describes any action that balances a possible gain against a 
possible loss. The hedging of an existing risk, therefore, effectively involves exposure 
to another risk the outcomes of which (for a given state of nature) are opposite in sign 
to those of the existing risk (i. e. the two risks must be negatively correlated). 
In business formal hedging tools are generally known as derivatives. Derivatives 
include financial instruments such as futures contracts, currency swaps and options 
(e. g. see Brealey & Myers 1991, Ch. 25). Note that derivatives may also be used 
speculatively to increase a finn's exposure to risk. 
Insurance 
Insurance is a form of risk financing, however, an important difference between 
insurance contracts and other risk financing tools is that with insurance a firm legally 
transfers the financial impact of a particular loss onto the insurer. Assuming full 
insurance the act of transferral effectively eliminates all the adverse financial 
consequences of a loss thus providing a firm with a very stable income stream. Given 
the stability that insurance can provide it might seem to be a very desirable risk 
financing tool, however, it is important to note that insurance can be very expensive 
and for certain risks may also be unavailable (see Williams et al 1995 for a good 
discussion of this topic). 
II 
Insurance Broker 
Traditionally corporate insurance brokers were simply financial interinediaries that 
helped to select and arrange suitable insurance cover for their clients and administer 
claims. More recently brokers have taken on many other roles including acting as risk 
management consultants and loss adjusters (an agent which helps to determine the 
monetary value and insurability of losses). 
Insurance Premium 
The price paid by an insured for an insurance contract. 
Insured 
The purchaser of an insurance contract. 
Joint Captive 
A joint captive is an insurance company that is owned by a group of firms whose risks 
it primarily insures. Usually this ownership takes the form of holding the captive 
insurerls common stock. 
In many respects a joint captive performs the same function as a risk financing pool - 
to help its owners share their losses between themselves. However, joint captive 
arrangements are rather more formal than risk financing pools. The main difference is 
that joint captives are legally classified as a normal insurance company -a situation 
which provides them with greater legal powers to ensure that premiums are paid and 
warranties (such as contractual requirements to install certain risk control devices, for 
example) are adhered to (see Chapter 6, section 3.2.1). 
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Risk Financing Pools 
The basic idea behind a risk financing pool is that its members agree to share the 
financial impact of each other's losses. For example, a group of oil companies might 
agree to share liability exposures ansing from oil spills through such an agreement. 
Under this agreement the financial impact of each finn's liability exposures then 
becomes more predictable. 
Note that risk financing pools are not the same as insurance. The crucial difference is 
that in a risk financing pool a firm does not transfer the financial impact of a particular 
loss but merely shares it. However despite this technical difference insurance and risk 
financing pools effectively perfonn the same function 
- 
to reduce the variability of 
cash flows. 
Single Parent Captive 
A single parent captive is an insurance company that is owned by the firm whose risks 
it primarily insures. Usually this ownership takes the form of holding the captive 
insureris common stock. 
Note that although legally an insurance company the role of a single parent captive is 
quite different to that of a traditional (external) insurer. The most important difference 
is that a firm which sets up a captive insurer is not trying to transfer the financial 
impact of its losses (unless the captive is used to gain access to the wholesale "re- 
insurance" market). Instead single parent captives are typically viewed as a more 
efficient form of retention fund. 
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Loss Prevention Tools 
Loss prevention tools are risk control activities intended to reduce or eliminate the 
chance that a firm (or individual) may experience a loss. Loss prevention activities 
include hazard warning lights (as fitted in planes), the salting of roads and safety 
training or monitoring programmes, for example. 
Loss Reduction Tools 
Loss reduction tools are risk control activities that reduce the impact of losses that do 
occur. Examples of loss reduction tools include catastrophe plans, sprinklers and 
protective clothing. 
Natural Hedge 
A natural hedge is a hedge that exists without any deliberate action on the part of a 
firm (or indeed individual). Natural hedges may be caused by many things, however 
in the current context the assumed negative correlation between output and price 
fluctuations is an important example (see Chapter 6). 
Retention Fund 
A retention fund is simply a formal financial arrangement (usually a dedicated bank 
account) in which funds are deposited to help pay for future losses. 
Although retention funds are often used in place of risk sharing or insurance 
arrangements (especially where these are either impractical or too expensive) the way 
that a retention fund works is quite different. A fin-n that uses a retention fund is 
neither transferring or sharing the financial impact of its losses, instead all a retention 
fund offers is a way of smoothing the impact of financial losses over time. 
1-) 
Risk Control Tools 
Risk control tools are those that focus upon directly avoiding, preventing, reducing or 
otherwise controlling risk. Risk control tools can take simple forins such as making 
sure that a factory has functioning fire extinguishers. They can also be more complex, 
such as the development of a catastrophe plan to use in the event of a major 
emergency. 
Risk Financing Tools 
The primary aim of any risk financing tool is to provide funds to help pay for losses 
that may occur as a result of a firm's exposure to risk. Risk financing tools include 
measures such as the purchase of insurance coverage, the establishment of a captive 
insurer, letters of credit or derivatives trading. Note that traditionally risk financing 
tools were only thought to have a role to play in financing losses, however, more 
recently authors such as Mayers & Smith (1982), Skogh (1989,1991), and Grillet 
(1992) have recognised that these tools can also facilitate the direct control of risk. 
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